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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to answer the question Can we devise a language for inter-
pretation of behavioural simulation of engineered systems (of arbitrary complexity)
in terms of the systems’ purpose? It does so by presenting a language that repre-
sents a device’s function as achieving some purpose if the device is in a state that
is intended to trigger the function and the function’s expected effect is present.
While most work in the qualitative and model-based reasoning community has
been concerned with simulation, this language is presented as a basis for interpret-
ing the results of the simulation of a system, enabling these results to be expressed
in terms of the system’s purpose. This, in turn, enables the automatic production
of draft design analysis reports using model based analysis of the subject system.
The increasing behavioural complexity of modern systems (resulting from the
increasing use of microprocessors and software) has led to a need to interpret the
results of simulation in cases beyond the capabilities of earlier functional mod-
elling languages. The present work is concerned with such cases and presents
a functional modelling language that enables these complex systems to be anal-
ysed. Specifically, the language presented herein allows functional description and
interpretation of the following.
• Cases where it is desired to distinguish between partial and complete failure
of a function.
• Systems whose functionality depends on achieving a sequence of intermittent
effects.
• Cases where a function being achieved in an untimely manner (typically late)
needs to be distinguished from a function failing completely.
• Systems with functions (such as warning functions) that depend upon the
state of some other system function.
This offers significant increases both in the range of systems and of design analysis
tasks for which the language can be used, compared to earlier work.
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The research described herein is concerned with the idea that automated model
based design analysis of engineered systems depends on more than the ability
to simulate the behaviour of the system. The ability of a simulation to derive
knowledge of a system’s behaviour can only describe that behaviour in terms
of internal variables, such as the level of current in an electrical system. For
many design analysis tasks, the finished output is a textual (or tabular) report
describing the effects of unexpected aspects of the system’s behaviour and the work
of interpreting the (internal) results of the simulation is still left to the engineer.
To automate these design analyses, what is required is a way of automating this
interpretation of the results of the simulation, presenting the results in terms of
the system’s purpose. This requirement entails some means of mapping aspects
of the system’s behaviour to achievement of its purpose.
The major component of the original work presented here is a language to support
this mapping of a system’s behaviour to its purpose to allow this interpretive task
to be included as part of an automated design analysis. This enables the automatic
generation of a textual design analysis report that describes the behaviour of the
system in terms of how well it fulfils its intended purpose rather than in terms of
changes to internal values. The thesis is therefore based upon the idea that there
are two stages to automated design analysis.
• Simulation of the system is carried out to establish its behaviour, given
knowledge of the system structure and behaviour either of the components
that make up the system or the physical laws underlying the system’s do-
main(s).
• Interpretation and comparison of the results of the simulation in terms ap-
propriate to the design analysis being undertaken, allowing useful compar-
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isons to be made either between the (simulated) behaviour of the system and
its intended behaviour or between the behaviour with some internal failure
and its behaviour when working correctly.
Most work in the field of model based reasoning has been concerned with the
simulation of systems’ behaviour while the present work proposes a language to
allow the automation of interpretation of the results of such a simulation in terms
appropriate to the design analysis task. It does this by enabling the description or
specification of the functions of a system, where function is taken to mean, in gen-
eral terms, a description of how the system fulfils its purpose, mapping a system’s
behaviour to its purpose. This knowledge of the function of the system can be
used to interpret the simulated behaviour of the system, identifying those signifi-
cant changes of behaviour that should be included in an automatically generated
draft design analysis report. The relationship between different classes of knowl-
edge in model based design analysis, such as knowledge of behaviour, function and
purpose, is discussed in Chapter 4.
1.1 Motivation
The modelling of engineered systems using knowledge of function (Sticklen et al.,
1989; Iwasaki et al., 1993) has been in use for a number of years, both for deriving
the behaviour of a system from knowledge of its structure and the function of
its components, and for interpreting the results of a qualitative simulation (in
which the system behaviour is derived from the system’s structure and component
behaviour and / or behavioural rules associated with the system’s domain) in terms
of the system’s purpose. See Chapters 3 and 4 for a fuller discussion of approaches
to modelling and simulation of engineered systems.
Historically, most work with functional modelling has been concerned with using
knowledge of the function of a system’s components to derive the behaviour of
the system as a whole. This functional knowledge can be used to support various
design tasks. A design can be developed by refining a functional model based
on the purpose of the system until the functions can be related to individual
components (Iwasaki et al., 1993). The purpose of the system is the need it
is intended to meet while its function or functions are concerned with how it
meets that need. In this case, the system functions are decomposed in terms
of connections between components. Functional modelling has also been used
to support diagnosis (Sticklen et al., 1989) and Failure Mode Effects Analysis
(Hawkins & Woollons, 1998). In all these cases, system function is expressed in
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terms of component functions which are related to each other primarily in terms
of the connections between components, so capturing the structure of the system.
The functional descriptions used are adequate for systems where the individual
component functions are simple (such as a wire conducting) but many systems’
functions depend on behaviour of greater complexity, requiring a more expressive
language for their description.
Another use of functional knowledge is interpretation of the results of simulation
in terms of the purpose of the system as a whole. Either a numerical or qualita-
tive simulation tool can be used to establish the behaviour of the system being
analysed. Knowledge of the system’s functions maps this behaviour to the sys-
tem’s purpose, allowing significant changes of behaviour to be identified. This is
particulary valuable for design analysis tasks such as Failure Mode Effects Anal-
ysis (FMEA) where the engineer must generate a report showing the effects of
component failures on the system as a whole (Price, 2000). That report will be
couched in terms relating to the intended purpose of the system, so instead of
noting that a failure results in no current flowing through a car headlamp, for
example, it will note that the headlamp fails to light, and the road will not be
lit and the legal implications. This task is a good candidate for automation as
it is extremely repetitive and it is best carried out early in the design process,
so any changes found necessary can be made easily, and analysis can be repeated
whenever changes are made to the design of the system, so the effects of such
changes can be established. While a simulation tool will help with the analysis,
the interpretation will still be the task of the engineer. Sneak Circuit Analysis
(SCA), in which the system is analyzed to ensure there are no unexpected current
flows resulting in unintended system outputs (Price et al., 1996a; Savakoor et al.,
1993), is another design analysis task where similar arguments apply. The need for
interpretation of results of simulation for model based design analysis is discussed
at greater length in Section 3.6.
If the interpretation of the simulation is to be automated (so a draft design anal-
ysis report can be produced completely automatically) then some way of mapping
the system’s behaviour to its purpose is needed. One approach to this that has
been found to be useful is “functional labelling” (Price, 1998). Functional labels
are used to identify the system’s outputs and to associate them with the purpose
of the system, identifying those outputs required for the system to fulfil a given
purpose. This approach has been found to work well for design analysis of many
electrical systems and is in use in a commercial design analysis tool that allows
the automatic generation of FMEA and SCA reports of electrical circuits in the
automotive sector. It has the advantage that the functional models are simple, as
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only those components whose inputs or outputs are also inputs or outputs to the
system as a whole need explicit representation in the functional model. The func-
tion of other components is (implicitly) derived from their behaviour. Also, the
functional model has no need of failure mode functions as the component’s failure
modes (that is, faulty behaviours) are associated with its reusable behavioural
model. The functional models are also reusable for systems having a similar pur-
pose, so the functional model for a car lighting system, for example, can be kept
and reused for the corresponding systems in future models. All that need be
changed is the mapping between the component level functions and the state of
the actual components.
While this use of functional knowledge does differ from that of other workers in
the field, there is common ground. The modelling of function in terms of the inputs
to and outputs from a system is not inconsistent with the definition of function as
“[a device’s] effect on its environment” in (Chandrasekaran & Josephson, 1996).
Also the mapping between purpose and behaviour and input and output in func-
tional labelling means that the approach specifies the function as the “expected
behaviour” consistently with the notion of function in (Iwasaki et al., 1993). While
the aim of the research is a language to support the interpretation of behavioural
simulation of engineered systems, it is suggested that there is enough similarity
between these notions of function that the proposed language should also be use-
ful for increasing the expressiveness of the functional decomposition in ways that
are appropriate for other functional reasoning tasks, besides the interpretive one.
These other uses of the language presented as the main result of the research are
discussed in Chapter 11.
With the increasing use of microprocessors in modern systems, it has been found
that the functional labelling approach is limited by the expressive power of the
language used to describe the system functions. The present research is concerned
with the development of a more expressive language for functional description that
allows functional modelling of systems whose functionality depends on behaviour
of greater complexity, specifically in the following areas:-
• Systems where a function might be partially achieved.
• Systems whose functionality depends on intermittent or sequential outputs.
• Systems where there is a danger of the required outputs being achieved in
an untimely manner (typically after an undue delay).
• Systems with subsidiary functions (such as monitoring or fault mitigating
“back up” functions) whose achievement depends on the state of some other
14
system function.
These requirements are discussed in Section 2.2. In addition, to increase the range
of tasks for which the new language is applicable the relationship between different
aspects of the representation of function has been more closely defined, as has the
nature of a hierarchical decomposition of function, following on from the work
in (Snooke & Price, 1998). The primary result of this research is therefore a
language for the description of function that is applicable both to a greater range
of engineered systems and to a greater variety of design related tasks.
1.2 Research questions and original work
The aim of the present work is to devise an appropriate language to allow the
interpretation of the results of model based simulation of a system in such a way
as to enable the automatic generation of a (draft) report describing the system’s
behaviour in terms appropriate to the design analysis task.
The question the research attempts to answer is can we devise a language for
interpretation of behavioural simulation of engineered systems (of arbitrary com-
plexity) in terms of the systems’ purpose? The thesis presents such a language,
together with a discussion of its appropriateness both for the task of automatic
generation of design analysis reports and also for other related tasks. There is also
discussion of the relationship between the simulation and interpretation tasks of
a model based design analysis tool. This language expresses the behaviour of the
system in terms of its functionality rather than in terms of its internal state.
There has been earlier work in Aberystwyth on the use of the functional descrip-
tion of an engineered system for the interpretation of model based simulation,
described in (Price, 1998) and (Snooke & Price, 1998). The present work builds
on this earlier research by presenting a language that supersedes the earlier lan-
guage by providing a more complete logical basis for description of system function
and by increasing the language’s expressive power. This enables the description of
the functionality of systems whose behaviour is of greater complexity than could
be handled by the earlier language. This earlier work resulted in the development
and marketing of a commercial model based design analysis tool which, before the
acquisition of the company set up to market the tool, was known as AutoSteve.
This name has been used throughout this thesis, but it should be noted that all
references to AutoSteve are to the tool as developed at the University of Wales
Aberystwyth, not to more recent developments by any other organisation. It is
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believed that all references to the tool are to materials already in the public do-
main. The tool, now known as Capital Analysis, is described in the web site of
Mentor Graphics, the current developers1.
1.2.1 Original contribution of the present research
The contribution of this research is a language for the description or specification of
a device’s function. The language supports the mapping of the device’s behaviour
to its purpose, allowing interpretation of the results of the simulation of a device
in those terms. This allows the automatic generation of design analysis reports
that state whether or not the device achieved its purpose as opposed to merely
listing the values of internal variables, as output by the simulation. The language
supports the description of device functions that depend on behaviour of greater
complexity than earlier approaches allowed, specifically to fulfil the requirements
listed in Section 1.1 above. The use of this language in design analysis is discussed,
including how it contributes to the generation of design analysis reports. There
is also discussion of how the language might be used in other activities, such as
supporting the design process. The language is for use in a design analysis tool that
combines the simulation of the subject system and its interpretation. This raises
the question of what relationship exists between the simulation and interpretation
tasks of such a tool. There is discussion of this relationship, specifically of the
requirements placed on the output of the simulator if the expressiveness of the
language is to be used to the full.
1.3 Scope of the present research
The language to be presented as the principal result of the research is intended
to allow the interpretation of model based simulation of an engineered system’s
behaviour in such a way as to enable the automatic generation of a textual report
describing the results of the design analysis. The language is not intended for
use in simulation, instead of the conventional model based approach of deriving
knowledge of system behaviour from knowledge of its structure and underlying
behaviours. The language is useful for different design analysis tasks though it is
most valuable in those tasks that require the repeated running and comparison
of simulations, such as Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA). As the aim of the
language is the description of a system’s behaviour in terms of its purpose, it is,
1The Mentor Graphics web page on this design analysis tool is at
http://www.mentor.com/harness/analysis.html
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perhaps, less appropriate for description of natural systems, such as ecological
systems where the notion of purpose is not appropriate.
With the increasing use of software, a system’s function might be implemented
using behaviour of considerable complexity. The language is to be capable of
describing systems whose correct functionality depends on behaviour of any ar-
bitrary level of complexity. However, it should be noted that in these cases the
simulation must itself be managed in such a way that this complexity of behaviour
is captured. The relationship between the simulation and interpretation of such
systems is discussed in Chapter 11. The function of a system is independent of
any domain whose laws are used as the basis for simulation. A domain can be
seen as having a self contained set of rules and be concerned with a set of internal
variables, so as to allow a certain class of systems to be simulated. It is possi-
ble, given a suitable set of domain rules, to simulate systems without a complete
knowledge of physics. An electrical system can be simulated using a set of rules
and variables (such as current and voltage) applicable to the electrical domain,
for example, but an electrical simulator is restricted by the rules it embodies to
that domain. Similar functional descriptions could be applied to, for example,
gas cookers or electric cookers, even though the design analysis tool might use
different simulators, embodying different domain rules and variables. While ex-
amples have been taken from different domains and application areas, many of
the examples are of electrical systems in the automotive sector. This is a result of
the background to the research rather than any limitation of the language itself.
The fact that these systems are familiar to most people means that they are well
suited for use as illustrative examples in the thesis.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
In outline, the earlier chapters, Chapters 2 to 4 are background material, incorpo-
rating the literature review, the description of the original work starts in Chap-
ter 5. Chapter 2 provides background material, including a description of the
design analysis tasks the research is concerned with and the nature of the systems
whose complex functionality causes difficulties for existing descriptive languages.
This is followed, in Chapter 3, by a brief survey of model based reasoning and
simulation of engineered systems so as to provide a context for the rôle of the
present research. That chapter also discusses the interpretation of simulation in
more detail. The different classes of knowledge used in model based reasoning
and their relationships are discussed in Chapter 4, concentrating on the place of
knowledge of function and purpose (teleology) in model based reasoning. There is
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also a discussion of different researchers’ approaches to the use of these classes of
knowledge and the relationships between them. A proposed definition of function
that is appropriate for the present work is also introduced in that chapter. Chap-
ter 5 contains a description of the representation of function used in the present
research, which forms the basis for the functional description language used for
interpretation of simulation. This language is referred to as the Functional Inter-
pretation Language to distinguish the specific language from a general reference to
a language for description of function. The following chapters (Chapters 6 to 10)
then extend this by describing the features of the language (and the underlying
representation of function) that are used to describe more complex functionality.
The language is evaluated against a real world case study and its use for different
design analysis tasks and other areas is discussed in Chapter 11. That chapter
also discusses the relationship between the language and the simulation. Finally
the conclusion discusses the degree to which the language meets the aim of the




This chapter describes two aspects of the problem area the Functional Interpre-
tation Language is concerned with. First there is a description of the design
analysis tasks that the Functional Interpretation Language can help automate,
together with other related tasks for model based reasoning about engineered sys-
tems. This is followed by a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of the
systems whose functions we want to describe. This includes introductions to some
of the case study systems to be discussed later in the thesis, which are used for
illustration and evaluation of the proposed Functional Interpretation Language.
2.1 Tasks for model based reasoning
Model based reasoning has been used for a variety of tasks which it seems worth
briefly discussing here, so as to provide background for later discussion of the dif-
ferent approaches to these tasks. Here we are primarily concerned with reasoning
about man made systems, specifically for design analysis, so this section will con-
centrate on such tasks. However it is worth noting that model based reasoning
has also been applied to other tasks and also to natural as opposed to man made
systems, and these areas will be briefly introduced so as to inform later discussion
as to the usefulness of the present research in these areas. The usefulness of the
Functional Interpretation Language for some of these tasks will be discussed in
Chapter 11.
2.1.1 Design analysis
One model of the design process describes the process as an iterative cycle between
synthesis of candidate designs and analysis of these designs so as to evaluate the
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candidate design and to inform any further iterations of the cycle (Wood et al.,
2005). The synthesis of candidate designs is discussed briefly in Section 2.1.2 but
the main focus of the present work is on automating the analysis of candidate
designs.
Design analysis can be considered to be the checking of a system design so as
to ensure that it meets the intended requirements and that any unintended be-
haviours (such as those resulting from component failures) have no unduly haz-
ardous consequences. These are promising tasks for model based reasoning as
they can be carried out by running a simulation of system design to establish
its behaviour. The behaviour is derived from knowledge of the system’s struc-
ture (possibly derived from a schematic drawn in a suitable CAD tool) and either
knowledge of the behaviour of the individual components or the physical domain
rules that underpin the system as a whole. The automation of these analyses
allows them to be carried out early in the design process and repeated for succes-
sive refinements of the design as the design process progresses. It is also a good
deal simpler than constructing a physical model of the proposed system design.
The use of model based and functional reasoning for these design analyses, and
different approaches, will be discussed more fully in the following chapters. There
are broadly speaking two groups of design analysis task:-
Design verification tasks where the design is simulated to ensure that its be-
haviour matches the intended functionality of the system. Such tasks require
the simulation to be compared with a representation of the intended func-
tionality of the system. They therefore need such a representation to act as
the basis for this comparison. These tasks include design verification itself
and Sneak Circuit Analysis.
Failure analysis tasks where the behaviour of the system with some failure (typ-
ically a failure to one or more components) is compared to its behaviour
when working correctly to identify the consequences of such component fail-
ures. Such analyses include Failure Mode Effects Analysis and Fault Tree
Analysis.
The design analysis tasks listed as examples above will each be briefly described
in the following sections.
All these design analysis tasks have in common that they are concerned with how
well the system fulfils its intended function (rather than any more detailed aspects
of its behaviour). They can perhaps usefully be grouped by the term “functional




The purpose of this analysis task is to ensure that the design for the system is
such that the system will fulfil its intended purpose. A model based approach to
design verification might simulate the system’s behaviour and compare the results
of the simulation with a suitable description of the system’s intended behaviour.
The resulting report will naturally need to highlight any areas where the simulated
behaviour fails to match the intended behaviour.
An approach to design verification has been proposed, (McManus et al., 1999)
based on the design analysis tool developed at Aberystwyth, in which an attain-
able envisionment of the system’s behaviour is compared with a representation
of the intended functionality. An attainable envisionment means that the sys-
tem is simulated in every state that can be reached from a specified initial state.
That paper suggested using a state chart as a means of representing the intended
functionality. This thesis will discuss the use of the Functional Interpretation
Language for this purpose, in Chapter 11.
A good deal of research, especially in the field of reasoning about function, has
been done into automating design verification. (Chandrasekaran et al., 1993)
see the design process as one of verifying and refining candidate designs, using
knowledge of the design’s functionality to inform its physical (structural) design.
This verification and top-down refinement of a system’s functional design is also
used by (Iwasaki et al., 1993).
2.1.1.2 Sneak Circuit Analysis
Sneak circuit analysis ensures that there are no unexpected paths (for electric
current or hydraulic pressure) through the system, resulting in unexpected (and
possibly damaging) actions taking place. Where related subsystems have several
switches (possibly including safety override switches) it is possible that certain
combinations of switch positions will result in an electrical path being completed
for some unexpected part of the system (typically with current flowing in the
opposite direction to that intended). Such “sneak circuits” are often found when
subsystems are combined. It can be carried out by running repeated simulations
of the circuit in different configurations, such as combinations of switch positions.
These simulations could be qualitative or quantitative. While running repeated
quantitative simulation will reveal sneak circuits, the output of the simulator will
need scanning to identify the variable values that indicate the sneak. The use of
an interpretive language can automate this identification of the significant values
21
generated by the simulation. This technique is a good candidate for qualitative
simulation, as sneak circuits can be detected from schematics of the system and are
also best found early in the design process, when changes to the circuit are easily
made. As the analysis requires repeated simulations (and their interpretation)
it is also time consuming if done manually, so automation of the task leads to a
worthwhile saving of an engineer’s time.
Sneak circuit analysis appears to be an analysis that can readily be added to a
tool intended for FMEA, see (Price et al., 1996a), suggesting SCA as a second rôle
for an automatic FMEA tool, and (Savakoor et al., 1993). The latter paper dis-
cusses the combination of sneak circuit analysis and FMEA. That paper includes
an example sneak circuit with potentially serious consequences, the inadvertent
lowering of an aircraft’s landing gear.
The name suggests this analysis is specific to certain domains, such as electrical
and hydraulic, unlike FMEA. However, one of the central ideas behind SCA is that
new failures might arise from the combination of subsystems and this possibility
is not limited to any domain, of course.
2.1.1.3 Failure Mode Effects Analysis
It is suggested by (Bowles & Wan, 2001) that Failure Mode Effects Analysis
(FMEA) is one of the most beneficial tasks in a well structured reliability program.
In FMEA, the effects of known failure modes (faulty behaviours) of components or
subsystems are projected to the next layer in the component / subsystem / system
hierarchy. For example, an electric wire has the failure mode “open circuit” (that
is, the wire breaks). Clearly its effect is that it fails to connect the components at
its ends, but the effect on the system will, of course, be determined by its position
in the system. The rôle of FMEA is to find the effects of all such component (or
subsystem) failures. The result of conducting an FMEA is a report describing
the (system level) effects of component failures, together with figures indicating
the failure’s severity, likelihood of detection and the probability of its occurrence.
The report might also allow the action to be taken by the design team to remove
the failure, and the person responsible for taking these actions, to be added. The
model based FMEA tool developed in earlier work at Aberystwyth automates the
generation of this report by simulating the behaviour of the circuit, both when
functioning correctly and when components have failed. The automatically gen-
erated FMEA report can then be edited by hand, allowing the resulting work to
be specified and allocated.
FMEA is a strong candidate for automation as it is a laborious task and also
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requires sufficient knowledge of the system and the domain to allow the effects
of faults to be traced. It therefore needs to be undertaken by an experienced
engineer. The laboriousness of the task means that FMEA will often only be
undertaken once, late in the design process, to verify correctness of the design.
Automating the process allows FMEA to be carried out more readily, so it can be
done more often, to see whether changes to the design are necessary, and to trace
the effects of changes to the design, rather than simply carrying out one FMEA
late in the design life-cycle, to confirm the safety of the system. If FMEA can be
done early in the design process, any drawbacks with the design are identified in
time for changes to be made in a cost effective manner. The benefit of running
FMEA early makes its automation a good candidate for the use of a qualitative
reasoning technique, as the necessary simulation of the system can be done with
incomplete knowledge. This is valuable in the automotive industry, for example,
as schematics of the electrical systems will typically be drawn before the actual
components to be used are specified and well before the actual wiring runs (which
depend on the design of the vehicle’s bodywork) are known. Therefore, complete
knowledge of the system, sufficient for a full mathematical simulation will only
come late in the design process.
In many application areas, it is becoming increasingly the case that some of the
intended behaviour of devices is implemented using programmable components,
so software is taking a greater rôle. The increasing use of software in modern
systems, has led a need for software FMEA of embedded systems, as identified
by (Goddard, 2000). That paper suggests two complementary methods, system
level FMEA, based on the top level design and detailed software FMEA, based on
source code. This might raise interesting questions for the automation of FMEA
of systems including significant software, as either model might be incorporated
into an FMEA of the system in which the software is embedded. A technique for
semi automatic safety analysis (including FMEA) is proposed by (Papadopoulos
et al., 2001).
2.1.1.4 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis has much in common with FMEA, see (Price et al., 1997). A
fault tree relates a fault (i.e. a system failure) to its possible causes (i.e. component
failure). As FMEA relates component failures to system failures, a simple fault
tree can be generated from an FMEA report, by grouping the various component
failures covered in the FMEA by the system failure they lead to. Clearly for the
fault tree to be complete, the FMEA must also be complete, and it is also likely
that there will be some component failures that must be listed in several places
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in an FTA report, as the same component failure might result in several distinct
system failures. (Price et al., 1996c) discusses the idea of generating a fault tree
from an FMEA. An FTA report can be used as a starting point in diagnosis, as
the symptom can be looked up and the possible causes found.
2.1.1.5 Prioritising failures
As noted in the description of FMEA above, the seriousness of a failure might be
estimated by the design engineer and this estimate expressed using three numbers
between one and ten. These are multiplied together to arrive at the failure’s Risk
Priority Number (RPN). Any alteration made to the system as a result of the
design analysis might depend on how high a failure’s RPN is. Failures with a high
RPN will be given higher priority for corrective work on the system. The RPN
is the product of three values, each of which can take a value between 1 and 10.
These are
Severity Indicates the seriousness of the consequences of the failure. A value of
1 is insignificant, 10 means the failure is likely to result in injury, death or
severe financial loss.
Detection Indicates the likelihood the failure will be noticed by an operator
before the failure results in its likely consequences. A value of 1 means the
failure is easily detected, 10 that it is likely to remain undetected.
Occurrence An indication of the likelihood of the failure occurring. A value
of 1 is highly unlikely, 10 is probable. Note that this is a property of the
reliability of the component, in terms of the failure that leads to a system
failure, rather than of the system failure itself. The same system failure
might have different causes, each with their own value for occurrence, so a
headlamp might not light because the bulb filament has blown (likely) of
because a connecting wire has broken (less likely).
Note that the values for detection and occurrence are not probabilities. Indeed
the value for detection varies inversely to the probability of detection. A value
of zero cannot be used for any of these, of course, as the product (the RPN) will
then be zero and information about the other two factors of the RPN is lost. It is
worth repeating that these values are estimates and it is possible for a failure to
be given different (inconsistent) values for severity and detection in different parts
of an FMEA report although this should not happen. This description is useful
because the values for severity and detection will be used to illustrate features of
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the decomposition of system functions in Chapter 6. As occurrence is associated
with the likelihood of the cause of a system failure occurring, it has less to do
with the functional model of a system than with the behaviour of the component
whose failure causes the fault, so is of less interest in the present work.
2.1.2 Support for the design process
There has been a good deal of research on automated support for the synthesis
aspect of the design process, some approaches to which are discussed briefly in
Chapter 4. One common model of this aspect of the design process is to refine
the design’s function, decomposing the device function into contributing functions
until these functions map onto component behaviours, so guiding the selection
of components and also the (schematic) structural design of the device. While
the approaches differ in detail, as do the representations used, the approaches
of (Umeda & Tomiyama, 1993; van Wie et al., 2005) as well as (Iwasaki et al.,
1993) all use this decomposition of function and mapping to behaviour as a way of
modelling functional design and an approach to developing computerised support
for the process.
There has been work attempting to use a functional representation language to
capture the functional decomposition of an intended system and use this to guide
the design of the system’s physical structure. For example, (Chandrasekaran et al.,
1993) seek to use their functional representation to capture the functional aspects
of the design rationale of a product, using it to help the design process, which they
see as being one of iterative refinement of the functional design of the product,
evaluating alternative candidate designs.
It has been argued, by (Gero, 1990) that a product’s functional design (concerned
with what a product is to do) is derived from a causal mechanism, this being an
intermediate stage between the requirements specification and the actual physical
design. A functional modelling language has been used, by (Iwasaki et al., 1993),
to capture this causal structure of a proposed system.
This raises the possibility of a model based reasoning tool being used during the
design process itself, rather than to verify the results of a (provisionally) completed
design, as is the case with the design analyses introduced earlier.
2.1.3 Diagnosis
Diagnosis can be considered a distinct field from the analyses introduced above, as
all the analyses above take as a starting point the use of a full set of known com-
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ponent failures, and they reason from the component failure to a system failure.
Reasoning for diagnosis, of course, works in the opposite direction as the system
failure is known and we wish to find candidate component failures. A fault tree
is one possible means of finding such candidates, of course. (Price et al., 1996b)
discusses the use of fault trees (generated from FMEA) for diagnosis.
Other research has looked at qualitative reasoning as an approach to automated
diagnosis, (David & Krivine, 1986) suggests using knowledge of structure and
behaviour as the starting point for system diagnosis. However, (Price & Hunt,
1989) argues that additional knowledge is needed besides the qualitative model.
It is necessary as a qualitative model might lead to ambiguous results; additional
knowledge, such as knowledge of the diagnosis task might be used to remove
these ambiguities. That paper discusses how such additional knowledge is used
by other workers in the field. Qualitative reasoning and its rôle in design analysis
is discussed in the next chapter.
2.1.4 Explanation and instruction
One other area in which model based simulation and analysis can be used is in the
field of demonstrating and explaining a system’s working. This might be done to
help with instruction of operators of a hazardous system, instructing them on the
system’s failures and how to react to them. The advantages of this with respect to
systems whose failures are hazardous need no explanation. For example, (Tuttle
& Wu, 2001) discusses the use of CyclePad, a thermodynamic modelling program,
in instruction in thermodynamics for engineering students.
2.1.5 Discussion
The design analysis tasks introduced above are all candidates for automation using
model based reasoning, especially qualitative reasoning, as the aim is to identify
significant differences between the intended behaviour and the actual (simulated)
behaviour, in the case of the design verification tasks and between the faulty
behaviour and the correct behaviour (that is with no component failures) in the
failure analysis tasks. In many cases the aim is to find system behaviours with
safety implications, such as the loss of a required output (car lights failing to light)
or internal behaviour changes with safety related consequences, such as electrical
short circuits. In other words, these analyses are less concerned with whether there
are minor changes in the operating state of the system (such as small changes in
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current) than they are with changes to system state or behaviour that result in
significant changes to the system’s effect on its environment.
As has been noted, these analyses are best carried out early in the design process
when any changes shown to be necessary are easily made and can usefully be
carried out before factors that affect a full numerical model of the system (such
as exact component specifications, cable runs) are known. The use of qualitative
reasoning techniques allows the automation of these analyses at an early stage
in the design process. However, for full automation of these analyses, more is
needed than the ability to run qualitative simulations of the systems. Some way
of presenting the results of these simulations in terms of the system’s effect on
its environment is required. This is where the ability to interpret the results of
simulation is important. There is a fuller discussion of the use of model based
reasoning in design analysis in Chapter 3.
2.2 The systems to be modelled
Another area introduced in Chapter 1 that might usefully be expanded on early
in the thesis is some description of the characteristics of the systems that a model
based design analysis tool might be called upon to model, specifically those fea-
tures of these systems that cause problems for existing functional description lan-
guages. Where appropriate, this discussion will be illustrated using real-world
example systems. The discussion is confined to characteristics of the systems
themselves, the problems caused by these characteristics is left to discussion of
the uses of functional knowledge and the languages themselves, in Chapter 4.
This section is subdivided into sections dealing with each significant characteristic
in turn. These subsections correspond to later chapters describing the proposed
language’s approach to describing these characteristics.
2.2.1 Partially achieved functions
Where a function has more than one effect, it might be necessary to distinguish
between cases where the achievement of some of the effects, but not all, is better
than nothing, so the failure of the function is mitigated and those where the
absence of any required effect is tantamount to complete failure to achieve the
expected function. For example, where a warning system has both an audible
and visual warning (a telltale lamp and a warning horn, perhaps), the failure of
either one of these outputs does mean that some warning is still given, so while the
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warning function is clearly not correctly achieved this is arguably a less complete
failure than is the case if both outputs fail. This can be contrasted with, say the
failure of either car headlamp, which, partly because of the legal implications can
reasonably be considered to amount to complete failure of the headlamp system,
as it renders the car unusable. This area is discussed in more detail, together with
an approach to representing these cases, in Chapter 6.
2.2.2 Intermittent and sequential behaviour
One aspect of many examples of engineered systems that causes problems for
simple functional languages is the idea that a system function can depend on a
sequence of distinct behaviours (or subsidiary functions). A simple example is a
washing machine whose overall function can be decomposed into a sequence of
wash, rinse and spin dry functions, each of which run to completion during the
cycle and which must occur in the right order. This function cannot readily be
modelled in terms of a single goal state as the goal state (as far as the machine
itself is concerned) is identical to the start state — the machine is idle with clothes
inside. The only difference is likely to be that the control systems (whether elec-
tromechanical switchgear or microprocessors) will be in a different state but this
is not appropriate for checking the function as this only relates indirectly to the
purpose of the machine. To illustrate, the switchgear might be in the required
final state but if the water flow was malfunctioning, the clothes will not be clean.
In many application domains (such as the automotive sector) this characteristic
results from the increasing use of microprocessors. Their use either allows exist-
ing, behaviourally simple systems to be used for more complex behaviours or the
addition of new, behaviourally complex systems. An example of the first case is
the use of counted flashes of a car’s direction indicators to confirm remote locking
or unlocking of the vehicle, for example two flashes to confirm locking, one to con-
firm unlocking. The second case is illustrated by the fitting of a warning system
to indicate that the driver’s or front seat passenger’s seat belts need fastening. An
example of such a system not only lights a telltale lamp on the dashboard but also
sounds a buzzer intermittently for a programmed period of time. This means that
once the function has been correctly achieved, the buzzer is once again idle, of
course. How the proposed functional language models such functions is described
and discussed in Chapter 8.
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2.2.3 Untimely achievement of function
This characteristic is related to the above. What is meant in this context is that
the expected effects of the function are achieved but not at the right time, relative
to the action that triggers the function. A simple example might be an excessive
delay between a driver pressing the dip switch and the headlamps dipping. Notice
that this differs from the case where the dipped headlights are on even though
they should not be. This particular example is perhaps unlikely, but cases where
the lamp switching is carried out using a network using a carrier sense multiple
access collision detection protocol (such as the widely used CANbus) could result
in delays caused by network loading resulting in collisions delaying transmission
of a message.
It will be appreciated that where a system function depends on intermittent
outputs, the timing of these outputs might be significant. In the seat belt warning
system mentioned above, the individual buzzes must each last a suitable length of
time, so the description of the buzzing sequence might be qualified by how long
each buzz and pause should be. The proposed approach to modelling cases where
a function is achieved late (or early) is discussed in Chapter 9.
2.2.4 Dependent functions
The term “dependent function” is used to refer to a system function that comes
into operation in response to the correct achievement (or otherwise) of some other
system function. Typical examples might be a monitoring or warning function
whose output is triggered by the failure of some expected system function or a
fault mitigation function that is triggered by a failure in the main function. The
nature of these functions is considered in more detail in Chapter 10.
One other similar area is where the action of an input depends on the current
state of a system. A simple example is a toggle switch. For example, in some
cars switching between dipped and main beam is accomplished by the identical
action of pulling and releasing the dip switch. In this case some way of identifying
the fact that a given action (operating the switch) has different consequences is
needed. These consequences depend on the current state of the system.
Having introduced various aspects of the problem area, it is time to consider




Model based design analysis
Having introduced the design analysis tasks for which model based and qualitative
reasoning offers a useful approach, this chapter introduces model based reasoning,
discusses its rôles in design analysis and the approaches to model based design
analysis taken by different researchers. Most work in the field has been concerned
with simulation of systems, to gain knowledge of their behaviour, so this area is
discussed here, although the main thrust of the present work is concerned with
the interpretation of the results of simulation. This chapter will conclude with a
discussion of the place of interpretation of the results of this simulation in design
analysis, and discuss the relations between this need for interpretation and dif-
ferent approaches to simulation. This material will lead on to a discussion of the
different classes of knowledge used in model based reasoning and the relationships
between them, which forms the content of the following chapter.
3.1 Model based reasoning for design analysis
The field of model based reasoning has grown from that of qualitative reasoning
which is an area of artificial intelligence with the aim of imitating a human expert’s
ability to reason with imprecise data. For the design analysis tasks outlined in
Section 2.1 the qualitative approach has several advantages. The ability to reason
with limited and imprecise data allows the analysis to be carried out early in
the design process, before all the information necessary for a full mathematical
analysis of the system is known. In addition, these analyses are concerned with
analysing the behaviour of a system in terms of its functionality (how well it
fulfils its intended purpose) which generally means that major changes to the
behaviour are what are of interest. For example, in a power windows system, we
are more interested in the fact that both windows open and close, rather than
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the more detailed case that the voltage across both motors is close enough that
they open or close at much the same speed. Even though this is of interest, it is
not significant for FMEA or SCA, for example. Naturally the use of qualitative
models of a system will lead to an analysis that captures changes to the system
that lead to such qualitative (with the term used in its more colloquial sense)
changes in behaviour. For example, a typical qualitative electrical model of an
electrical system might use three levels of resistance (zero, load and infinite) and
these will be associated with three levels current; short, active and none. Therefore
any change in the system’s structure must entail a substantial change in current
(from active to none, perhaps, if the resistance of part of the circuit changes
from load to infinite) which will clearly imply a significant change in the system’s
behaviour. This is not to say that there is not a rôle for numerical analysis in
these functional design analyses, merely to suggest that qualitative reasoning is
a useful approach to such analysis. There is more on the relationship between
qualitative and numerical simulation in Section 3.3 and on how they affect the
need for interpretation of the results in Section 3.6.
3.2 The nature of models for reasoning
Reasoning, in this context, is taken to mean the generation and use of knowl-
edge not explicitly included in the original description. For example, the aim of
qualitative simulation, the establishment of a system’s behaviour from knowledge
of its structure, is the generation of new knowledge about the system. The na-
ture of the knowledge to be generated and the use to which it will be put will,
of course, depend on the reasoning task. It will typically be the case that for
a design analysis task, the required new knowledge will indeed be knowledge of
the behaviour of the whole system. How this knowledge is generated will in turn
depend on what knowledge is available to the reasoning system and what methods
are available to work on this available knowledge. For tasks dealing with failures
of the subject system, such as FMEA for example, we might generate a model
of the behaviour of the correctly working system and a model of the behaviour
of the system incorporating the failure and then establish the effects of the fail-
ure by comparing the two models. For design verification the generated model of
the system’s behaviour might be compared with some suitable description of the
system’s required behaviour.
The idea of generating new knowledge from the input models suggests that they
need be executable, though (Leitch et al., 1999) notes that the model itself need
not be executable, if the reasoner includes some sort of simulation engine to work
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with the model. In an electrical design analysis tool, for example, the structural
model of the circuit need not itself be executable, if a circuit analysis engine (such
as “CIRQ” (Lee & Ormsby, 1991; Lee, 1999a)) provides the necessary facility to
allow reasoning (in this case the derivation of the system’s behaviour) to take place
using that model. In contrast, a state chart might be considered an executable
model of a system. It can certainly be suggested that some way of working with
the model is needed.
Another important feature of the models used as the basis for reasoning is that
they must capture sufficient knowledge of the system to be analysed. There are
two aspects to this. The model must capture sufficient knowledge of the system
to be a sound basis for the reasoning process and the system itself needs to be
sufficiently self contained to allow all the necessary knowledge to be represented.
If a system’s behaviour is to be derived, we need to be able to model all the
(significant) influences on the system. In other words we need to be able to define
the boundaries of the system such that the closed world assumption holds true, and
the boundaries must themselves be such that the amount of knowledge they must
contain does not lead to a model of intractable complexity. This is one reason why
electrical systems have been commonly used as subjects for qualitative reasoning.
The domain knowledge is relatively simple and electrical systems are sufficiently
self contained that the closed world assumption holds in that inputs to and outputs
from the system can easily be defined and other effects on the system (such as
heating from the environment) can be ignored without so simplifying the models
that useful reasoning can no longer be done.
A related aspect of whether a model is adequate for the analysis is the possibil-
ity that for the design analyses discussed in Section 2.1 that are concerned with
analysing the system in terms of its intended functionality a detailed simulation
might require the use of more information than is necessary for the analysis con-
cerned, leading to excessive overhead in capturing the information. This case,
especially as it relates to the relationship between numerical and qualitative sim-
ulation is discussed in the next section.
3.3 Qualitative and quantitative models
Model-based reasoning is concerned with building tools capable of reasoning about
physical systems from first principles, rather than by attempting to explain the
system in terms of rules specific to that system, as is the case with first generation
expert systems. In contrast the rules governing a model based system are more
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general in scope, such as qualitative versions of the physical laws that underpin a
system’s behaviour. It has grown from the field of qualitative reasoning (QR), to
include quantitative and mixed models as well as those seeking to capture qual-
itative behaviour. This, of course, introduces an immediate distinction between
using conventional mathematical models of a system, such as underpin the nu-
merical electrical circuit analysis tools Saber (Saber, 1996) and SPICE (Quarles
et al., 1980), and qualitative models.
It might be supposed that if mathematical (numerical) models are available,
there is no reason to use a less precise alternative. However, there do appear to
be good reasons for using qualitative techniques alongside conventional numerical
analyses. This section will discuss these and the differences of approach between
using qualitative and numerical analyses. The electrical domain provides a good
example of this, as there exist both numerical and qualitative tools for circuit
analysis.
Conventionally, an engineer will seek to use a mathematical model of the system
under consideration. Tools exist to allow computerised analysis of electrical cir-
cuits using mathematical models, notably Saber and SPICE. These tools allow a
variety of sophisticated analyses. These analyses are detailed and are concerned
as much with how well a system works, how efficient it is for example, as with how
it works, such as whether it fulfils its purpose. It is quite possible to argue that
there is a place for more high level analyses besides these. It will be noticed, for
example, that this list does not include either FMEA or SCA. This is not to say
that such tools cannot be used to help with such functional analyses of electrical
systems, but there are difficulties with so doing.
One difficulty with using the sort of numerical analysis undertaken by these
tools is that it needs considerable interpretation. A change in the system might
alter the potential across some significant component. The analysis will produce
a listing of all changes so will include small changes of no significance as well
as any substantial changes. It is left to the user to interpret this list, to decide
which changes are significant. Some design analysis tasks, including FMEA and
SCA, are concerned with such significant changes to the circuit’s operation. A
qualitative analysis of the system will naturally highlight significant changes, such
as those to the system’s topology, but will not capture relatively small parametric
changes. If the results are to be interpreted in terms of system function, then
this is more easily done from a qualitative analysis because of this highlighting of
major changes to the system. This is valuable for design analysis tasks such as
FMEA. How an interpretive language relates to this difficulty is introduced later.
If a numerical analysis of the system is to be done, full mathematical models of all
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the components are needed. One aim of qualitative reasoning was to imitate the
human reasoner’s ability to “reason with less data and less precise data” (Forbus,
1988) than is necessary for a full mathematical analysis. The availability of all
the data necessary for mathematical modelling is especially unlikely early in the
design life cycle of a system, when functional refinement of a design might result
in its schematic being drawn before the actual components are specified. Indeed,
in the automotive sector, a full numerical analysis will need to wait until such
details as the cable runs are known, which information depends on the design of
the vehicle’s bodywork and so will not be available until late in the design process.
These difficulties mean that there is a rôle for a simpler qualitative tool, espe-
cially for use early in the design process. Qualitative reasoning is an established
branch of artificial intelligence that seeks to capture the intuitive knowledge of
engineers and scientists and which they will use to guide their analyses of the
problem. As electrical systems are typically self contained with a well known
set of physical laws, that domain has been an important one for research into
qualitative reasoning and various approaches have been tried.
3.4 Simulation for design analysis
There has been a variety of approaches to qualitative reasoning about systems
and as an aim of the present research is to establish relationships between these
approaches, and between the different models used, much of the rest of this chapter
and most of the next are concerned with discussions of these different approaches.
Arguably the most fundamental distinction between approaches is concerned
with the model of behaviour from which the system behaviour can be derived.
One approach makes use of some qualitative physics, such as that proposed in
(Hayes, 1985) or failing that a set of domain specific laws to provide a global view
of a system’s behaviour. In practice, a more realistic target seems to have been
to develop a useful set of rules sufficient for a specific domain (such as modelling
electrical circuits). The series - parallel - star reduction approach to reasoning
about electrical circuits of (Mauss & Neumann, 1996) is an example, discussed
shortly. The alternative approach reasons from knowledge of individual compo-
nents’ behaviour or function. The functional reasoning approaches of (Sticklen
et al., 1989; Sembugamoorthy & Chandrasekaran, 1986) and others are examples
of this approach. These contrasting approaches to reasoning about the behaviour
of a system are discussed in more detail in Section 4.1.2.
These qualitative physics based approaches contrast with the causal reasoning
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approach of (de Kleer, 1984). That paper uses causal reasoning to derive the
behaviour of a circuit from its structure, and then uses teleological reasoning to
determine the circuit’s function. He is interested in reasoning about how a circuit
reacts to perturbations in its inputs. The circuit is modelled as a connected
graph of component models, each of which interacts with its neighbours, those
components with which it is connected. A component model is used when there is
an input to that component (such as a change in voltage or current). Components
only interact with their neighbours, so preserving a link between the behaviour
and structure of the circuit and only act directionally, so there is no negotiation
between components - a component’s input cannot be changed. This generates a
causal explanation of the circuit’s behaviour. This, of course, relies on the notion
that a change causes other changes, when actually they occur simultaneously, but
is a useful model of an electrical engineer’s intuition. The other area of this paper,
the use of teleological reasoning to link behaviour and purpose, is briefly discussed
in the section on knowledge for reasoning, section 4.1.4. This differs from the
qualitative physics approaches in not being dependent on domain laws.
One possible difficulty with this approach is scalability as a complete causal net
may be of intractable complexity. One approach to this problem is to make use
of knowledge of a device’s function in order to organise causal knowledge of the
device. This is one of the goals of Functional Modelling (Sticklen et al., 1991).
Knowledge of device function is used to inform the construction of and so reduce
the complexity of the causal net. This maintains the domain independence of
a causal (as opposed to a qualitative physics based) simulation while reducing
the problem of scalability. There is more on the uses of functional knowledge in
Section 4.1.3.
One difficulty with any causal reasoning based approach is that it cannot be used
to find the behaviour of systems that cannot be reduced to a chain of causality.
Examples of such systems include electrical circuits where it cannot be shown
which components are active, as directions of current flows cannot be found. It is
a weakness of techniques based on local information (such as component models)
that they miss global information that might add useful extra knowledge about
the circuit. This is a motivation for techniques that reason about a system’s global
structure. Examples of this approach can be found in the field of circuit analysis.
One classification of approaches to qualitative modelling of systems that relates
closely to the contrasting approaches noted above is to distinguish between those
that reason about interactions of components with their neighbours, such as (de
Kleer, 1984) and those that reason about the global structure of the system, such
as (Lee & Ormsby, 1991; Mauss & Neumann, 1996; Milde et al., 1999) in the
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electrical domain. By “global” in this context is meant knowledge of the structure
of the system as a whole.
These “global” techniques can treat the circuit as a graph and replace constraint
propagation with graph analysis. Mauss and Neumann (Mauss & Neumann, 1996)
use series-parallel-star (SPS) reduction to reduce a circuit to a single resistance.
This resistive edge has a known direction of current and voltage drop, as it joins
power and ground. The act of reducing the circuit generates a tree which is
then used to trace the flow and voltage drop back to the original edges in the
circuit graph. This reduction allows circuits incorporating bridges to be modelled,
but the simple three valued qualitative resistance model will generally not allow
the direction of flow through a bridge to be established, it must be labelled as
ambiguous. The SPS reduction can be used in combination with a quantitative
resistance model, so directions of flow are found through bridges.
A similar approach is used by Milde at al (Milde et al., 1999) as they also re-
duce the circuit to generate a tree to represent the circuit structure. They use
qualitative analysis of the network to generate a diagnostic decision tree for the
circuit. They differ from both (Mauss & Neumann, 1996) and (Lee & Ormsby,
1991) in using deviations from the reference values for resistance, voltage and cur-
rent, as in diagnosis it was felt important to model the effects of slight parameter
deviations. Components have expressions to describe their behaviour, following
FLAME (Pugh & Snooke, 1996). In this approach, a component’s behaviour is
modelled as an expression relating its input and output. For example, a relay
might be modelled as “if there is current through the coil, resistance across the
switch is low”. A component behaviour is instantiated, the qualitative currents
are found and if the instantiated behaviour results in a violation of an internal
condition of the model, another component behaviour is used. Clearly if the all
component models result in such a violation of the internal condition, behaviour
prediction fails. This technique was intended for diagnosis, and as such can as-
sume that the original, correctly functioning circuit’s behaviour can be predicted.
This might not be the case if the topology gives rise to ambiguous current flows.
The paper does not suggest how this difficulty is approached.
A different simplification of the circuit is used by CIRQ (Lee & Ormsby, 1991;
Lee, 1999a). The circuit is represented as a graph of nodes, representing terminals,
and edges representing connections, with a value for resistance. This algorithm
also uses three values for resistance (zero, load and infinite) and the circuit is
simplified by combining the nodes connected by zero resistance edges into so-called
“supernodes”. The simplified graph is then traversed, finding the distance of each
node from power and ground. These values represent the qualitative potential
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at each node, and can be used to derive the current flow, as current flows from
points of higher potential to points of lower potential. This allows directions of
current to be found for a circuit with no bridges but the same difficulty arises
with bridges as with (Mauss & Neumann, 1996), the three values for resistance
are not sufficient to find unambiguous flows. Clearly, where the original circuit
has bridges some of whose surrounding edges are of zero resistance, these edges
are removed in deriving the supernodes, so the circuit will no longer contain the
bridge. This algorithm is simpler than Mauss and Neumann’s SPS algorithm, but
gives identical results in three-valued qualitative analysis.
This problem with finding direction of flows through bridges has led to some
work in the use of more than three values for resistance. A development of CIRQ
has been devised and implemented, (Lee, 1999b; Lee et al., 2001). This allows any
number of values for resistance, provided they are of different orders of magnitude.
The idea of an order of magnitude follows (Raiman, 1986) and means that there
are no cases where a series of resistances add up to a total resistance as great as
the next higher level, so each level is insignificant relative to the next higher level.
This uses series parallel reduction to simplify the circuit and a variation of CIRQ’s
finding of potentials at the nodes in the circuit graph to find directions of current.
This allows bridges that are unbalanced by an order of magnitude to be identified
and the unambiguous current flow to be found.
AutoSteve (Price, 1998) uses CIRQ as a global (domain level) simulator com-
bined with component models that incorporate behaviour in a similar way to that
described in the discussion of the technique of (Milde et al., 1999). There is more
on the relationship between the structural and behavioural aspects of AutoSteve
in Chapter 4, but it is worth noting here that the component modelling has been
extended by allowing the use of state charts (Harel, 1987) to model components
with internal memory, as described in (Snooke, 1999).
In these cases, (Pugh & Snooke, 1996; Milde et al., 1999; Snooke, 1999), the be-
haviour of a component is specified by the user rather than being derived from a
complete qualitative physics (Hayes, 1985; Forbus, 1984), as was proposed as a tar-
get for qualitative reasoning. This makes the theoretical foundation less complete
than was intended by Hayes, as the bottom level of the system decomposition is
expressed in terms of knowledge of how components work rather than by physical
laws. However, it does capture the knowledge of the engineer who is designing the
system being analysed about electrical components in easily built models, rather
than relying on a library of domain theoretical models describing the behaviour
of components. Although a complete qualitative physics might have laws that
allow the behaviour of a relay, for example, to be derived, this will be a good deal
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more complex than a simple description of its behaviour. In principle, a quali-
tative physics could, perhaps also derive failures of a component as is needed for
FMEA, but modelling the component in such detail as to allow, say, the ingress
of dirt to cause a relay to stick open seems impossible, as too much will need to
be known about the physical construction and environment of the component. It
seems a good deal simpler to allow the tool to capture the engineer’s knowledge
of component’s failure modes. It is worth noting that both AutoSteve and Milde
et al’s tool are intended for use by engineers, and have been developed as working
tools, so their usability is important. In practice, of course, component models
can generally be retrieved from a library. Simplicity of modelling and re-use of
models is important if a tool is to be used, there is little gained by automating a
task if the automation results in (or is felt to result in) more work than carrying
out the task manually.
All of these global reasoning techniques have in common the fact that they
depend on the circuit being represented by a network of resistances and that
the analysis is of the circuit in a steady state. This limits the components that
can readily be modelled — capacitors, for example, whose behaviour is dynamic,
cannot be included. In some application areas this is not too problematic, as such
components are rare. AutoSteve, for example, is capable of analysing the great
majority of circuits in the automotive sector. However, there are limitations on
the use of qualitative analysis of electrical circuits, both in the circuits that can
be analysed and the kinds of analysis. As both FMEA and SCA depend on the
topology of the circuit (the kind of steady state DC analysis of which qualitative
reasoning is capable) qualitative simulation is a suitable technique for these tasks.
This does, however suggest that there are complementary rôles for qualitative and
quantitative analysis.
Indeed AutoSteve has been extended to make use of a quantitative circuit analysis
tool (Saber). This means that later in the design life cycle, once components have
been specified, a more detailed analysis can be carried out for FMEA, allowing
possibly ambiguous current flows through bridges to be determined as well as the
level of current across fuses, so showing whether the fuse will blow correctly.
If a global view of the system is to be used, as in the cases discussed above,
then this needs to be combined with a global view of behaviour, as can readily
be done in the electrical domain. It could well be argued that it is impossible to
derive a system’s behaviour purely from its structure, there must be some suitable
notion of behaviour either locally (as in the constraint propagation approach)
or globally (as in a qualitative physics) from which the system behaviour can be
derived. The quoted aim of qualitative simulation being “to derive behaviour from
38
structure” is something of an over-simplification. Other domains might either have
a less convenient set of possible domain laws to capture this global behaviour,
or indeed none at all. One example of a domain where domain rules are not
appropriate is modelling of software. In this case a global view of the proposed
system architecture will have different rôles, such as tracing the dependencies of
specific variables through the system. There is more on the relationship between
global and local models of behaviour in section 4.1.2.
3.5 Ontologies for modelling
In the context of model based reasoning, by ontology is meant the nature of the
basis for modelling the system that is to be analysed, of what the model is primarily
composed. It can be seen as defining the chosen view of the nature of the system
being modelled. The model of the system might be composed principally in terms
of it components, the processes it embodies or the constraints that act upon the
possible values of the system’s variables. All of these alternative views might rely
on the same set of variables, so a model of an electrical system will use variables
for voltage, current and resistance, for example, whatever the ontology chosen.
The component centred ontology, see (de Kleer, 1984), describes a system pri-
marily in terms of its components. So a locomotive boiler, for example, will be
viewed as an assembly of a fire box and its water jacket, a pressure vessel, several
fire tubes and an inlet for the water (with a feed pump) and outlet for the steam,
and so on. This is a natural ontology for the design analysis of engineered system,
of course, as they are built up from components and this view of the system will
be readily available for analysis, as in the way an electrical simulator uses the
schematic as the basis for its model building.
The process centred ontology takes the alternative approach of viewing a system
as a collection of related processes, see (Forbus, 1984). Instead of the physical
components, the boiler will be viewed in terms of the processes of flow of water in,
steam out and the heating of the water by the fire. This ontology has been used
for modelling engineered systems, and also has a close relationship with the idea of
functional decomposition for design. For example, a domestic washing machine’s
wash function can be decomposed into the filling, heating, agitation and draining
processes. The idea of refining the functional specification of a system as part of
the design process is discussed in (Iwasaki et al., 1993). In this approach to design
the functional and physical designs are refined in parallel, one might use knowledge
of the functional design to inform selection of components. In the washing machine
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example, the breaking down of the wash function leads to identification of a need
for a connection to a water supply, further decomposition of the requirements of
the fill subsidiary function will reveal the need for valves and filters in the inlet
system.
The constraint centred ontology views the system in terms of the constraints
on variables within the system. It is introduced in (Kuipers, 1986). Of the three
ontologies it is perhaps closest to conventional mathematical modelling. For exam-
ple, in modelling a boiler a constraint centred model will capture the relationship
between the pumping of water into the boiler and the boiler pressure — if water is
being injected, the pressure will tend to reduce. It is arguable that these models
are more abstract than is helpful for many design analysis tasks, a simpler view
of the system will be sufficient.
For the design analyses introduced in Section 2.1, the component centred ontol-
ogy might well be seen as the most natural and most work in the area of design
analysis does use this ontology. In failure analysis (such as FMEA), especially,
what we are concerned with is tracing the effects of the failure of a component
on the system and its environment. The fact that component failure modes are
known (and reusable) pieces of behavioural knowledge at a component level, seems
to support this view. The functional refinement of a design proposed as a model
of the process by (Iwasaki et al., 1993) in which function is refined until a function
can be related to a specific component can be seen as relating a process centred
view of the system to a component centred one.
3.6 Interpretation and simulation
While qualitative and model based reasoning have long appeared to be a useful
approach to automating design analysis (and other tasks), the approach has led
to the introduction of very few commercially useful tools. One problem with the
approach, at least from this point of view, could be argued to be the concentration
on the simulation of the subject systems, as this is insufficient to automate the
whole task of design analysis. It is suggested in (Price et al., 1997) that one of
the challenges an automated design analysis tool must meet if it is to be adopted
is that it should offer support for the whole process. To illustrate this idea that a
tool should support the whole design analysis process, let us consider the process
of conducting FMEA using a mock up of the system and using a model based tool
that simulates the behaviour of the system.
FMEA is conventionally undertaken by assembling the system, using examples of
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the actual components so that its behaviour can be explored and the failure modes
introduced enabling the resulting behaviour to be compared with the behaviour
of the system working correctly. It will be appreciated that even a simple system
will have a good number of components, each with its failure modes whose effects
need to be assessed so this is a time consuming and repetitive task. Firstly, the
system’s behaviour when working correctly must be established, by assembling the
system and noting what happens in response to the various inputs (for example
when throwing switches). Then each failure mode is introduced in turn and the
same programme of alterations to the system inputs is repeated and changes to the
behaviour of the system (especially its outputs) relative to the correct behaviour
are noted and a report describing these effects is compiled. A model based (or
mathematical) simulation of the system can be expected to save time and might
be more reliable, if derived from the design schematic, as the possibility of the in-
advertent incorrect assembly of the test system is eliminated. If a simulation tool
is available, then the system can be simulated working correctly and the behaviour
noted as before and the failure mode behaviours can readily be modelled as these
changes can be inserted into the simulation tool. The drawback of this approach is
that the effects on the outputs of the system still need to be assessed by the engi-
neer. For example, suppose a numerical electrical simulation tool (such as SPICE)
is used, then a comparison between the correct and failure mode simulations might
show that there is a different level of current in parts of the circuit. It is left to the
engineer himself to assess how these changes affect how well the system fulfils its
intended purpose, by translating these internal changes to the system behaviour
to the state of its outputs. It could be argued that the use of a simulator on its
own is therefore not an unmitigated improvement. It saves having to set up the
test system and having to physically model the component faults but against this,
the mock up of the physical system will show the effects on the significant system
outputs. For example, any lamps will be seen not to come on. As the results of
the simulations need assessing manually, then the design analysis tool is limited
to running one simulation at a time and presenting the results to the user of the
system (the engineer) for assessment and comparison with the intended behaviour
(if the analysis is concerned with design verification) or the correct simulation (for
failure analysis). Therefore the use of a simulation or modelling tool does little to
alleviate the repetitive nature of such design analyses as FMEA or SCA. Indeed
as it will involve the interpretation of a complete set of simulations of the whole
system it might even lead to more work, as a human engineer will have enough
knowledge to avoid mentally simulating parts of a system that will be unaffected
by a certain failure.
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Therefore if the advantages of model based simulation of systems are to be fully
realised for design analysis it is necessary to find some way of enabling the de-
sign analysis tool to present the results of the simulations in terms linked to the
purpose of the system. If this is done, the output of the tool can highlight the
important features of the behaviour of the system. For example, the simulator
might show that there is no current through the one side of a headlamps circuit
by listing all components in which the level of current has changed, while once
the purpose is known, all that need be shown is that there is no current through
one of the headlamps themselves. Also, where the analysis is numerical, the tool
might be able to distinguish between changes of system behaviour that result in
a small change to the level of current (for example) in some part of the system
and behaviours where the change in current results in some important change in
system output. A simulator with no capability for interpretation of its results will
inevitably list all changes of system state or behaviour now matter how insignifi-
cant. Therefore, one important rôle for interpretation of simulation is to provide
a useful basis for the comparison between different simulations in failure analyses
such as FMEA, so that these comparisons can also be handled automatically. A
related rôle is to provide a similar basis for comparison between the intended and
(simulated) actual behaviour of the system in design verification.
Previous work in Aberystwyth has used the approach of “functional labelling”
(Price, 1998) in which significant system states (or, usually, outputs) are associated
with intended system functions. This is discussed in more detail in Section 4.1.3.
This approach has been shown to be successful in allowing the automatic gener-
ation of design analysis (specifically FMEA and SCA) reports from model based
simulation and an important motivation for the present work is to increase the
expressiveness of the functional description language used to allow the approach
to be used for a greater variety of engineered systems.
Different simulation techniques might be used as the system’s design lifecycle
proceeds, allowing different analysis tasks to be done as more detailed informa-
tion about the system becomes available. Design analysis might begin by using a
simple three valued qualitative model, progressing through a more sophisticated
qualitative model (such as an order of magnitude based one) to a numerical model,
as the design process continues, as proposed in (Price et al., 2003). Running suc-
cessively finer-grained simulations allows a greater variety of analyses to be carried
out and also allows more detailed results of repeats of earlier analyses to be ob-
tained. This might serve to disambiguate earlier results, for example by showing
whether or not a fuse will blow, preventing an otherwise uncontrolled short cir-
cuit. For this to be done and textual design analysis reports to be generated
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automatically the language used for interpretation of the results must be capable
of being mapped either to qualitative or numerical simulations. The commercial
tool developed from the earlier work at Aberystwyth does this, to allow either
three valued qualitative or numerical simulations (using Saber) to be compared
using the functional labelling approach to interpretation. A refinement of the idea
of comparison between the results of different simulations is the notion of an incre-
mental FMEA, (Price, 1996). In that paper it was suggested that the consistency
of automatically generated FMEA reports enabled two such FMEA reports of dif-
ferent versions of the same system to be compared by the automated FMEA tool
and a report to be generated that showed only the changes from the earlier report.
This means that FMEA can be carried out early because it is quick and cheap
to re-do the FMEA in response to changes to the system design. The use of an
interpretive language for this comparison allows the generation of a similar incre-
mental FMEA report following a finer grained simulation of the system, comparing
its results with an earlier coarse grained simulation. These differences have to be
identified using the interpretive language as the two simulations concerned might
have results that are incompatible — the current flow through some significant
component might be “medium” in a qualitative simulation and 2 Amps in a later
numerical simulation. The respective mappings between the simulations and the
interpretive (functional) description of the system provide the means to establish
whether these two values can be regarded as equivalent, in so far as they lead to
the same system behaviour or state. The idea of such incremental design analysis
reports comparing analyses at different granularities is discussed in (Price et al.,
2003) and a similar incremental approach to generating diagnostics is discussed in
(Price, 2002).
It was suggested in Section 3.2 that for simulation the system needs to be mod-
elled such that the closed world assumption applies. However, for automatic gen-
eration of design analysis reports, some knowledge of the systems environment is
required. For example, an FMEA report of a car headlamps circuit might say that
the left headlamp fails to light in full beam so the road ahead is not properly lit
and further note the legal implications. An ideal reasoner might know all this, of
course, but as we have seen, all a model based reasoner’s simulation is likely to
reveal is the loss of current through the part of the system that includes the left
hand headlamp’s main beam filament. The interpretation of the simulation can
and should allow the capture and use of knowledge other than that required for
the simulation itself in presentation of the output of the design analysis tool. Since
the report will typically be concerned with unexpected effects of the system on its
environment or on unexpected loss of intended effects, some way of weakening the
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closed world assumption is required for interpretation of results. This is discussed
in more detail in the next chapter.
As the rôle of interpretation is concerned with the results of the simulation, it
need not matter how the simulation is carried out. However one possible use
of an interpretive language that might be of interest is in providing a basis for
comparison of a functional decomposition of a newly designed system, as proposed
by (Iwasaki et al., 1993) with the resulting component based behavioural model
of the same system, as an aid to verifying the correctness of the design.
This chapter has suggested that an aim of model based simulation is to derive
knowledge of the behaviour of a system from knowledge of its structure and that
the functional design analyses are concerned with how well the system fulfils its
intended purpose. Therefore we are concerned with different classes of knowledge,
both of the system itself and (some aspects of) its environment. The following
chapter considers these classes of knowledge in more detail and explores the re-





As suggested at the close of the previous chapter, there are various classes of knowl-
edge held to be useful for model based reasoning. At the simplest, for model based
simulation there is a requirement for knowledge of the subject system’s structure
and some representation of underlying behaviour, whether derived from domain
rules associated with a qualitative physics or representations of the behaviour of
components at the bottom level of decomposition of the system.
The following section discusses these classes of knowledge. It incorporates sepa-
rate subsections for each of the four classes of knowledge commonly held to be of
interest in model based design analysis. These will introduce different researchers’
uses of these classes of knowledge. This section will conclude with a discussion
of the definitions of each class of knowledge used throughout the remainder of
the thesis. There follows a discussion of the different relationships between these
classes of knowledge used by different researchers.
4.1 Classes of knowledge for model building
There are frequently taken to be four classes of knowledge used in model based
reasoning. These were summarised as follows in (Chittaro & Kumar, 1998).
Structural knowledge describes system topology. The main question it answers
is “Which components are in the system?”.
Behavioural knowledge describes the potential behaviours of components. The
main question it answers is “How do components work?”.
Functional knowledge describes the rôles components play in a system. The
main question it answers is “What do components do?”.
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Teleological knowledge describes the purpose assigned to a system by its de-
signer or users. The main question it answers is “Why is a component in
the system?”.
While there is a fair degree of agreement about the usefulness of these four classes
of knowledge there is less agreement about their uses. Indeed it is frequently the
case that a researcher’s approach will not actually use all four classes of knowledge.
The nature of structural knowledge is generally agreed, perhaps not surprisingly as
it is (generally) distinguished by its static nature as opposed to the more dynamic
nature of the other classes of knowledge. By this is meant that the components of
which a system will not change during simulation, assuming a component centred
ontology. The static nature of the presence of components in the system contrasts
with the accent on what components do and why in the summaries of the other
three classes on knowledge in the list above. In particular, different researchers
have quite different ideas of the rôle of functional knowledge. Some researchers,
especially in the functional reasoning community use it in simulation and so have
an idea of function that is closer to behaviour than those researchers who use
models of behaviour and have a notion of function that might be very close to
that of purpose. These areas will be considered in more detail in the separate
subsections as will the different approaches to these classes of knowledge.
These classes of knowledge are related. Each class can be regarded as an ab-
straction of the class below, provided there is no interest in how the item modelled
achieves its results. Näıvely, we can say that if a system is fulfilling its purpose,
we can say that its function is achieved, if its function is achieved it is behaving
correctly and if it is behaving correctly we need take no interest in its internal
structure. These abstractions are, of course, not helpful when the purpose is
not being correctly fulfilled as we are likely to want to know why not and what
behaviour might be occurring instead.
As a more concrete example of the idea that behaviour abstracts structure, an
electrical relay might have four terminals, two for the coil and two for the switch.
If current flows through the coil, the magnetic field generated will cause a core to
move, so changing the position of the switch, and allowing current to flow between
that pair of terminals. A structural description, combined with knowledge of
electromagnetism reveals this. However, it might be that for the purposes of the
analysis being undertaken, we can simplify the modelling by ignoring the structure
and simply using a behavioural model of the relay. This model might capture no
more knowledge than the idea that if current flows between one pair of terminals
(those associated with the coil), then resistance between the other pair of terminals
is changed to zero or, if we prefer to remove all reference to structure, that flow
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of current is enabled (though not guaranteed) between the switch terminals. We
cannot state that there is a flow between the switch terminals as that implies
knowledge of the present behaviour of the reset of the system. This does suggest
that we can say that behaviour abstracts structure. The relationship between the
other classes of knowledge is more complex in that they depend on the context of
the system or component, what Chandrasekaran (Chandrasekaran & Josephson,
1996) calls the “mode of deployment”. This is because a component might have
several possible functions, and so several functional models, not all of which will
be used in a given system. For example, a wire might transmit electricity, transmit
a physical force, if pulled, or generate a sound if plucked. Which of these modes
of deployment is used will depend on the system.
The fact that different researchers have used these terms in different ways and the
resulting overlap between them, especially between behaviour and function and
between function and teleology had already been noted by (Franke, 1993). Franke
proposed a set of definitions not dissimilar to those listed above that stressed the
contextual differences between the classes of knowledge. His definition of struc-
ture has it describing the entities (either components or processes) that make up
the system. Behaviour is defined in that paper as the description of the struc-
ture ontology, within and at the boundary of the structural entity (such as the
component), so that the behavioural model is self contained, rather than being
defined in terms of the system. This definition does appear to differ from that
offered by (Chittaro & Kumar, 1998) in so far as there is no idea of explanation
of how the component works. Function is defined as the descriptive elements of
the structure ontology, expressed in terms of the behaviour of the system. This
does give a quite clear distinction between the idea of behaviour and function.
Finally teleology is defined as the elements of the structure ontology considered
in terms of the requirements or specifications of the system. This does lead to a
distinct differentiation between the classes of knowledge, but these definitions do
not appear to have resulted in the hoped for standardisation of usage of the terms.
The remainder of this section will consist of a consideration of different re-
searchers’ definitions and uses of each of these classes of knowledge in turn, before
a discussion of these classes of knowledge (most especially functional knowledge
as being most relevant to the present work) in which definitions used throughout
the remainder of the thesis will be introduced.
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4.1.1 Structural knowledge
It is suggested that if the behaviour of a system is to be derived either from
knowledge of the behaviour of the individual components or from some global
knowledge of the behaviour of the system’s domain(s), then the reasoner at least
needs knowledge of what component is connected to what, so it can trace the paths
of changes in state of components through the system. There is a fair degree of
agreement between workers on the nature of structural knowledge. The definition
in (Chittaro & Kumar, 1998) has already been quoted, while (Kaindl, 1993) has
“a structural description deals with components and their relationships”. The
idea that structure can be represented in terms of entities and their connections
seems common, though whether these entities are components depends on the
ontology, so (Franke, 1993) notes that the entities might be (physical) components
or processes. Another possibility is that in (Keuneke, 1991), where components
are related according to their functional, rather than topological, relationships.
Keuneke notes that this might result in a different structural diagram. She uses
as an example the difference between a topological deconstruction of a telephone,
which might be split into chassis and handset, and a functional one that might
relate components concerned with transmission of signals as opposed to those
concerned with their reception. Each of these functional groupings will, of course,
include components in both the chassis and the handset. It might be argued that
a process based structural description will be not dissimilar to a functional one.
In Section 3.4, the idea that there are two contrasting approaches to the struc-
tural model was discussed. These are those that have a global view of the structure,
such as is needed by an electrical circuit simulator, see (Mauss & Neumann, 1996;
Lee & Ormsby, 1991) and those that simply add knowledge of what a component
is connected to (and how) to the component models, so there is no global view.
The causal approach of (de Kleer, 1984) and the functional approach of (Sticklen
et al., 1989) are examples. Possible difficulties with this latter approach to repre-
senting structural knowledge (or strictly approaches to simulation associated with
it) were raised in Section 3.4. It is, of course, the case that the structural model
used by the reasoning engine need not be the same one that a user sees. It would
be quite simple to derive knowledge of what each individual component is con-
nected to from a schematic (which encapsulates a global view of the system) or
indeed to derive a global view of the system from a complete set of component
models’ connections, so at the structural level, both approaches can be seen as
equivalent.
One important difference between these approaches, if a component centred on-
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tology is used, is that the global view of a system must include knowledge of the
components’ internal structure if it is to be analysed using a domain level simula-
tor, such as CIRQ. Both (Mauss & Neumann, 1996; Lee & Ormsby, 1991) model
an electrical circuit as a network of resistances. This network of resistances has to
be constructed both from the schematic (if that is how the circuit’s connections are
captured) and from the internal structure of the components. This combination
of a global circuit model with components structural models is described in (Price
et al., 1997). The resulting design analysis tool provides a user interface to allow
these component structural models (which are reusable) to be drawn. This need
for knowledge of a component’s internal structure could make modelling of com-
ponents difficult in cases where the system designer has insufficient knowledge. An
example might be a system that interacts electrically with a complex Electronic
Control Unit (ECU), as the ECU will typically be supplied by an external con-
tractor, and will be a “black box” as far as the system designer is concerned. If
no global view is used, we need no knowledge of a component’s internal structure.
This provides a neat definition of what is meant by a component in terms of the
decomposition of the system, as it will be modelled purely in terms of function or
behaviour, rather than structure in that there is no need for a description of the
internal structure of the component. In other words, the idea of a component is
placed unambiguously at the bottom of the hierarchy of elements of the system,
rather than being underpinned by a model of domain level behaviour.
The difference between these contrasting approaches is illustrated by the relay
example above. Where there is a global view of the system combined with a
domain based simulator, the effect of a component’s behaviour might be described
in terms of change to the internal structure of the component. In the case of
the relay, “when current flows through the coil, resistance between the switch
terminal becomes zero, else it is infinite”. If there is no domain level simulator,
that description is not helpful, and will be replaced with one along the lines of “if
there is current flowing between the coil terminals then flow is enabled between
the switch terminals”.
Structural knowledge is commonly held to differ from the other classes of knowl-
edge by its static nature, in that the components in the system do not change
during the simulation. There are two areas where the static nature of structural
knowledge does not apply. One is where the connections between components
change during simulation. The relay is a good example of this as during an Au-
toSteve simulation the circuit will be simulated (using CIRQ) and if there is found
to be current in the relay’s coil then the switch will close, changing the resistance
of the switch and so adding an electrical connection between the components pre-
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viously separated by the open switch. This does, of course, change the structure
of the circuit. The other area in which the static nature of structural knowledge
does not apply is where a process based ontology is used. While new components
are not added to the system during simulation it can certainly be the case that
running a simulation will result in individual processes starting or stopping.
4.1.2 Behavioural knowledge
It has already been suggested that the primary aim of model based reasoning (cer-
tainly when used for design analysis) is to generate knowledge of the behaviour
of the system as a whole. This aim was often stated as “deriving behaviour from
structure” but it is the case that some knowledge of underlying behaviour (either
at a domain or component level) is also required. The early aim was to establish a
qualitative physics (Hayes, 1985) that consisted of underlying knowledge of quali-
tative versions of physical laws that would (in principle) allow the behaviour of any
system to be derived from knowledge of its structure. It might, for example, be
feasible to derive a model of the behaviour of an electric motor from such a physics
and then incorporate this behavioural model (or these behavioural models) into
model based simulation of a larger system. This approach does have drawbacks,
however. The first is the amount of work required in generating the necessary
underlying physics, and the difficulty of devising suitable qualitative versions of
physical laws. Related to this issue is the fact that many qualitative models of
behaviour at a component level are very simple. To return to the motor example,
it is hardly worth qualitatively simulating a motor (even if the physics is available)
to learn, essentially, that if you put a flow of current through the windings, you get
torque at the shaft. This simple model of behaviour is something that engineers
know, so is readily captured by the system without such low level simulation. If
there is no underlying set of laws from which we can derive the behaviour of any
element, then this suggests the need for some approach to capturing knowledge of
behaviour at the bottom level of the component / subsystem / system hierarchy.
Different researchers are concerned with behaviour at different levels of the com-
ponent — system hierarchy. As noted in the introduction to this section, (Chit-
taro & Kumar, 1998) defines behavioural knowledge as describing the potential
behaviours of components. That is, they are concerned with the use of behavioural
knowledge as an aspect of the basis for simulation. In contrast, (Kaindl, 1993) has
a behavioural description representing the potential behaviours of a system. This
might be read as suggesting that this sees the behavioural description as the target
of simulation rather than as knowledge to be used in reaching the target. Kaindl
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is concerned to distinguish between behaviour and function and sees behaviour
as describing how a function is achieved. (Keuneke, 1991) is also concerned with
this distinction and also has the rôle of behaviour as explaining how an expected
result (function) is achieved. The overlap and distinction between function and
behaviour will be considered in greater detail in the following subsection.
One aspect that these various definitions of behaviour have in common is that
they are concerned with representing the state of the system or component itself,
so there is no explicit representation of the system’s (or component’s) environment.
Function, by contrast, typically does place the effect of a device’s behaviour in the
context of its surroundings, as will be discussed in the next section. This local
nature of behaviour is illustrated by the definition in (Franke, 1993) where the
behavioural representation consists of the descriptive elements of the structure
ontology (that is components or processes) within and at the boundary of the
structural entity. An apparent example of this distinction between behaviour and
function is (Sasajima et al., 1995) which has behavioural representation simply
as “necessary and sufficient information for simulating state changes”. In other
words it has nothing about what the state is intended to achieve. Instead it is
concerned solely with the system in isolation. The other definitions cited here
also represent behaviour in terms of state, though (Franke, 1993) has a sequence
of states where states map variables onto values as an example of a behavioural
representation, as opposed to (an element of) a definition.
As suggested earlier, there are two approaches to behavioural modelling. The
original intention of the qualitative reasoning community, of developing a qualita-
tive physics that would result in a set of physical laws available for deriving the
behaviour of any system, is typically simplified to a set of domain laws, allowing
systems in that domain (such as electrical systems) to be analysed. For example
the approaches to electrical analysis in (Lee & Ormsby, 1991; Mauss & Neumann,
1996; Milde et al., 1999) all model the circuit as a resistive net, allowing the use of
relatively simple domain rules, sufficient to model and simulate most (but not all)
circuits. Exceptions include circuits that include capacitors if the domain model
has no rule for modelling charge. An alternative approach is to model behaviour
as local to a component and trace the influence of that behaviour through the
system.
In practice a combination of these approaches might be used. Both (Price et al.,
1997; Milde et al., 1999) use a domain based simulator to model the behaviour
of the circuit as a whole, combined with component behavioural models that will
affect the structure of the circuit and so cause changes to the circuit’s behaviour.
These researchers use different approaches to modelling the circuit, (Milde et al.,
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1999) uses the series — parallel — star approach of (Mauss & Neumann, 1996)
while (Price et al., 1997) uses CIRQ, (Lee & Ormsby, 1991). However they both use
similar component models that have dependency expressions to model changes to
the component’s internal structure as a result of its behaviour. The relay example
used earlier might have the dependency expression
if coil.i = ACTIVE then switch.r = ZERO else switch.r = INFINITE;
where i is (qualitative) current and r is resistance. The meaning is, of course,
that resistance between the switch terminals is zero if and only if there is current
in the relay’s coil, otherwise it is infinite. The use of these behavioural models
means simulation is iterative. (Price et al., 1997) describes how the domain level
simulator (CIRQ, in this case) will be run on a circuit in its initial state and then
the components’ behavioural models are checked to ascertain if any changes to the
circuit topology result from the state of the circuit established by the simulation.
These changes are made and the process repeated until a steady state is reached.
For example, if the initial run of CIRQ shows that there is current flowing through
the coil of a relay, the resistance of its switch is changed to zero and CIRQ run again
with the changed circuit. The software component that manages this interaction
between the circuit’s structural model and the components’ behavioural models is
described in (Price et al., 1997).
This use of a library of component behaviour models avoids the overhead of cre-
ating a sufficient set of domain rules to allow components such as (in the electrical
domain) relays and motors to have their (typically) simple behaviours to be es-
tablished by additional simulation. These component models are reusable as they
are independent of the context of the component. It will be appreciated that this
is consistent with the idea that behaviour is local. This does require some care in
modelling component behaviour. An electric motor will generate torque if there is
current in the windings, but whether this torque results in a rotation will depend
on the state of the system, for example that all bearings are correctly aligned
and lubricated so as to allow rotation of the mechanical components to which the
motor is connected.
Where this approach is used, some components need no explicit representation
of behaviour. A wire (used as a connector in an electrical circuit) has no need
for such an expression as its behaviour will not change during simulation and
any changes to the wire (such as failures) can be represented by changes to the
structural model. For example, if a wire is to be modelled as broken (for failure
analysis), its resistance can simply be changed from zero (assuming a qualitative
model) to infinite. If it is to be modelled as creating a short circuit than that
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can be modelled by adding a zero resistance connection between the wire and the
component it is shorted to.
In contrast, it might be the case that some components have an internal be-
haviour that is too complex for representation by a simple dependency expression.
The increasing use of electronic control units (ECUs) in electrical systems is a case
in point. In these cases a more complex model of behaviour might be required.
For example, (Snooke, 1999) describes the use of state charts to model complex
component behaviour. The system adopted for the tool as developed actually dif-
fers slightly from the description therein, as a component’s interaction with the
system is through its electrical terminals rather than the ports discussed in the
paper. The ports were intended to allow non electrical interactions.
State charts are an extension of state transition diagrams for finite state ma-
chines, see (Harel, 1987). They add three features:
• Hierarchical decomposition. A state can have subsidiary states so that to be
in the state is to be in one or other of its subsidiary states, with transitions
between the subsidiary states and also transitions between the so-called “su-
per state” and other high level states. A transition leaving the super state
entails leaving whichever subsidiary state is active.
• Concurrency. A super state can be divided such that to be in the super state
is to be in more than one of its subsidiary states concurrently. There will
typically be two (or more) concurrent subsidiary state charts, both of which
are active when the super state is active. Leaving the super state entails
leaving each concurrent group of sub states.
• Communication. A state chart might fire a transition which has an associ-
ated action firing a transition in another part of the state chart, or in the
case of many state chart based languages, another related state chart.
As such they are a useful formalism for representing components such as ECUs
whose behaviour implements logic rather than being modelled by domain rules.
Strictly speaking, of course, such components could conceivably be modelled in
terms of domain laws with a model of the governing logic (the software) being
used to guide the iteration through the domain level simulations. This seems un-
duly complicated, however, as this would reduce the simulation to operating at
the gate level of a logic component when all that is needed is an adequate model
of the governing logic. Naturally, if what is modelled is the logic, this depends
for correctness on both the model used for simulation being an accurate model of
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the actual component’s implementation of the intended logic and that implemen-
tation being itself being correct. A possible approach to modelling software for
design analysis, specifically FMEA, is proposed in (Snooke, 2004). The approach
allows dependencies between variables to be traced statically, showing the effects
of erroneous values. The intention is that either the source code or a graphical
model of the code can be used for such an analysis so this would help ensure the
correctness of the models used in design analysis by avoiding the need to create a
further model of the software (such as a state chart).
The division between a domain based simulator for simulating the system as
a whole (or at least for the whole of that part of a system associated with a
specific domain) and component behavioural models, as in (Price et al., 1997;
Milde et al., 1999) works best if all interactions between components are simulated
at the domain level, so each component model is self contained. Modern systems,
however, in many application areas are making increasing use of data buses for
passing signals between parts of the system. This means that some interactions
within a system are best modelled at a behavioural level in much the same way as
complex component behaviours and for the same reason, that there is no benefit in
modelling such digital signals at the bit level, even assuming an electrical simulator
is available. This raises the difficulty that the correct correspondence between the
behavioural and structural model is less well maintained. An electrical circuit
simulator can readily use the system structural model (possibly derived from an
ECAD schematic) as its primary source but if message passing is modelled at the
component behavioural level, using state charts, then the structural model must
be checked specifically to ensure that there is a suitable connection between the
transmitting and receiving components. Note that all a component behavioural
model can do is make a signal available to the network. It cannot model its
transmission as that depends on the system outside the transmitting component.
This loss of the simulation’s reliance on the structural model might suggest an
increased rôle for functional knowledge in these cases.
4.1.3 Functional knowledge
Of the four classes of knowledge discussed here there is arguably least agreement
about the nature of functional knowledge. There is a good deal of difference be-
tween how different researchers treat this class of knowledge. While (Chittaro
& Kumar, 1998) defines functional knowledge in terms of the rôles components
play in the system, answering the question “what does a component do?”, that
paper notes that function is actually an overloaded term. Besides this so-called
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“purposive” definition that is concerned with the relation between behaviour and
purpose (teleology), that paper offers an alternative definition of function. The
alternative, “operational”, definition defines function as a relation between input
and output of energy, information or material. It is perhaps closer to the mathe-
matical idea of a function. In addition to the two definitions, (Chittaro & Kumar,
1998) also gives two alternative formalisms for representing function.
Associational defines the function of a component in terms of its effect on the
system or environment. This might relate a component’s function to a sys-
tem purpose, so there is an association between this representation of func-
tion and the purposive definition above. It works well when there is a one
to one mapping between component and output.
Definitional defines function in terms of low level primitives, such as flow and
state. In state based models, the semantics of each unit of function is defined
by the model builder. This introduces the problem that different model
builders will define function differently. In flow based models, a function is
defined as a relation between input and output, which suggests an association
with the operational definition of function. A set of functions is defined for
the modelling system, not by the model builder. Definition of a complete set
is a difficulty, but given a sufficient set, it is less subjective than the state
based approach.
These representations differ in that the associational representation associates a
function with the world outside the system, with the purpose or effect of achieving
the function, while the definitional representation associates a function with values
of flow or state that are intrinsic to the system model itself. This distinction
supports the idea that the associational representation is readily associated with
the purposive definition of function, while the definitional representation can be
associated with the operational definition.
Function is a relational concept in that it establishes relations between a system’s
(or component’s) behaviour and its purpose. This can be thought of as abstracting
behaviour as, if we are to assign a function to a component, then in analysis of the
system, we need not be concerned with how that component fulfils its function,
merely that it does. It can be argued that function in this view simplifies the
effects of a behavioural representation, as the system’s state (resulting from the
behavioural description) is represented in terms of some goal state, as in (Sasajima
et al., 1995). While this abstraction might be useful if a device is fulfilling its
function it is less useful if the device is failing to do so, as we are likely to want
to know more about the effect of the faulty device than that it is not fulfilling its
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function. This is, therefore, arguably not a useful abstraction for failure analysis,
as we wish to model what happens when a component fails to fulfil its function,
and in doing so model the effects of faulty behaviour. The behaviour of some
component that is failing to fill its intended function might have other, unexpected,
side effects on the behaviour of the system.
Different workers frequently have their own definition of function, but these can
in general be placed within the context of the overall framework outlined above.
Simplistically there are two main schools, one sees function in a more or less
behavioural context, contrasting it with the idea of purpose while the other sees
function in terms of purpose. An extreme case of this latter approach is that of
(Kaindl, 1993) which simply has function as the intended purpose of a component,
so that the function of a steam release valve is to prevent a boiler explosion. An
example of the opposite, behavioural, approach is that of (Navinchandra & Sycara,
1989) where function is represented in terms of inputs and outputs. Function
has also simply been defined as a device’s effect on the flow of material, energy
or information through the device, without reference to the physical processes
that cause the effect (van Wie et al., 2005). This can readily be seen as an
abstraction of behaviour. The absence of reference to physical processes also
seems consistent with the idea in Functional Modeling (Sticklen et al., 1991) that
functional decomposition of a system can be stopped at a level where “world
knowledge” can be treated as the cause of some function’s effect. This allows the
function of a motor, for example, to be explained simply in terms of what motors
do. This is therefore not dissimilar to the idea of a dependency based (or even
state based) model of a component’s behaviour, in that that model also abstracts
away the underlying domain rules.
One area where there is some common ground between these two schools is the
idea that function is to be considered in the context of the enclosing system or its
environment. While (Kitamura et al., 2002) notes there is no consensus on defini-
tion of functionality of artifacts, that paper suggests that most functional models
represent intended goals or rôles of the behaviour and then they are dependent on
the context of the components in contrast with behavioural models [that are] in-
dependent of context. This agrees with the definition of function in (Franke, 1993)
as the descriptive elements of the structure ontology considered in the context of
the larger, enclosing mechanism or system. This idea of function as being in the
context of the component’s (or system’s) surroundings seems to raise interesting
questions about the nature of component function and its use in simulation, which
will be discussed in Section 4.1.5. The idea that function is less local to a device
than its behaviour is suggested by (Sembugamoorthy & Chandrasekaran, 1986)
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defining function as what the response of a device is to some external stimulus, as
opposed to behaviour explaining how this result is achieved and also by the defini-
tion of function in (Chandrasekaran & Josephson, 1996) as a device’s effect on its
environment. That paper gives three desiderata for a representation of function.
It should:-
• Apply to intended functions of human designed devices and to functions or
rôles in natural systems.
• Apply to functions of both static and dynamic objects (e.g. support).
• Apply to functions of both abstract and physical objects (e.g. software
modules or steps in plans as well as physical systems).
There is a formal definition of function as effect in (Chandrasekaran & Josephson,
1996):
Function: Let G be a formula defined over properties of interest in an
environment E. Let us consider the environment plus an object O. If
O (by virtue of certain of its properties) causes G to be true in E we
say that O performs, has or achieves the function (or rôle) G.
This definition fulfils the three desiderata. It does not have any specific notion of
purpose, which strengthens its applicability for describing natural systems, where
the idea of purpose or design might be philosophically debatable.
While there is general agreement that function and behaviour are distinct con-
cepts, (Loganantharaja, 1993) notes that there is some confusion and that it is
sometimes assumed that function and behaviour are the same thing. It is, however,
arguable that this confusion is less common than failing to distinguish function
and teleology (purpose). Most researchers’ approaches to and definitions of func-
tion have some idea of purpose, intention or goal, so that (Kampis, 1987) suggests
that the concept of function enters into a system when some purpose is supposed
to b accomplished by the system and (Chittaro et al., 1993) defines function as the
relation between a device’s behaviour and the goals assigned to it by the designer.
A related idea is that function is an interpretation of behaviour (Wood et al.,
2005). That paper notes that function is more than a subset of behaviour and
implies a notion of intent on the part of the designer, following (Chandrasekaran
& Josephson, 2000).
The field of functional reasoning seeks to make use of functional knowledge to as-
sist in reasoning about a device’s behaviour and functionality. This arises from the
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idea in (Sticklen et al., 1989) that knowledge of the function (purpose) of a device
enables an organisation of our causal knowledge of the device. It is suggested by
(Sticklen et al., 1989) that reasoning about function is useful with reference to the
three crux issues identified in (Davis & Hamscher, 1988) as important for model
based reasoning. These are domain independence, scalability and model selection.
It is claimed that the functional reasoning approach is intermediate between the
deep reasoning approach, which entails the production of a complete causal net
for the system (leading to problems with scaling) and naive physics that is based
on a set of domain rules. Representing components in terms of their function
avoids the need both for the causal net and the domain rules, so the approach
addresses the first two of the three issues. This leads to the idea of Functional
Modeling (Sticklen et al., 1991) whose aim is to use the known functionality of
a device to organise causal understanding of the device (so avoiding the need for
a complete causal net) and provide a reasoning algorithm that can simulate the
device for given starting conditions. There might be felt to be a possible question
about the soundness of this approach (at least for some design analyses) as if the
organisation of knowledge is used to avoid a complete causal net there does seem
to be a danger that possible unexpected behaviours will be missed by the analysis.
The importance of capturing the unintended but inevitable functions (by which is
presumably meant behaviours) in FMEA is noted in (Wirth & O’Rorke, 1993).
One use of function in simulation is demonstrated in (Hawkins & Woollons, 1998),
who use a flow based operational definition of function for FMEA. Each component
has a functional rôle model, such as ‘generator’ or ‘conduit’. The components’
rôle models are combined in functional process models that show how components
combine in processes. These processes, in turn, combine to create phenomena,
and these phenomena relate to system goals, the teleological model. The paper
only deals with the rôle and teleological models. The teleological model represents
the designer’s goal for the component, such as “transfer”, “keep” etc. The paper
links these goals to activities in the rôle model. The idea of defining functions for
components can be argued to have the benefit of domain independence, enabling
FMEA of complex, mixed domain systems. The paper example uses a system with
an electrically driven rotary pump. The approach has been demonstrated, but it
does seem to suffer from the difficulty associated with flow based representation
of function, in that there is a need for a full set of functional primitives. An
additional difficulty is arguably the need to capture the functional rôle model of
each component — this relation seems less intuitive than a more domain specific
behavioural model of the component and as the functional rôle is specific to the
system, the resulting component model is less reusable than a behavioural model
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might be. The analysis for FMEA is complex, as the effect of the introduced
failure is traced all the way through the system’s component models, but it does
support tracing the effects of failures through mixed domains.
Another approach with some similarities to (Hawkins & Woollons, 1998) is that of
(Chittaro et al., 1994). In common with most other work on functional modelling,
function is associated with components. Functional knowledge is represented by
three models, a functional rôle model that interprets the component’s behaviour,
which participates in a process model, and the processes, in turn, participate
in the model of the phenomenon. The teleology of the system is defined as its
goals, which are assumed to be achieved by the phenomenon model. This means
several models are needed for components, as each has a structural, behavioural
and functional model in Chittaro’s “multimodeling” approach. There is more on
this in section 4.2. A theoretical basis is claimed for this method.
The Multi Flow Modelling (MFM) approach of (Lind, 1994; Larsson, 1996) also
has the idea of functions contributing to achieving goals. In this approach, which
is intended for monitoring and diagnosis of industrial plant, components realise
functions and functions achieve goals. These relations are many to many as a
component can contribute to several functions. Each component function is taken
from a set of function definitions intended to specify that component’s effect of a
flow of energy, material or information. This relates the means — end relations
that exist between functions and goals and the whole — part relations involved
in modelling complex plant. The MFM model of a plant is a static graph repre-
senting these relations. This has the advantage that the approach is scalable, the
complexity of the graph increases linearly with the size of the model (plant). As
this graph is the only model of the plant, the correctness of the results depend on
the correctness of the model. The approach is also limited to its intended field.
These approaches to and uses of function contrast with its use in (Price, 1998).
Here, the functional modelling is done at system level, by attaching system func-
tions (“functional labels”) to the output of significant components. For example,
in a car lighting system the function “headlamps on full beam” is linked to the
output of the two headlamp bulbs. Function is therefore defined in terms of pur-
pose of the system. The functional label is easily added to a component centred
representation of the system. Not every component has a functional label, typi-
cally they need only be attached to those components that generate the system’s
output. Three advantages are claimed:
• Simplicity, functional labels are easily added to structural representations
especially as they relate so closely to the system’s purpose.
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• Re-usability, the functional label is not tied to how a function is achieved,
so can be applied to some other design of system with the same purpose.
• Capability, The approach is capable of recognising the unexpected achieve-
ment of a function.
Linking function to the system avoids the problem of an associative representa-
tion of function relying on a one to one mapping between function and component.
There is no difficulty in combining outputs of several components, if necessary, as
in the headlamp case. The paper does not discuss the use for mixed domain sys-
tems, but as the function is linked to system output, the domains in the system
are scarcely significant. This leaves a rôle for behavioural modelling as the ba-
sis for reasoning about the system, as described in Section 4.1.2. The relations
between models in this approach and elsewhere is discussed in section 4.2. The
usefulness of this approach has been demonstrated by its use in AutoSteve, the
commercial tool resulting from the work. One difference between this representa-
tion of function and many others is that there is no explicit representation of the
input of the function. This is because the input associated with a function can be
derived from the simulation of the correctly working system for failure analysis.
For design verification (such as Sneak Circuit Analysis), the input does need to
be specified. The lack of representation of the input for a function is problematic
when describing cases where a system has functions (such as telltale or back up
functions) that depend on the achievement or otherwise of some other function.
These cases are discussed in Chapter 10.
This approach merely uses the functional labels to interpret the results of a sys-
tem simulation derived from knowledge of behaviour and structure, as discussed
in Section 4.1.2. This contrasts with approach taken by the functional reason-
ing community, where functional knowledge is used as the basis of the reasoning
process. Indeed, as the work at Aberystwyth progressed the functional models be-
came simpler, as discussed in (Pugh et al., 1995) and (Price & Pugh, 1996). This
simplification of functional models started when it was found that the functional
reasoning approach duplicated the results obtained by the domain simulator, so
building the required functional models was found to be redundant.
An extension to that approach to functional modelling has been suggested by
(Snooke & Price, 1998). In this variation, each significant component has a func-
tional label attached and the system’s functional model is built up from the compo-
nent functional models. To reuse the headlamps example, instead of the function
“full beam” being associated with the left and right hand lamps being active, each
lamp has a functional label for full beam and the system function “full beam”
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is achieved if both functions “left full beam” and “right full beam” are achieved.
This has the advantage of adding detail to the explanation, along the lines of
“function full beam not achieved because left full beam not achieved”. Against
this advantage is the need for some additional work in adding the more complex
functional labels. This extension seems to provide a possible starting point for
the idea of associating functions with subsystems for modelling mixed domain
systems.
A distinguishing feature of both (Price, 1998) and (Milde et al., 1999), is how
much less use they make of functional representation, compared to the functional
reasoning community. They both use behavioural models in a component cen-
tred representation, combined with domain rules, as the basis for reasoning. One
possible explanation is that both systems are concerned with modelling faulty
behaviour, which will not readily be captured using component level functional
modelling, although Hawkins and Woollons use functional modelling for a similar
task. Another arguable point is that behavioural models more readily capture
the available knowledge, so are easier to use. For example, the user (an engineer)
can readily use an existing behavioural model of some component, say an electric
motor, and this can be used in simulation without asking the engineer to provide
a specific description of the motor’s function in the context of that system. Both
these systems are intended for use by engineers, and maybe making fuller use of
functional modelling, at least in this context, is merely unnecessary complication.
Despite this, it is tempting to suggest that functional modelling is more applicable
for other tasks, such as recognition, that is deriving function from structure, us-
ing functional models of known components. The corresponding drawback is the
limitation on the range of systems that can be analysed because of the reliance on
domain rules. The avoidance of domain rules is one of the claimed advantages of
a functional approach.
The functional labelling approach resembles the association of function and sys-
tem behaviour in (Sembugamoorthy & Chandrasekaran, 1986). There function is
defined as the what a device’s response is to an external stimulus and behaviour
explains how this response is achieved. The approach links a functional label
to an external stimulus (such as pressing a button) and a set of descriptions for
the system behaviour. The behavioural descriptions explain how the stimulus
achieves the function for a correctly working system. A drawback is the difficulty
of building the behavioural descriptions for large systems.
There is an alternative approach to associating function with output in (Chan-
drasekaran & Josephson, 1996). Here, the function of a device is simply defined
as its effect on its environment. It is expressed in terms of relationships in the
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environment, so a pump, for example, will have its function defined in terms of
volumes of water at different locations in the environment. This is intended as a
general definition of device function, capturing various intuitions. An important
part of this definition is the idea of a “mode of deployment”, which defines a
causal interaction between the device and the environment. They suggest a prim-
itive representation of an “object in an environment, viewed from a perspective”.
The view supports abstraction of composed objects. The paper imagines a design
activity that proceeds from a library of stored designs, specialising the designs and
composing items from the library. This relates closely to the purposive definition
of function in (Chittaro & Kumar, 1998). The paper fails to demonstrate their
notion of explaining a device level function in terms of component functions, which
is a feature of the hierarchical functional reasoning proposed by (Snooke & Price,
1998).
Work has also been done on using functional reasoning to support the design
process, notably by (Iwasaki et al., 1993). Here function is defined to mean the
intended behaviour of the system (or device) and as such includes notions of
purpose. The model of the design process follows the idea in (Gero, 1990) that
the physical structure of a design is derived from a causal mechanism and has the
functional model of the system being refined and so informing the refinement of the
physical design. The physical specification must include all components specified
by the functional specification and the requisite connections. It is not made clear
how the physical specification is represented, however, and nor is it made clear how
the system verifies the design — is the system behaviour derived from its physical
structure or from the functional model? There seem to be problems with the
simple model of the design process as in many cases, at least, some of the physical
design might be derived from knowledge of other designs (case knowledge) and
functional refinement will not be necessary. These points are discussed further
later.
There is a slightly different definition of function in (Iwasaki et al., 1995), where
function is defined with reference to a goal, rather than to intended behaviour.
The definition of function is given as
An object O has a function F if there is an agent who can use O under
some circumstances in some specific manner to achieve a goal.
The paper also defines a “device” as a physical object that has a function. There
seems to be no reference to the idea of intent in this definition. For example a
handyman could use a chisel to lever open a paint tin and this appears to suggest
that, according to the definition, a chisel has that rôle as a function. However,
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intuitively this is not the case, as this rôle amounts to abuse of the chisel, and will
ruin the edge, rendering it less fit for its intended function. There does seem to be
a need for some more explicit notion of intent in this definition, though the lack is
perhaps understandable in the context of supporting the design process, as in this
process, unanticipated uses of a device are more or less by definition excluded.
An approach to supporting the functional design of a device was introduced in
(Umeda & Tomiyama, 1993). That paper divided the design process into three
stages; functional design, basic design and detailed design. In this case, func-
tional design is concerned with what a device must be able to do, so is related
to the needs it must fulfil. They define function in terms of human abstraction
of behaviour and treat it as subjective, as opposed to the objective nature of be-
haviour, which is determined by the underlying physics. They use a model of
function, behaviour and state, in which function is related to behaviour and be-
haviour is defined in terms of changes of state over time. It is therefore not clear
how static (as opposed to dynamic) functions are modelled, though they could
perhaps be modelled in terms of the absence of undesirable changes of state. This
approach has been demonstrated for designing increased reliability into a system
by introducing “functional redundancy” (Umeda & Tomiyama, 1993) and for de-
signing products so as to allow easy upgrading of the products in future (Umeda
et al., 2005).
There is a discussion of these definitions and uses of knowledge of function, with
a proposed definition to be used for the remainder of this thesis in Section 4.1.5.
4.1.4 Teleological knowledge
In the context of design analysis, teleological knowledge is generally taken to be
knowledge of the purpose of the system or component. The idea of purpose can
introduce difficulties in modelling certain natural systems. While there seems to
be little difficulty in stating the purpose of the heart as driving the circulation
of blood, there seem to be philosophical difficulties in using the idea of purpose
in an ecological system. For example, the behaviour of a predator will certainly
include the killing of its prey, and that will have the effect of controlling the
prey’s population but unless one accepts the theological doctrine of teleology (that
there is evidence of design in the natural world), then considering the control of
population as the purpose of the predator seems problematic. It is not proposed to
explore this area of discussion any further here, except to suggest that this is one
reason why these four classes of knowledge are more appropriate for modelling of
engineered systems, the subject of this thesis. (Chittaro & Kumar, 1998) suggests
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that some researchers feel the need to differentiate between the idea of function
and the idea of purpose. They differentiate between the definitions by associating
purpose with human notions of utility in a sociocultural context. In other words,
teleological knowledge is concerned with the need the system is to fulfil, such as
the need to light the road ahead to allow a car to be driven after dark.
If teleological knowledge is concerned with the purpose of a system (or compo-
nent) this does seem to leave an overlap with the purposive idea of function. It
can be argued that the question given in (Chittaro & Kumar, 1998) as answered
by functional knowledge (“What does a component do?”) and that answered by
teleological knowledge (“Why is a component in the system?”) differ as much
in their respective emphases on the component and system than in their actual
content. For example the question “what does a safety valve do?” could have
the answer that it prevents a boiler explosion by relieving the pressure” while the
teleological question “why is a safety valve in the system?” might have the answer
that it is to prevent a boiler explosion, which it does by relieving pressure. This
is not to suggest that there is no room for both classes of knowledge, rather to
attempt to illustrate how similar they can be considered to be. The requirements
of a system might be considered either in terms of purpose or function. The func-
tional decomposition approach of (Iwasaki et al., 1993), applied to the model of
the design process in (Gero, 1990) could start out with a stated requirement that
is a description of purpose, rather than of function, which is then itself decom-
posed into more specific, closely defined and formally represented functions. This
is illustrated in Section 4.2. For example, one might begin the functional refine-
ment of the design for a washing machine with the simple (not to say obvious)
statement that its purpose is to clean clothes and break this down into more re-
fined functional specifications, such as the need to wash with soapy water, then
rinse then remove at least some of the water. This refinement will continue in
the manner proposed Iwasaki’s paper. This is discussed further in Section 4.2. It
might be argued that this is quite a useful model of the process of requirements
capture for a new system, the aim being to reify the original (typically informal)
idea of the purpose of a new system to generate a sufficiently well specified set of
requirements that the success or failure of a system in meeting the requirements
can be assessed.
(Franke, 1993) differentiates between purpose and function by defining a tele-
ological description as concerned with “the elements of the structural ontology
considered in the context of requirements or specifications of the mechanism or
system” as opposed to function being considered in the context of the (compo-
nent’s) surrounding system. This seems to suggest that a functional description is
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applied to an element in a larger system (a component or subsystem) while a tele-
ological description is applied to the system itself. As the paper suggests that the
teleological specifications are expressed in terms of structure and behaviour, this
tends to reinforce the similarity between notions of function and purpose. This is
taken a stage further in (Kaindl, 1993) where a functional description reveals the
intended purpose of a component or connection, so the function of a steam-release
valve (to use Kaindl’s example) is to prevent a boiler explosion. This certainly
seems to leave no room for a more abstract teleological description (that paper
does not include purpose as a separate class of knowledge) while being consistent
with the definition of function in (Franke, 1993) in so far as the valve’s function
is in the context of its surrounding system, the boiler.
A language for representing teleological descriptions was proposed in (Franke,
1991). This represents changes to a system design in terms of changes to the
structure and changes to its behaviour. To use the example given in the paper,
the addition of a pressure relieving valve to a boiler changes the behaviour of
the boiler such that its internal pressure will not exceed some known value. It is
tempting to argue that this is closer to Franke’s later definition of a functional
description, being, as it is, placed in the context of the system. It is also devoid of
any explicit notion of the purpose of the component, in this case the prevention
of boiler explosions. This seems to offer further evidence of how closely linked
many researchers’ notions of purpose and function appear to be. This language
makes use of primitives to describe the change the new part of the design has
its behaviour, which looks not dissimilar to the functional primitives in some
functional description languages. However, the use of these languages does appear
to differ, as the component based functional descriptions are intended to build a
causal description of the system’s behaviour. This does not appear to be the
intention with this teleological description language.
While the foregoing appears to suggest that there is little room (or perhaps need)
for teleological representation as well as functional, one area where a notion of
purpose is of value is in the generation of design analysis reports, such as FMEA
reports. This is simply because the consequences of a system failure appear in
these reports and these will relate to the intended purpose of the system. Therefore
some knowledge of the purpose of the system is required if these reports are to be
generated automatically.
As the idea of function is associated with a system in the functional labelling
approach of (Price, 1998) there might be thought to be little room for any more
abstract notion of purpose, especially in the light of the proposed definitions in
(Franke, 1993). Arguably a functional label has no formal notion of purpose, but
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as a design analysis report generated automatically using functional labels will
include consequences of failure of a system function, this at least will typically
refer to an implicit notion of purpose. For example, a car headlamp system might
have as a consequence of failure that the road ahead is not lit, implicitly referring
to the idea that the purpose of the system is to light the road ahead. This area
is expanded upon in Chapter 5 but it is worth pointing out here that there might
be additional information included in a functional label, such as the consequence
that it is illegal to drive the vehicle if the headlamps have failed. This points
to the idea that functional and teleological knowledge, especially when used for
interpretation of behavioural simulation of engineered systems provide a way of
capturing knowledge that is external to the system and therefore beyond the range
of the simulation engine itself. There is a discussion of the relationship between
the classes of knowledge, the boundaries of the system under analysis and the
boundaries of the simulated world in the following section.
As a final note on the rôle of teleology, it is worth pointing out that there has
been work in qualitative reasoning whose aim is the recognition of the (previously
unknown) purpose of some system or device. This was an aim of (de Kleer,
1984), in which teleological reasoning was employed to derive knowledge of some
system’s unknown purpose from knowledge of its behaviour. As the present work
is concerned with design analysis this use of teleological reasoning is outside its
scope, as it seems safe to suggest that any design process will be founded on
knowledge of the purpose of the system being designed.
4.1.5 Using the four classes of knowledge
The earlier sections in this chapter have been largely concerned with previous work
that has made use of some or all of these four classes of knowledge. It also at-
tempted to identify common threads in these (frequently contrasting) approaches
to functional modelling. This section will propose a set of definitions of these
classes of knowledge that will support the intended use of functional knowledge to
support the interpretation of simulations and allow the automatic generation of
textual design analysis reports. How these new definitions might relate to other
researchers’ approaches will also be discussed. The focus is now, therefore, less on
other researchers’ work and rather lays foundations for the material in the succeed-
ing chapters, describing the Functional Interpretation Language that is one of the
main results of the present research. However, the present chapter will conclude
with a discussion of the relationships between these classes of knowledge in other
work, in the light of the proposed definitions proposed here, concentrating on the
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uses of functional knowledge.
4.1.5.1 Proposed definitions of knowledge classes
This subsection will propose a set of definitions of the classes of knowledge and
suggest a relatively well defined way in which they can be considered to relate
to each other. The definitions and relations will be explained with reference to
possible examples to attempt to clarify the differences between them, specifically
between function and behavioural knowledge and between function and purpose.
Informally, the four classes of knowledge might be defined as follows:-
Structural knowledge is concerned with the elements that make up a system
and the physical relationships (connections) between them. Typically, this
might be concerned with physical components and connections but the ele-
ments might be processes. For example, a torch contains a battery connected
to a switch connected to a lamp connected back to the battery.
Behavioural knowledge is concerned with what takes place within a device.
This will typically be the possible states of a device and the possible transi-
tions between them. The torch can be on (switch closed and lamp lit) or off
(switch open and lamp not lit).
Functional knowledge is concerned with how a device fulfils its purpose. For
example what system states can be associated with fulfilling some purpose.
The torch being lit can be associated with the purpose of enabling a user to
see in the dark.
Teleological knowledge is concerned with the requirements (or needs) a device
is intended to fulfil. The torch is needed so that a user can use it to light
their way in the dark.
The term device has been used to attempt to free these definitions from any
specific notion of what level of system decomposition they are associated with.
For example, if a system is analysed using a qualitative simulation, knowledge of
the system’s behaviour might be derived from knowledge of its structure and of
the behaviours of its components. The same definition of behavioural knowledge
should be applicable to both component and system behaviour.
One approach to clarifying the relationships between these definitions is with
respect to the device itself. It is suggested that both structure and behaviour are
internal to the device and purpose is external to it. Function, being related to
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both behaviour and purpose is concerned with describing the interface between the
device and its environment, in terms of purpose. It can be thought of as an external
(“black box”) view of the device and to be related to the device’s environment
(which might be some surrounding system or the environment in general). To
illustrate, consider an electric torch. The purpose of the torch is to allow the user
to see in the dark. This is external to the torch itself, notice that the need could
be filled with a lantern or candle. The functional view of the torch reifies this need
by describing how the torch can be used to fulfil the purpose, in this case by the
switching on of the torch resulting in a beam of light. The behaviour of the torch
describes how switching on completes a circuit linking battery and lamp so the
lamp has current flowing through it and the structure describes the components
and connections that make up the circuit. A not dissimilar distinction between
behaviour, function and purpose is drawn in (Franke, 1993).
As the present work is concerned with interpreting the result of a (behavioural)
simulation with respect to purpose, it seems worth proposing a more formal defi-
nition of function than that listed above. The following is suggested.
Function: An object O has a function F if it achieves an intended goal
by virtue of some external trigger T resulting in the achievement of an
external effect E.
This is similar to the definition in (Iwasaki et al., 1995) but specifies that the goal
is intended (by the designer) and the adds the notions of trigger and effect, which
are discussed in the following chapter. For example, a torch achieves the goal of
lighting the dark when switching it on triggers the effect of the lamp shining. The
nature of the trigger and the effect will depend on the nature of the device whose
function is being described. This approach to function can also be used at the
component level (assuming the use of a component centred ontology) so that the
function of the motor in an electric fan is to generate a flow of air, triggered by
current flowing through its windings leading to the effect of the shaft rotating the
fan blades. This adds some notion of purpose (which is specific to the system that
includes the motor) to the description of behaviour of the motor. The trigger and
effect of the function are defined as being external so as to express the idea that
the function of a system is concerned with its interaction with its environment.
The environment might, of course, be some larger encompassing system that is
being treated as beyond the scope of the present analysis.
This definition raises the point of whether a functional representation should
incorporate a specific description of the goal (purpose). It is suggested that there
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are advantages in the idea that it does not, but rather has a reference to a teleo-
logical description that is treated as a separate component of the model. In other
words the model incorporates a teleological description achieved by a function,
which describes how the purpose is achieved. This is discussed in more detail in
Chapter 5 but the point is worth raising here as this style of representation has a
bearing on the illustrations of uses of functional knowledge illustrated in the next
section.
The idea that behaviour is local as against function relating to the device’s en-
vironment raises some interesting points about what can be included in a device’s
behavioural model where a device is modelled as an atomic component with a
behaviour rather than in terms of its structure and underlying domain based be-
havioural rules. Such a behavioural description should make no assumptions about
the state of a device’s environment. For example, rather then describing its struc-
ture and deriving its behaviour from domain rules, an electric motor’s behaviour
might be described informally as “if there is current flowing through the windings,
then there is torque at the shaft”. This contrasts with a motor’s functional de-
scription which will (almost certainly) be concerned with moving something. This
does, of course, make assumptions about the motor’s environment, most obviously
that its shaft is connected to the component it is to move and that the connection
allows the required movement. So the motor of an electric fan, for example, might
be behaving correctly in that there is current flowing through the windings and
there is torque at the shaft, but it is failing to achieve its function (making the
fan blades rotate) because one of the blades is fouling the casing, perhaps. This
arguably raises something of a difficulty with the idea of using function in the
simulation of a system’s behaviour, as whether a component is actually fulfilling
its function can only be established with reference to the behaviour (function?) of
the rest of the system.
Arguably a better example of this difference is provided by a digital component,
if only because there is no benefit in modelling such a component at a structural
level, its behaviour is almost certainly best described in terms of the logic it
implements, though this does assume that the logic is implemented correctly.
4.1.5.2 On the proposed definition of function
Having introduced a new definition of function, it seems worth including a discus-
sion of how the definition relates to other researchers’ definitions and uses of the
idea of function.
It is, perhaps, arguable whether this is beneficial, but one feature of this definition
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of function is that it unites the purposive and operational notions of function in
(Chittaro & Kumar, 1998). On the one hand it relates behaviour to teleology by
defining the external aspects of its behaviour (the trigger and effect) that fulfil the
purpose and on the other hand it relates a trigger (which might be a representation
of input) to the (expected) effect, which equally might be thought of as output,
though it might, in many cases, be better considered to relate to a goal state.
This observation suggests that the proposed definition of function incorporates
the elements of other definitions, so other definitions can be regarded as aspects
(or components) of the proposed definition. Therefore the intended goal can be
likened to the definition of function as purpose in (Kaindl, 1993) and the trig-
ger and effect can be thought of in terms of input and output, consistently with
(Navinchandra & Sycara, 1989). The relationship with the definitions of function
and teleology in (Franke, 1993) raises some interesting questions. His definition of
function as being in terms of “the behaviour of the larger, enclosing mechanism or
system” could be seen to imply that function belongs to a component or subsys-
tem, while the definition of purpose as being in terms of the requirements of the
system places that, perhaps, a little more at the system level. There is arguably
some common ground between Franke’s definitions and the idea expressed above
that behaviour is internal to the device, purpose external and function in between,
at the boundary between the device and its environment. The suggested approach
avoids the apparent implication that function depends on some larger mechanism,
though this objection is weakened if one accepts the idea that a system’s environ-
ment is treated by the reasoner identically to a larger enclosing system. This is
(arguably) unlikely, simply because the reasoner will not contain sufficient knowl-
edge to model the environment in general in the same way as the system under
analysis. In the absence of a reasoner having a complete knowledge of physics
(qualitative or otherwise), either the reasoning (simulation) will be domain based,
restricting analysis of the environment, or if a functional reasoning approach is
used, the network of functional relationships must be extended to include neces-
sary aspects of the environment.
These relationships raise the question of the relationship between the idea of
the system under analysis and the simulated world. One important rôle of a
functional representation is, at least for the present work, to capture knowledge
about the world around the system being analysed. The idea proposed above
that purpose is external to the system implies this, assuming that the system
being analysed corresponds to the simulated world. For example, we might state
that the purpose of a car headlamp system is to light the road ahead, and refine
this into a functional representation in which this purpose is achieved when the
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headlamp switch is turned on and the headlamps light. This now allows the
system’s simulation to be interpreted in terms that relate to the world outside
the system so the simulation engine itself needs no knowledge of them. All the
simulation has to show is that the headlamps will indeed light up when the switch
is turned on and the functional description will capture the (implicit) knowledge
that this will light the road ahead, assuming that it would be dark otherwise.
This is, it will be remembered, what the “functional labelling” approach of (Price,
1998) already does.
The present definition of function is distinct from notions both of behaviour and
purpose. This is not always the case in definitions and uses of function in the
model based reasoning and functional reasoning communities. For example in the
way (Kaindl, 1993) has function synonymous with purpose or the way that the
functional reasoning community use (component) function instead of (component)
behaviour, as in (Hawkins & Woollons, 1998).
This proposed definition of function can be regarded as an attempt at a more
closely defined idea of function than that used in (Price, 1998). A more detailed
comparison is perhaps best left until later, but it is worth pointing out that in the
original functional labelling approach (for FMEA), function was implicitly defined
largely in terms of output, or effect. The definition proposed herein attempts to
extend that by including express knowledge of input (or trigger) and purpose. How
these fit into the representation of function itself will be discussed in Chapter 5.
It seems well worth considering how well the proposed definition of function
fulfils the desiderata for a representation of function given in (Chandrasekaran &
Josephson, 1996).
Arguably, the first desideratum, that a representation of function should “apply
to intended functions of human designed devices and to functions or rôles in natural
systems” causes difficulties for any purposive definition of function, including that
proposed. These were introduced at the start of the discussion of teleological
knowledge, Section 4.1.4. In other words, any notion of intent implies a notion of
a creator of the system with intentions for it. While replacing the word “intended”
in the proposed definition with “expected” might allow its use for some natural
systems, such as in specifying the function of an organ, it is arguably inappropriate
to use any idea of a goal in ecological systems. Reducing the population of prey
is an effect of predation, but not its goal. Indeed it is disadvantageous to the
population of predators. As the present work is concerned with design analysis of
engineered systems, this objection to the proposed definition is not important to
this research.
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It might be felt that the proposed definition of function does not fit the second of
the three desiderata, that a representation of function should “apply to functions
of both static and dynamic objects (e.g. support)”. However, this need not be the
case, note that (Chandrasekaran & Josephson, 1996) already uses the idea of effect
in defining function in a way that is argued to fulfil this desideratum. The notion
of a trigger does, it is appreciated, carry connotations of movement or change but
there seems no real difficulty in specifying the trigger as a static entity. To use the
idea of an entity having a function of support, the trigger can be represented in
terms of the maximum intended loading of the entity and the effect as the absence
of movement in the structure. A plausible example of the representation of a static
function might be that the goal of a girder is to ensure the strength of a bridge,
which it achieves adequately if a loading of x tonnes triggers a deflection of no
more than y millimeters. The effect is the lack of excessive deflection under the
designed load.
The final desideratum, that a functional representation should “apply to func-
tions of both abstract and physical objects (e.g. software modules or steps in
plans)” seems to present no difficulty. The goal of the entity can be represented
in such a case, the trigger is readily defined and likewise the effect. For example,
the goal of carrying out an FMEA early in the design process is to find how safe
a system is when operating under component failures so as to establish whether
changes should be made to the design. The trigger is completion of a candidate
design for the system and the effect is the acquisition of knowledge to be used to
inform the decision on changing the design, achieved by production of a report
listing the effects of component failures. Whether such a full representation of
function is useful in this case is, perhaps, open to question and a definition of
purpose (that is, the goal) might be adequate.
One possible difficulty with this approach to function, at least in some areas, is
that it is perhaps unnecessarily detailed. It is clearly more elaborate than (Kaindl,
1993) which defines function purely in terms of purpose.
4.2 Relationships between the classes of knowl-
edge
In this section, the definitions and suggested contexts of the four classes of knowl-
edge discussed above will be used to compare and contrast the uses of different
knowledge by different researchers in the field. In view of the present work’s em-
phasis on functional knowledge, the focus in this review will be on uses of that
72
class of knowledge. In view of the fact that other representations of function do
not include all the elements expected by the more formal definition of function
given above, it is perhaps more useful to use the informal definition, so in this
review functional knowledge is classified as requiring some notion of purpose and
also some representation of how this purpose is achieved, but that representation
need not be in terms of triggers and effects.
Earlier in the chapter the idea that the different classes of knowledge can be
placed in a hierarchy, with each class being an abstraction of the next class below
it in the hierarchy, was introduced. For example, a component behavioural model
can be thought of as abstracting the component’s structure. Another hierarchy
we can consider is that of system elements. This can be thought of as having four
layers.
Product The top layer in the hierarchy, having several distinct (and largely in-
dependent) functions. For example, a motor car combines several quite
distinct systems that either contribute to its core functionality (such as the
transmission) or are necessary adjuncts, such as lighting.
System A self contained set of related components (or subsystems) whose role
is to fulfil one aspect (or several closely related aspects) of the product’s
functionality. The lighting system of a car would be a good example.
Subsystem or module An identifiable part of a system, identifiable either in
terms of physical separation (the front lamps of a car lighting system) or
in terms of function (such as the direction indicators in the car’s lighting
system). While the term subsystem is frequently used to refer to a physical
subset of the system and module to refer to a functional subset, these terms
are treated as interchangeable.
Component An individual item. For the purpose of modelling, we can regard a
component as being something to be modelled as a single atomic unit, the
bottom level of system decomposition.
It is not impossible that there are several intermediate ‘subsystem’ layers between
system and component, depending on the complexity of the system and how this
system is to subdivided. Another possible decomposition, typically at system or
subsystem level, might be in terms of domain. For example, a domestic washing
machine might have its structure decomposed into water and electrical systems.
It will be appreciated that in simple cases, the product layer will be unnecessary
as a simple product can be regarded as embodying one system, which might be
decomposed into subsystems. The washing machine is a case in point.
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This decomposition of a system can be regarded as orthogonal to the idea that
each class of knowledge in the hierarchy introduced in Chapter 4 abstracts the
previous class of knowledge. It should be noted that there are problems with the
treatment off these hierarchies as being orthogonal, to be discussed later. This
introduces the idea that we can use a simple two dimensional grid to represent the
space in which the necessary models are placed. This grid can have the system
hierarchy as the vertical axis and the four classes of knowledge as the horizontal
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Figure 4.1: Grid to show possible model relationships
is expected to provide and also the models the system itself will derive, and can
also show relations between models, either expressed by the user, or implicit in the
system. In these diagrams, the models the user will have to provide are shown as
grey boxes and the models either included in the system (such as domain models)
or derived by the system’s reasoning as white ones. The relations the user should
explicitly express are shown as solid arrows and those native to the reasoner are
dashed arrows. The grid in use is illustrated in Figure 4.2 on page 79 and there is
a key to the symbols used in Appendix C on page 285.
In any given case, it is unlikely that all the layers in the system hierarchy will
be used. Indeed the typical, simple, case is that a system will be modelled as
being assembled from components. It does seem possible, however, that during
the design process, small systems will later be combined as subsystems of a larger
system and so on up to the product level. It seems likely that in most cases the
aim of the reasoning (certainly the simulation) will be to establish the behaviour of
the entity that is currently the highest in the hierarchy, possibly using the results
of earlier simulations of smaller systems to allow subsystems to be treated as
atomic components whose behavioural models are used in simulation of the newly
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integrated larger system (or product). Work has been done on this approach, see
(Snooke & Bell, 2002), with the aim of simplifying simulations of systems whose
size might otherwise render them intractable. The only layer, therefore that has a
fixed nature throughout the process is the component layer, as the diagram is based
on the idea that a component is treated as being atomic and is modelled primarily
in terms of its behaviour (or function). As has been observed, some representation
of component structure might be needed to complete the structural description of
a system for a domain based simulation engine, such as CIRQ.
It is also frequently the case that a specific approach will not use all the classes of
knowledge either. Indeed, one of the aims of the functional reasoning community
is to reason with a minimal set of knowledge. It is therefore the case that not all
the spaces in the grid will be filled. How different researchers’ model sets fit in
with the grid will be described later in the section.
Implicit in this hierarchy, from the point of view of modelling, is the idea that
any layer except the lowest (component) will need a representation of structure,
so that that element’s behaviour can be determined from the behavioural models
of the next layer down, and its structure. There remains a decision to be made
as to what level of complexity we wish to place at the bottom of our hierarchy,
represented in terms of behaviour (or function) rather than structure. For example,
do we treat an electric motor as a component, simply modelling it with some sort of
behavioural model (such as a state chart) or is its internal structure to be modelled,
allowing its behaviour to be derived from its structure and the necessary domain
laws from a suitable qualitative physics? The answer will depend on the nature of
the task to be undertaken, of course. An engineer designing an electrical system
is likely to be happy with a simple behavioural model of a motor, treating it as a
component of his design.
This leads to a characteristic of what is meant by a component in this context
being that it is modelled in terms of behaviour rather than structure — so is at
the bottom of the decomposition. A similar characteristic of the system level on
the hierarchy is also useful, as it is the top level of our decomposition, if it is to
be modelled usefully, it should be the case that the closed world assumption is
applicable so we can ignore influences on its behaviour from anything outside the
system. Any model reasoner will therefore use models at each of these layers but
the other two layers need not be used in a given case. The subsystem layer might
have models included to simplify management of the information (for example,
having a structural diagram split into separate subassemblies) or for functional
decomposition in that column of the grid. These two uses of the subsystem layer
mean that there will not necessarily be a mapping between subsystems in different
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columns. An example is the way that the transmitting and receiving functions of
a telephone both use components in the chassis and handset. The product layer
has been included largely for the sake of completeness. The main reason for it
might well be to allow several systems to be combined to analyse their interactions,
especially as this is a common cause of sneak circuits. It could, however, be argued
that once this is done, then the product becomes the system under analysis, so
this layer shifts. As noted above, (Snooke & Bell, 2002) describes an approach to
deriving a behavioural model of a system or subsystem and substituting this for
the structural model. This is intended to avoid the size of the system becoming
intractable for running design analysis simulations on a whole product (such as a
car) and this could be seen as a use of the product layer in the grid.
4.2.1 Relations between models within the grid
In the grid, there is a column for each class of knowledge, but it will be appreciated
that not all columns need be used, depending on the approach taken. Indeed, one
problem with this attempt to define the relationships between models is that
the distinctions are by no means clearly defined, nor are they consistent between
researchers. These relations will be discussed in general terms here and illustrated
by considering the model relationships used by different researchers later in this
section.
The aim of most of the approaches discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 is to generate a
behavioural model of the specific system under consideration, to occupy the space
at the top of the second column. How they differ is in what knowledge is used to
derive this. Individual cases will be discussed later. It is true that all approaches
have some knowledge of structure and the distinction between structure and be-
haviour is arguably the most clearly defined of those between adjacent columns
in the representation. This is because structure is essentially static while all the
other classes of knowledge are concerned with what things do and why, so are
concerned with changes to the system’s states and effects.
This structural model might be represented as a view of the system as a whole
or by each model including knowledge of its neighbours. Which is chosen might
depend both on how the reasoning is to be done, particularly whether a domain
rule based reasoning engine is used and how the knowledge itself is to be captured,
for example whether a schematic is used or whether individual components are
arrived at by a process of functional decomposition. In the case of functional
decomposition, the structure might be treated as implicit in knowledge of which
functions contribute to which of the functions that are higher up the functional
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hierarchy so there is no explicit representation of the system’s physical structure,
this being derived from the functional hierarchy.
As has already been observed, the view the user has of the structure need not be
the same as that used by the reasoning engine. If, say, the system structure was
derived from a schematic (so a global view) it would be perfectly feasible to use
that information merely to instantiate each component model with knowledge of
its neighbours. This might be useful in cases where a schematic covers several do-
mains, not all of which have a suitable domain level analyser. Equally, it would be
simple to use each component’s knowledge of its neighbours to construct a global
view of the system. If an electrical system had been specified using a functional
decomposition, this would support the possibility of introducing a circuit analysis
tool to analyse the behaviour of the system. This could be valuable if the circuit
topology is complex, so that the difficulties in finding current through bridges
that are associated with purely local structural knowledge apply in this case. One
problem with this is that a global system structural model will need the internal
structures of the components and this might not be available.
The relations between the other classes of knowledge are less clear cut. Indeed
the functional reasoning approach might well omit the behavioural models and
express components’ behaviour purely in terms of its function. The operational
definition of function as illustrated by (Hawkins & Woollons, 1998) can be regarded
as mapping more closely to behaviour while the purposive definition provides a
more explicit mapping between behaviour and purpose, especially when function
is defined as intended behaviour, as by (Iwasaki et al., 1993). This use of function
could be argued to include notions of teleology. This will be discussed further in
describing these sets of models.
It is tempting to regard the three right most columns in the grid as fairly arbi-
trary divisions of what is almost a continual gradation between representations of
behaviour at one end and purpose at the other. However, this observation must be
tempered by noting that as one of the most important tasks of design analysis is to
establish how well the system’s behaviour maps to its purpose, then in any given
reasoning system there is a need for a clear cut distinction between the capturing
of the knowledge of the intended behaviour and the knowledge that leads to the
derivation of the actual (simulated) behaviour. As far as possible, models used in
each illustration in this chapter have been placed consistently with the definitions
of the four classes of knowledge proposed earlier. That set of definitions does
provide a way of avoiding the danger of the divisions between the columns being
too arbitrary.
There are other shortcomings of the simple illustration of model relationships,
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which should be made plain, although it is felt that they do not prevent this matrix
illustration being useful. The first of these is that there is nowhere in the grid to
represent domain knowledge. There are arguments for placing it at the bottom,
especially if it is used to underpin (and so explain) component level behaviour in
the way “knowledge” is referred to at the bottom of the functional decomposition
in (Sticklen et al., 1989). However in the case of the domain level rules in (Price
et al., 1997) and the circuit reduction rules used by (Mauss & Neumann, 1996;
Milde et al., 1999) that are applied to the system, and as any such domain rule
is applicable to other systems within the domain, it can be regarded as global in
nature, so should arguably be added as a top layer. In both cases the domain
model cannot really be considered a part of the system in the way component
or subsystem models can, so it was felt reasonable not to allow space for domain
models and add them at the top or bottom of the grid as seemed appropriate.
The other point to be made is that it could be argued that the axes of the
grid are not truly orthogonal in that if a component’s function is expressed as its
effect on the system, then it could perhaps be argued that the relation between
functional and behavioural model must imply moving both across the grid, from
the behaviour to the function column, and up it, from component to subsystem
(or system if there is no subsystem layer in the decomposition). It is considered
that despite this, the grid remains useful. After all, a full functional decomposition
will end at a layer where the behaviour is known and the relationship implicit in
the representation of function as effect can be expressed as a link between the
component and (sub)system level functional model.
Despite these points, the simple model of model relationships appears useful
both in illustrating potential weaknesses in a specific model set and in showing
how different model sets differ.
The commercial design analysis tool developed from earlier work in Aberystwyth
is a useful starting point for comparison of different model sets as it happens to
use a quite a large set of models. It should be observed that individually, these
models are relatively simple and reusable.
The minimum set of models needed for FMEA by the design analysis tool de-
veloped at Aberystwyth is as shown in Figure 4.2. It will be seen that the user is
expected to provide a representation for each column in the grid, except teleology.
This might seem to ask the user for a good deal of work in input, but the com-
ponent behavioural models are reusable, being independent of the system. The
functional model is also reusable, being simply a list of functions the system is ex-
pected to achieve, these functions being related by boolean operators as described

































Figure 4.2: Minimum set of AutoSteve models for FMEA
gineer is working with, so that also comes with no additional effort. As a domain
level simulator is used to define the relationships between the components, the
components need internal structural models (shown at bottom left in the figure)
to be combined with the schematic to create the network of resistances for CIRQ.
These component structural models are also reusable.
The relationships in figure 4.2 are actually specific to FMEA. For sneak circuit
analysis the sets of models required are identical (though the models themselves do
differ slightly) but the relationship between the system behavioural model derived
by the reasoner and the system functional model is different. While in FMEA, the
functional model is simply used to interpret the results of a comparison between
the system behavioural models of the correctly working system and the system
affected by a failure, in SCA (and in design verification in general) the actual
comparison is between the system behavioural models and the required behaviour
represented by the functional model. This leads to the necessity of including the
required inputs to the system (that is, the switch positions) in the functional
model for SCA. This has been dispensed with for FMEA as the input states of
the two behavioural models can be compared.
The models shown in Figure 4.2 are the minimal set that might be required.
Typically, there will be functional models at the intermediate, subsystem, level,
as the system functions will be decomposed into the necessary subsidiary func-
tions, as described in (Snooke & Price, 1998). An example might be that a “head-
lamps” top level function might include subsidiary functions for side lights and tail
lamps. These functions themselves can be decomposed into component level func-
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tions leading to a one to one mapping between the bottom level of the functional
decomposition and component behaviour. It could be argued that this mapping
should be a requirement. This arises from the fact that it is possible to build
an incomplete functional model and use that. This leads to misleading results in
the FMEA report. For example it is quite possible to carelessly specify a head-
lamp circuit functional model in such a way that all functions are recorded as
being achieved as expected, despite one of the headlamps staying on full beam
the whole time. This leads to questions as to whether a component level mapping
between behaviour and function will prevent this, and also as to whether a full
functional model should specify what should not be happening (undesirable out-
puts to be avoided) as well as what should. One of the benefits of the Functional
Interpretation Language described in this thesis is that it avoids this pitfall. This
is discussed later in the thesis.
The “output property” 1 that links behaviour to function can be made to cross
both between rows and columns in the diagram. This is done by using a Boolean
expression to combine more than one output upon which a function depends as
part of the output property rather than completing the functional decomposition.
This is what leads to the possibility of the incomplete mapping between behaviour
and function outlined above and leads to the suggestion that such “diagonal”
relations between models in the grid should be avoided.
This set of models has been discussed at some length because of its importance
as a starting point for the present work. The grid can also be used to illustrate the
model relationships used by other researchers. This will now be done and both
the models and their relationships compared and contrasted. The interpretation
of the models used has, of course, been derived from the literature, as reviewed
in the preceding chapter and earlier in this chapter. It was felt better to separate
this material, partly as it was decided that introduction of different approaches
was better separated from this more interpretive discussion, as interweaving the
two might be more confusing for the reader and partly simply to emphasise that
this material is interpretive, and the interpretation is my own, rather than the
original authors’, and others may prefer different interpretations.
Attention has already been drawn to the idea that there are two contrasting
approaches to model based reasoning. These are a “bottom up” behaviour based
approach (deriving behaviour from structure and component or domain behaviour)
1In AutoSteve, those components that are interfaces to the system have “interface properties”
attached to them. These might be input properties, which allow the user to set input states of
the system using them, so will be attached to switches, or output properties, which associate
a component with a system output. For example, a lamp will have the output property “lit”
associated with the state of having current flowing through the filament.
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and the top down functional reasoning approach in which structure is derived from
function. These contrasting approaches are illustrated by the different model sets
used.
The model set described above, see figure 4.2, is consistent with a behaviour
based approach, so includes structural and behavioural models as the basis for
simulation and adds simple functional models for interpretation. A similar model


















Figure 4.3: Models used in the behavioural approach
the set of models used for simulation is similar to that in figure 4.2, though the
models themselves differ. The main difference is the replacement of CIRQ as the
domain level simulator by their tree decomposition of the circuit. This does suggest
that it would be possible to swap between these two alternatives relatively easily.
How easily depends also on the models themselves being similar. The component
models are similar, either can use dependency expressions (expressed as if...then
rules) as are the structural models, as both represent the circuit as a network of
resistances.
The most important difference is the addition of the interpretive functional mod-
els in figure 4.2, but the similarity of the models used for simulation does suggest
that if it was desired, a similar set of interpretive models could be added.
It will be appreciated that the model set used by (Mauss & Neumann, 1996) is
also similar, but as that paper does not explain how components with complex
internal behaviour (such as relays) are modelled, that model will be missing. This
would tend to militate against easy addition of functional models for interpretation
of behaviour.
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These model sets contrast quite strongly with the model sets used by the func-
tional reasoners.
The functional reasoning approach has components’ rôles defined in terms of
their function in the system, so there is a functional decomposition down to the






















Figure 4.4: Models used in Functional Representation
is (implicitly) derived from the functional decomposition, which is underpinned
by knowledge of components’ behaviour. The functional models in the Functional
Modeling approach (Sticklen et al., 1991) actually incorporate knowledge of the
structure (in that each component functional model knows which are its neigh-
bours) and behaviour. This does perhaps raise the question of how appropriate
this approach is for design verification, the aim of which is to compare what the
system actually does with what it is intended to do. There might be thought to
be a danger that if the composition of a system is defined in terms of function, the
actual behaviour simulation will miss any possible errors in the physical specifi-
cation. There is also the need to define the functional model for a component. If
this is specific to the system, then such models are not reusable, and it might be
argued that they are less intuitive for the user to build than the kind of context
free behavioural models used by (Snooke, 1999) and (Milde et al., 1999). How-
ever, this relationship between functional and physical structure does introduce
the possibility of using knowledge of the functional structure of a proposed system
to guide the design of its physical structure. This is consistent with the model of
the design process used in (Iwasaki et al., 1993).
The use of a similar functional decomposition is common to other approaches
to functional reasoning. In (Chandrasekaran & Josephson, 2000), the top level
function in a decomposition is described in terms of the device’s effect on its en-
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vironment. This is contrasted with the “device centred” functions lower down the
decomposition, which are closer to abstract behavioural models, described in terms
of variables that are internal to the system. For example, an electrical switch is
defined in terms of the voltage across its terminals (if closed) and the absence of
current through the switch if it is open. The examples quoted in (Chandrasekaran,
2005) are dependency expressions not dissimilar to the component behaviour mod-
els used in (Milde et al., 1999). One slight difference is that a behavioural model of
a switch might be expressed in terms of its electrical resistance as the behavioural
simulator can use domain knowledge to find the switch’s effect on the voltages and
current in the circuit.
The models used by (Iwasaki et al., 1993) are similar, but as their representation
of function includes explicit notions of purpose and as they seek to model the
design process, then there is a fuller set of models in both the functional and espe-































Figure 4.5: Models in CFRL
includes the function’s goal, that suggests that part of the functional representa-
tion belongs in the teleology column of the grid. The additional (optional) models
of subsidiary goals and functions are intended to represent their model of func-
tional refinement as part of the design process. However, it is arguable that this
model is an over simplification of the design process. A design support tool should,
though, be able to offer support to all stages of the process, and so arguably needs
to support the idea of functional refinement. The more complete functional model
that should result would address the problem identified above with the functional
labelling in figure 4.2, but if the tool is only to be used for behaviour based anal-
ysis of a system whose physical design is done, such a model might be unduly
elaborate, and capturing the necessary functional knowledge might be excessively
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time consuming for the user.
The multimodeling approach of (Chittaro et al., 1993), figure 4.6, does include
























Figure 4.6: Models used in Multimodeling
cation model of system behaviour is derived from knowledge of the components’
functional rôles which are, in turn, derived from knowledge of the components’
behaviour.
It could be argued that the express representation of a component’s functional
rôle is unnecessary, as in many cases it can be implicitly derived from knowledge
of its behaviour and the system structure. For example, the functional rôle of
the wire connecting the left headlamp main beam pin can readily be identified as
part of the path of current from battery to lamp, so its rôle is to transmit any
flow. There is arguably no need for such elaborate functional modelling unless it
is of help in refining the design, as in the model of the design process suggested in
(Iwasaki et al., 1993).
It will be seen that in all the cases illustrated above, the job of the reasoner is
to generate a model of the system’s behaviour. This contrasts with the aim of
(Falkenhainer & Forbus, 1991) which is to generate a sufficient model to allow a
specific query to be answered. It might be suggested that the aim of the reasoner
in their work is to generate a behavioural model of a sufficient subset of the
system to allow the query to be answered. In figure 4.7, this different aim has
been illustrated by placing the reasoner generated model in the subsystem layer
of the grid. This implies an interpretation of the aim of compositional modelling
in terms of its identifying a subsystem whose behavioural model is sufficient for



















Figure 4.7: Models for Compositional Modeling
It might be suggested that the aim of the compositional modelling approach is
better suited to other tasks than design analysis. The example given in their
paper, of using it to find the effect of changing the air flow through the firebox of
a steam turbine, suggests it is well suited to training of operators of systems, for
example.
It is felt that these differences of aim between compositional modelling and the
other approaches, all of which seem to be aimed more at using model based rea-
soning for design of systems, means that this approach can be considered more
peripheral to the aim of this research.
4.2.2 Discussion of the model sets
The most apparent difference between the various sets of models illustrated above
is the idea that they can be grouped by whether they are associated with a be-
havioural or functional approach. This seems to confirm the idea that there are
two contrasting approaches. It is worth noting, however, that most of the reasoners
do have the same aim, to generate a behavioural model of the subject system.
In most of the approaches illustrated, functional models are used as part of the
simulation process, in that functional knowledge of components is used to derive
the behaviour of the system as a whole. The exception is the approach illustrated
in figure 4.2, (Price, 1998), where the simulation is purely based on knowledge
of the system’s structure and components’ behaviours and the functional models
are used to interpret this behaviour in terms of the system’s purpose. This is the
aim of the Functional Interpretation Language that is the result of the present
work. The similarity of the model sets used for simulation in figure 4.2 and the
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set in figure 4.3 suggest that a similar approach to interpretation of their simula-
tion would be possible, using functional labelling or the Functional Interpretation
Language. This further suggests that the present work, building as it does on
the functional labelling approach, is not dependent on any specific approach to
simulation. However, its use for interpretation of simulation does perhaps imply
a behaviour based (as opposed to a function based) simulation.
In general the approaches illustrated all use a component centred ontology, the
main exception being that of (Falkenhainer & Forbus, 1991), which is processed
based. Therefore all uses of functional models seem to be associated with the com-
ponent centred ontology. This is a natural, intuitive approach to design analysis,
as the design of a system can be seen as the specification and connection of the
components used in the system. That being the case, the present research was
also centred on that ontology.
Having explored the background to the use of functional modelling as the basis





This chapter will introduce and discuss the nature of the proposed language for the
representation of function, in the light of the definition proposed in the previous
chapter,
an object O has a function F if it achieves an intended goal by virtue
of some external trigger T resulting in the achievement of an external
effect E.
This can be less formally described as a representation of function in terms of the
triggers and effects of a system that result in its meeting some intended purpose,
and as such in terms of how a device fulfils its purpose when viewed externally.
The discussion will concentrate on the use of functional representation for the
interpretation of the results of simulation, to drive the automated production of
design analysis reports. The usefulness of the proposed functional representation
for other tasks (such as functional reasoning and functional refinement of a pro-
posed design) will be introduced briefly here but will be discussed at greater length
in Chapter 11.
The definition of function as a relation between trigger, effect and purpose leads
to the need for a representation of function to incorporate the three elements:-
• The trigger of the function can be thought of as the preconditions for the
correct achievement of the function. This is a Boolean expression which, if it
resolves to true, means the function’s effects are expected. This allows sev-
eral input states of the system to be identified and combined appropriately,
using Boolean operators.
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• The effect amounts to the post-conditions of the function. This is also a
Boolean expression, so (loosely) the function is achieved when the post-
conditions resolve to true. The use of Boolean operators allows cases where
a function depends on several effects to be described.
• A representation of the purpose the function is to fulfil. A possible ap-
proach is to have a distinct teleological description that is referred to by the
functional description, as being achieved by the function. This is discussed
further below.
The trigger and effect between them provide a link to the behavioural model of
the system, being concerned with inputs and outputs respectively. These three
elements of a functional representation will be discussed in turn, following a dis-
cussion of the requirements of a functional representation and of the use of logic
in recognising achievement of a system function.
As elements of the Functional Interpretation Language are introduced in this
chapter, it is an opportune point to introduce the convention that elements of
the language and quotations of functional descriptions are highlighted using a
typewriter typeface and in addition keywords of the language, including the
conventional logical relations, are in CAPITAL LETTERS.
5.1 Requirements of a functional representation
Before discussing the proposed representation of function, it seems worth briefly
summarising requirements for a useful representation, specifically in the light of
its use in interpretation of a simulation of an engineered system. The important
requirements of a functional language are that it should be:-
1. Capable of recognising whether the purpose is being fulfilled. This naturally
implies a mapping to some description of purpose. This is consistent with the
reference to the idea of a function fulfilling a purpose in definition of function
given earlier. This also requires a mapping to the simulated behaviour. What
is required is some way of recognising whether or not the simulated behaviour
fulfils an intended purpose of the system, so the behaviour is considered in
terms of the truth or falsehood of the achievement of a function, and in turn
the fulfilling of the intended purpose. This follows the functional labelling
approach of (Price, 1998) and a logical basis for recognition of function that
allows the development of recognisers for the achievement or otherwise of
some function forms the subject of the next section.
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2. Applicable to static or dynamic functions. This is one of the three desiderata
for function in (Chandrasekaran & Josephson, 1996).
3. Applicable to physical and abstract objects. This is also one of the desiderata
for function in (Chandrasekaran & Josephson, 1996) and is clearly signifi-
cant if we are to use the representation of function in analysis of software
based systems. The use of the proposed representation for interpretation of
software based systems will be discussed later.
4. Independent of the system, specifically of the representation of its structure
and behaviour. By this is meant that it should be possible to construct a
functional description or specification of the intended system with no ex-
plicit reference to the details of the system itself. This increases the lan-
guage’s usefulness for functional refinement of a design and also improves
the reusability of the functional model. One aspect of this is that the func-
tional representation might be independent of the domain(s) of the internal
workings of the subject system. For example, the purposes of gas and electric
hobs are identical and at an admittedly rather high level of abstraction they
both consume energy from some external source and convert that energy
into heat. Therefore, at this abstract level, a similar functional description
might be used for either. This independence from the system is important
if the functional language is to be used to support the design of a system by
functional refinement as the functional description will precede the specifica-
tion of the details of the system. It also allows the functional language to be
used for specification of detailed requirements of the planned system. The
idea that the functional model is independent of the target system differs
from the approach to functional labelling in (Price, 1998), where functions
were attached to existing behaviours of significant components.
5. Capable of specifying expected behaviour to an arbitrary level of precision.
What is meant by this that the functional model can be developed as far
as is necessary to specify the intended (external) behaviour of the system.
It will be appreciated that there is a likely conflict between the detail with
which a functional model specifies the intended behaviour of a system and
the model’s reusability. For example, if the functional model of a gas hob
specifies that to light a ring, the knob should be turned to some appropriate
setting and then pushed in to trigger ignition of the resultant gas flow, then
this description is not useful for an electric hob. This is valuable for func-
tional specification of a system as the intended behaviour can be specified
without reference to the implementation. One specific area where this is
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valuable is if a functional specification is used to clarify the requirements
of a system early in the design process. For example rather than simply
stating that it is required to dip a car’s headlamps the functional model
could specify how this is to be achieved in terms of the user interactions,
such as specifying that whenever the headlamps are first switched on they
are dipped and that the dip switch itself is pulled and released to both dip
the headlamps and return them to main beam, as opposed to simply having
two positions of the dip switch. Later in the design process, the candidate
design can then be verified against these requirements by simulation and
interpretation of the results, using the specified functional description.
It will be seen that two of the three desiderata for a functional representation in
(Chandrasekaran & Josephson, 1996) have been included. As the present work is
concerned with functional representation in design analysis of engineered systems,
the third, that a functional representation should be usable for both natural and
man made systems, is not relevant. How the Functional Interpretation Language
meets these requirements will discussed later in this chapter. In addition, there
are the requirements identified in the introduction. These are that the language
be capable of describing
• Systems where a function might be partially achieved.
• Systems whose functionality depends on intermittent or sequential effects.
• Systems where there is a danger of the required effects being achieved in an
untimely manner (typically after an excessive delay since the function was
triggered).
• Systems with subsidiary functions whose achievement depends on the state
of some other system function.
How the proposed language approaches these requirements forms the content of
Chapters 6 to 10.
As the first of these requirements is that the functional model can be used to
establish whether or not a function has been achieved, the main rôle of the func-
tional representation is to abstract the behavioural state of the system in these
terms. The basis for this is described in the following section.
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5.2 Logic and functional description
If a representation of function is to be used to interpret the results of simulation, in
other words to express the system’s behaviour in terms of its purpose, then some
method of recognising the achievement (or otherwise) of the function is required,
along with a representation of (or mapping to) the purpose the function is to
fulfil. What is required is a mapping between the behavioural state of the system
and the functional model, such that a behaviour can be identified as achieving
the function or not, and through this whether or not it succeeds in achieving the
system’s purpose. To return to the simple torch example in Section 4.1.5.1, the
simulation of the correctly working (and correctly designed) torch might, assuming
a domain based electrical simulator, show that when the switch is closed, there
is current flowing through the lamp (bulb). Informally, the definition of function
given in Section 4.1.5.1 can be stated as “that relation between input (trigger)
and output (effect) that achieves some purpose” so if we identify the purpose as
being to “light the dark”, the trigger with the switch being closed and the effect
as current flowing through the bulb, then that behavioural state can be identified
as fulfilling the torch’s purpose. However, if a wire comes adrift, so it no longer
makes the required connection, then switching on the torch no longer triggers
the required effect and the torch no longer fulfils its purpose. Incidentally, in
this case it seems safe representing the lamp as shining whenever there is current
flowing if any failure of the bulb (such as the filament breaking) that prevents
it lighting also prevents current from flowing. Such a condition might well be
associated with some specific state in the component’s behavioural model. For
example a lamp might have a qualitative behavioural description along the lines
of if filament.i = ACTIVE then state is LIT and that state might be used
to map to the functional model of the torch. In this case the use of state is arguably
an unnecessary complication, however. The relation between the simulation (and
so the behavioural models) and interpretation (and so the functional model) is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 11. Where a behavioural description is used
in illustration of an example in the present thesis, it will be done (implicitly) in
terms of state.
This approach to functional modelling follows (Price, 1998), with the change that
the proposed representation of function includes the trigger as well as the effect.
This is necessary for design verification and indeed is added to the functional model
when the tool developed as a result of earlier work in Aberystwyth (AutoSteve)
is used for SCA, see (Price et al., 1996a). This approach has the advantage that
a functional model need only be associated with the system as a whole and it
need only be concerned with those components that form the “interface” between
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the system and its environment, typically the controlling components (such as
switches) and the effectors, simplifying the functional modelling. There is no need
to add functional models for purely internal components (such as connections in
the case of the torch) as the simulation does not require them and the system’s
functional model is stated in terms of its interfaces with the system’s environment,
any significant effects of malfunctions in internal components will show at these
interfaces. This might require additional behavioural models that describe failure
mode behaviours of components, at least for failure analysis.
The trigger and effect of a function are treated as Boolean expressions that be-
tween them serve to define the state of the function. The trigger can be seen as
the precondition of the function, showing when the function’s effect is expected,
and the effect as its post-condition. The present representation of function dif-
fers from most other representations by its inclusion of the trigger that leads to
the expected effect (output). The trigger and effect expressions are mapped to
appropriate properties of the system’s structural and behavioural model. This is
discussed later. This has the advantage for the present work that the represen-
tation of function is intrinsically capable of showing the unexpected achievement
of the effect, which does seem to be a potential weakness of the use of function.
Naturally, if the trigger is false and the effect true, then the effect is achieved un-
expectedly, unless, of course, the same effect can result from some other trigger,
as part of some other function. This leads to the idea that there are actually four
states that might be associated with the achievement of a function, as shown in
Table 5.1. The table shows that if the trigger (precondition) is false, the function












Table 5.1: Achievement of function using trigger and effect.
should not be achieved, so the effect (post-condition) should also be false. If the
effect resolves to true, there is something wrong. If the trigger resolves to true
then the function should be achieved and clearly if the effect is false in this case
then the function has failed. Therefore a function can fail in two ways — either
by not being achieved when expected (referred to as failed, Fa) or the effect being
achieved when not expected (achieved unexpectedly or unexpected, Un, in the
Functional Interpretation Language). It will be seen that the trigger and effect
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sharing a common value (whether true or false), is consistent with correct be-
haviour of the system. Either the function is correctly achieved or not intended,
which case has been labelled inoperative (In). Despite this pairing off of values
as being consistent with correct behaviour of the system (whenever the truths of
the trigger and effect expression agree) or not, there remains a need to distinguish
between the two cases of inconsistent behaviour(failed and unexpected). This is
because the consequences of these two cases differ. As a function’s state is consis-
tent with the expected behaviour of the system if the trigger and effect have the
same truth value, this consistency could be identified using the Boolean expression
NOT XOR. However, this would lose the distinction between the two cases.
These functional states are used as keywords in the language so they can be used
in specifying the triggering of some function that depends on the state of some
other system function. This is discussed in Chapter 10.
The four function states, inoperative, achieved, failed and unexpected are defined
in terms of the truth of the trigger and effect expressions, so for example a function
having failed means that is trigger is true and its effect is false or in practice that
the trigger has not resulted in the expected effect. The abbreviations as given in
parentheses in the table are those used elsewhere in the thesis. Failed has been
abbreviated as ‘Fa’ rather than ‘F’ to avoid confusion with false and the other
three function states given similar two letter abbreviations. If we let f be some
function that depends on a trigger expression t and an effect expression e, we can
restate table 5.1 as four rules to define the four function states, inoperative, In(f),
failed, Fa(f), unexpected, Un(f) and achieved Ac(f). The function f is said to
be inoperative if neither the trigger not effect are present.
In(f) ⇔ ¬t ∧ ¬e (5.1)
If the trigger is present but the effect absent, function f is failed.
Fa(f) ⇔ t ∧ ¬e (5.2)
The effect being present without the trigger means f is unexpected.
Un(f) ⇔ ¬t ∧ e (5.3)
If both trigger and effect are present the function f is achieved.
Ac(f) ⇔ t ∧ e (5.4)
All the formal definitions of the rules used in the Functional Interpretation Lan-
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guage are summarised in Appendix A on page 275.
In addition to these four functional states, it is sometimes useful to define the
state of a function purely in terms of one or other of its trigger or effect. A function
f is said to be triggered, Tr(f), if its trigger t is true regardless of the truth of its
effect e.
Tr(f) ⇔ t ⇔ t ∧ (e ∨ ¬e) (5.5)
Likewise, f is said to be effective, Ef(f), if its effect e is true regardless of its
trigger t.
Ef(f) ⇔ e ⇔ e ∧ (t ∨ ¬t) (5.6)
This allows the four function states inoperative, failed, unexpected and achieved
to be defined in terms of these function states, by replacing the trigger and effect
with the triggered and effective function states.
In(f) ⇔ ¬Tr(f) ∧ ¬Ef(f) (5.7)
Fa(f) ⇔ Tr(f) ∧ ¬Ef(f) (5.8)
Un(f) ⇔ ¬Tr(f) ∧ Ef(f) (5.9)
Ac(f) ⇔ Tr(f) ∧ Ef(f) (5.10)
It will be seen that these are identical to the four rules (5.1 to 5.4) given earlier.
These relations are useful in the text and also for describing dependencies between
functions, as discussed in Chapter 10. All of these relations can be traced back to
the truth of the triggers and / or effects, and as such there is no ambiguity.
The operator TRIGGERS is used to represent the relationship between the trigger
and effect, table 5.1 can be regarded as the truth table for this operator. The
trigger and effect between them serve to show the state of achievement of the
function, so in combination they serve as the recogniser for the function. The ex-
pression that precedes TRIGGERS describes the function’s trigger and the keyword
is followed by the required effect. For example, the recogniser for the functional
description for a torch might read like this.
switch_on TRIGGERS lamp_lit
Here switch_on is a label that represents the trigger and lamp_lit the effect.
These labels are then attached to appropriate properties of component behavioural
description. This is described in Section 5.6.
There are arguably objections to the idea that the function is achieved unex-
pectedly if the effect is true and the trigger false. Pedantically, if the function is
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to be defined as being dependent on both trigger and effect, then it should not
be regarded as being achieved if either are false. This does lead to an interesting
point, however, which is that the consequences of unexpected achievement of a
function’s effect do not, typically, relate to the purpose, while the consequences of
failure of the expected effects do. To re-use the headlamps example, if the lamps
do not light when expected the goal of lighting the road ahead is not achieved
but if they are achieved unexpectedly, the consequences are dazzling of oncoming
road users, unnecessary drain on the battery (if the engine is not running), and, of
course, the road ahead might not be lit by the lamps at all, if it is daylight. There
is therefore some asymmetry between the consequences of failure of a function and
the unexpected achievement of its effect. This will be considered further in the
sections discussing the effect of a function and the purpose to which the function
relates.
As the trigger and effect are Boolean expressions, the Boolean operators can be
used to specify the trigger and effect in cases where the achievement of a function
depends on required combinations of triggers and effects, such as a combination
of switch positions and / or several outputs being required. This is the simplest
approach to decomposition of a system function and is discussed alongside the
other possible approaches in the following chapter.
It appears to be the case that this four valued table applies less well to component
function, as this will have a closer correspondence with its behaviour. Specifically
it is unlikely that a component function’s effect will be achieved unexpectedly as in
this case the trigger will generally be the actual cause of the effect, instead of being
merely one end of a causal network that leads to the effect. For example, a lamp’s
(that is a bulb’s) function might be “light room achieved when filament current
is active triggers shining”. In this case the functional description adds little to
the behavioural description as the behaviour of a lamp can be described in the
same way, except for the reference to purpose, which arguably is more a property
of the system the lamp is a part of, though it does (implicitly) suggest that the
lamp should be in a room! As the proposed use of the functional representation
is the interpretation of a system’s behaviour with reference to its purpose, this is
not seen as an undue difficulty. It is out of concern for the complexity of causality
in a system that the term trigger has been preferred to cause. This is not to rule
out the use of this representation of function for component functions, a lamp’s
function could be represented in terms of its being triggered by the presence of a
current triggering the effect of light delivered to the rest of the system. However,
it might be felt that the express description of purpose is superfluous at this level,
unless functional models are used in simulation and a description of purpose is
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useful in guiding the structural design of a system. For example, if a functional
decomposition of some system includes the knowledge that a wire’s purpose is to
conduct electricity to some specified effector, this guides the structural design by
implying that the wire be on a path to that effector.
Having shown that the state of achievement of a system function can be recog-
nised in terms of the truth of pre and post conditions (its trigger and effect) the
nature of the trigger and effect can now be discussed. In the simplest case, each
need be no more than a label which acts as a hook to which some property of the
simulated behavioural model can be attached.
5.3 The trigger
The trigger can be thought of as the required precondition for the function to be
expected. If the trigger resolves to false, then the trigger’s effects are unexpected
and its purpose can remain unfulfilled. It might, of course, be the case that a
given effect might be associated with more than one function, and so with more
than one trigger. A possible example might be an industrial monitoring system
where a hooter sounds to draw attention to any one of a number of failures in the
process being monitored, which failure being distinguished by a different warning
lamp. In this case, of course, the hooter sounding is not an unexpected effect of
one such warning function if another process failure has triggered it.
Another view of the trigger is that it describes an interface with which a user
(either human or some other encompassing system) interacts with the system being
designed. It can be thought of the controlling condition that calls on the function.
A switch is a typical example of such an interface. When specifying the trigger
for a system function, any power supply will generally not be modelled as part of
the trigger. This is simply because the power is either part of the system (such as
a battery) or beyond the scope of the system design, such as the public electricity
or gas supply, the testing of which is not really part of the design process for a
specific mains powered device. An exception to this case is where the failure of
the external power supply should result in some specific behaviour of the system,
such as the starting of a backup power supply to allow the system to be shut down
correctly. Even in these cases, the power supply need not be treated as part of
the trigger of the main function, instead there will typically be a backup function
triggered by the failure. This is discussed in Chapter 10.
The idea that the trigger is concerned with control of the system rather than
driving it is one area where system level function typically differs from component
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function. In the case of an effector component of a dynamic system, the input
that triggers its function will be of energy, the task of the rest of the system being
to deliver that energy and additionally control its delivery.
As has already been noted, a function might depend on several triggers which
can be related using Boolean operators. It is quite possible that any of the three
binary Boolean operators might be used in describing a trigger. The headlamp
example mentioned above includes a trigger that combines two necessary compo-
nents, combined using AND. While this is, perhaps the most usual operator, there
are cases where the other binary operators (OR and XOR) might be used. An exter-
nal light, for example, might be switched on either manually or by an automatic
device that senses the ambient light level and switches on the external light if the




Here, of course, the simulation will need some way of modelling the idea that the
ambient light is low. XOR is useful for describing the typical dual switched light in
a stairwell, for example, where if one or other of the two switches is in the down




In both these cases, of course, the effect and purpose associated with each trigger
are the same. The use of the Boolean operators is discussed in greater detail in
the following chapter, which discusses decomposition of function.
Having suggested that one requirement of a functional language is that it applies
to static as well as dynamic systems, following (Chandrasekaran & Josephson,
1996), then a discussion of how the idea of a trigger might work in a static sys-
tem seems necessary. The idea that a function is achieved by an effect resulting
from a trigger does, it is appreciated, appear more consistent with dynamic sys-
tems. However there seems no difficulty in using the approach to describe a static
function, such as support. For example, a bridge might be required to support a
vehicle of some specified gross weight. This might be expressed as follows.
loading NOT greater than max weight TRIGGERS NOT collapse
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The maximum weight is that intended (plus, presumably, some safety margin)
and the effect of not collapsing might be defined in terms of a maximum deflection
of the centre of the bridge. These can be specified when associating the functional
description of the bridge to the simulation or could be specified in the functional
description itself.
loading <= than 25 tonnes TRIGGERS deflection < 10 millimetres
On the one hand this seems a reasonable part of the functional specification of
a bridge (though the figures might not be realistic!), but it does raise questions
as to how best to associate the functional description with the simulation. An
approach to associating simulations and functional models is discussed later.
5.4 The effect
At its simplest the effect in a functional description is, like the trigger, simply
a label to which a property of the system’s behaviour can be attached. The
nature of this property is independent of the functional description itself. It might
be an output, as will be the case if the system is a software module, or a goal
state, such as a centrally locked car’s doors all being locked. The effect does, of
course need to be linked to some recognisable feature of the system’s behavioural
model. It will typically be some property associated with an effector component.
It should certainly be some component whose effect on the system’s environment
is apparent.
While the use of logical operators is as applicable to effects as it is to triggers,
in practice OR and XOR will seldom (if ever) be used to combine effects. This
is because it is extremely unusual for a system to have a trigger that triggers,
non-deterministically, one or both of two possible effects, such that either is an
acceptable way of fulfilling the same purpose. Indeed, if this seems to be the
case, then typically the trigger should be better defined. In the case of a software
module, for example, an input might result in one of two outputs but if there is
no need to distinguish between the outputs (they both fulfil the same purpose)
then what is the purpose of the module? It is, perhaps, not impossible that for
some analyses, all that is required is to know that the module handles the input
concerned without crashing, in which case, arguably, the different outputs might
be immaterial. This seems unlikely but should not be ruled out. This, combined
with the possibility of wanting to describe a non-deterministic system, suggests
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that the use of OR and XOR should be allowed in combining effects. One possible
approach to this case might be to have a tool that implements the functional
language warn the user about the use of these operators in this situation.
It does seem worth noting that where a description of function is used to interpret
a simulation, then the effect on which the function depends does need to be capable
of representation in a simulation. This does restrict its use for cases where a
function is aesthetic and / or subjective, such as the function (strictly, the purpose)
of placing a potted plant in the room is to improve the room’s ambience. The anti-
corrosive properties of paint could be represented, while the aesthetic properties
could not.
Having considered the two components of a functional description’s recogniser,
we can now consider the representation of the purpose the function is to fulfil.
Note that from hereon a single function, associated with the achievement of some
purpose of a system will be referred to as a “functional description”, the term
“functional model” being reserved for the set of functional descriptions associated
with some system. In the case of a simple system like the torch, therefore, the
functional model might contain but one functional description. However, for many
systems, the system’s functional model will include several functional descriptions.
For example, a car exterior lighting system’s functional model will include func-
tional descriptions for headlamps (dipped and main beam), tail lamps, brake lights
and so on.
5.5 Representation of purpose
At its simplest, in principle, a description of purpose need consist of no more than
a textual description of the purpose, so the purpose of a torch might be no more
than the entry “help the user see in the dark”. This could, of course easily be
incorporated a functional description. The keyword ACHIEVES is used to indicate
the purpose associated with a function, so the torch functional description can be
expanded to this.
FUNCTION torch
ACHIEVES "help the user see in the dark"
BY
switch_on TRIGGERS lamp_lit
The keyword FUNCTION labels the function itself and BY indicates the recogniser.
However, for design analysis there is more interest in unexpected results (whether
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failure to achieve the required effect or unexpected achievement of an unwanted
effect) so that the functional description in (Price, 1998) includes a description of
the consequences, both of failure and unexpected achievement of a function. As
the consequences of failure of the function (the expected effects not being achieved)
will typically relate to the purpose of the function (so if the torch fails to light, the
user is not helped to see in the dark) these can neatly be added to the description
of purpose. Similarly, the values for severity and detection, used to arrive at the
failure’s risk priority number (see Section 2.1.1.5 on page 24), can also be added
to the description of purpose. The value for occurrence is associated with the
likelihood of the component failure that gives rise to the failure of the function, so
is included in the component’s behavioural model. It is not part of the functional
description. The torch’s functional description might now be further expanded.
FUNCTION torch
ACHIEVES "help the user see in the dark"





Separating the description of purpose (teleological model) from the functional
description itself simplifies the functional description. It is also consistent with
the idea that function is concerned with how a purpose is fulfilled rather than the





Here see_in_dark is a reference to a separate teleological model.
PURPOSE see_in_dark
DESCRIPTION "help the user see in the dark"
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE "user not helped to see"
SEVERITY 5
DETECTION 2
This has the practical advantage of assisting in reuse of existing information. For
example, the purpose, consequences of failure and severity value of a stop lamp
100
system on any road vehicle are similar and such information could well be reused
by functional models that associate the function with the lighting of one lamp
(on a motorbike), two (on a car) or three (if there is an extra repeater fitted).
The alternative is, of course, to use the same functional description in each case,
but this cannot be done without changes to the composition of the effect, at
the very least, so reusing only the teleological description might be simpler and
more convenient in this case. The idea that a purpose is external to the system
(and therefore generally to the simulated world) makes a formal description more
difficult and arguably unnecessary. One of the purposes of the functional language
is therefore to provide a connection between the informal teleological description
and the formal representation of behaviour associated with the reasoner.
While the consequences of failure of a function will be associated with the purpose
the function is associated with, the consequences of unexpected achievement of
the effects will frequently not be. For example, the consequences of a torch lamp
staying on when switched off are concerned with draining the battery rather than
seeing in the dark. Therefore these consequences typically will not be included
in the teleological model but instead will be associated with the link between the
functional description and the simulation, as will be discussed later. However,
there are occasions where unexpected achievement of a function’s effects do relate
to the system failing to fulfil its purpose. For example, if a car’s stop lights stay
lit when the brake pedal is not being pressed, the driver of a following car is not
shown that the car is stopping. Therefore, a teleological model can, optionally,
include a similar set of consequences, and values for severity and detection for
unexpected achievement of a function’s effects. The idea that the consequences
of unexpected achievement of a function’s effects are attached to the link between
the functional model and the system’s behavioural representation is discussed in
the following section, on the relationship between those two models. Note that the
inclusion of the values for severity and detection will depend on the use to which
the design analysis is being put, and they need not be present. In this thesis, their
use is assumed, partly because their presence is of help in clarifying features of
the Functional Interpretation Language.
5.6 Relationship with the simulation
The inclusion of the trigger and the use of labels to represent the trigger and effect
of the function allow the functional description to be built independently of the
target system. This has the advantage that the language can be used for tasks
in which the functional model is built before the system itself, such as supporting
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the functional refinement of a design and capturing functional requirements of a
possible system. It should also encourage reuse of functional models.
For interpretation of a simulation, we naturally require a mapping between the
system’s behavioural model and the functional model. The approach taken here
is to link a complete functional description with appropriate properties of the
system’s behavioural model. This does follow (Price, 1998) in that the models
are actually those of significant components, that is input components (such as
switches) and effectors. These behavioural models are labelled as implementing
a trigger or effect of a function, from some existing functional description. For
example, the component models of the torch will include a switch and a lamp
(bulb). The switch might be modelled as having two positions, open and closed.
On attaching the model of the torch system to the torch functional description, the
switch being closed will implement the trigger of the torch function. The model
of the torch will then have the following attached on associating the system with
an appropriate functional model.
switch.position = closed IMPLEMENTS torch.switch_on
Here, torch is, of course, a reference to a functional description and switch_on
a reference to that model’s trigger. Naturally such an attachment will use com-
ponents that control inputs to the system being simulated
Implementing effects is a little more complex. An effect might be an output
(such as light) or a goal state, such as a car’s central locking system having all
the doors locked. It also requires the consequence of unexpected achievement of
the effect adding. If an effect is achieved unexpectedly (that is, when it is not
triggered) this failure of the system will have its own consequences, distinct from
those associated with failure to achieve an expected effect (that is, failure of the
function). These consequences will, like the consequence of failure of a function,
consist of a textual description of the consequences and (depending on the use
to which the language is being put) values for severity and detection. Attaching
these consequence to the association between system and functional description
maintains the independence of the functional description from its target system
and so encourages reuse of the functional description itself. The IMPLEMENTS
connection for the torch effect is as follows
lamp.state = lit IMPLEMENTS torch.lamp_lit




The lamp has a (possibly redundant) state description. All that is required is
that the property of the system that implements an effect can be recognised by
the simulation. In this case the state description could be dispensed with and a
(qualitative) current used instead, as shown here.
lamp.current = active IMPLEMENTS torch.lamp_lit
UNEXPECTED_CONSEQUENCES "Drain on battery"
SEVERITY 3
DETECTION 2
This does assume that there is no failure of the bulb that allows current to
flow through it without it lighting. In general, where such associations are shown
in this thesis, they will be shown using state, for the sake of consistency. The
nature of the relationship between the functional model, its target system and the
simulation is discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.
One aspect of the links between a functional description and its associated system
is how this affects the precision of the functional description. Should the functional
description itself specify the possible triggers of a function, or should this be left
to the association between function and system? To illustrate, a torch might have
a sprung push-to-make switch to switch on the torch when it is only required for a
short flash, as well as the two position switch. There are three possible approaches
to representing this case. The simple functional description given earlier could be
used, with the alternative trigger specified in the association.
slider_switch.position = closed OR push_button.position = pressed
IMPLEMENTS torch.switch_on
This simplification of the functional description itself does, of course, encour-
age its reuse, but at the expense of precision in the description of the expected
functionality. One advantage of the use of labels for representing the trigger (and





switch_on OR flash_on TRIGGERS lamp_lit
This shows that an alternative way of switching on the torch is required, with
identical effects (and purpose). It will require two associations with the system.
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slider_switch.position = closed IMPLEMENTS torch.switch_on
push_button.position = pressed IMPLEMENTS torch.flash_on
An alternative (as in this case) might be to associate the flash_on function with
its own purpose (signalling, perhaps), with the two functions sharing an effect and
so have two separate functional descriptions, one for each intended use of the
torch. There are cases where one might or might not wish to associate an effect
with alternative triggers, but where there is no question of a distinct purpose the
option of using different functions is arguably not appropriate, though the two
functions could be associated with one description of purpose. These alternative
approaches allow the intended functionality to be specified to an arbitrary level of
precision, subject to an inevitable “trade off” between precision and reusability of
the functional description. This was one of the requirements of a functional lan-
guage listed earlier in this chapter. The choice of how much precision to use will
be at least partly dependent on how the functional model is used. If a system’s
functional model is to be used simply for interpretation of simulation, the simplest
model is likely to be adequate, but if functional modelling is used to guide the
design process then the more elaborate model might be more appropriate as en-
suring all intended behaviours are allowed for in the physical design. For example,
the functional model above shows that the design of the torch is to allow for it to
be flashed briefly on and off.
There is less need for the use of logical operators to combine implementations
of a function’s effects than triggers. The effects are typically all going to be
required for achievement of the function rather than being alternatives, as might
well be the case for triggers. Also, of course, the effects are also what actually
achieves the function, so a correct functional description will specify them with
adequate precision. For example, the effect clause in a car headlamps main beam
function should specifically refer to the effect of both right and left headlamps.
This association with the effects of a system might rely on an indirect indicator,
so in the case of the headlamps system, the presence of current through the lamps
can be taken as indirect evidence of the output of light (the real effect) given that
there is no failure of a lamp that allows current to flow through the lamp without
it giving off light.
Attaching the consequences of the unexpected achievement of an effect to the
mapping between system and function has the advantage that the model includes
the unexpected consequence of any effect, even where it does not amount to achiev-
ing a function. In the approach taken by (Price, 1998), the consequences of both
failure and unexpected achievement were associated with a function, with the
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result that the consequences of unexpected achievement of an effect were not re-
ported if that effect did not itself amount to achieving a function. For example, a
car headlamp main beam function might look like this.
FUNCTION main_beam
FAILURE "Driver cannot see road ahead"
SEVERITY 8
DETECTION 2







Note that this is not an accurate rendition of the functional label approach in
(Price, 1998), but is a plausible one, that carries the same meanings. There are
two differences between this and the Functional Interpretation Language presented
in this thesis that while appearing slight are nonetheless significant. The first of
these is the lack of a trigger expression (which for FMEA is derived from the cor-
rect simulation). Its inclusion in the Functional Interpretation Language allows
the state of some system function to be included in the trigger expression for some
other function, as discussed in Chapter 10. The second and the use in functional
labelling of existing properties of the system as effects that achieve the function.
The Functional Interpretation Language’s use of labels for the effect, which are
later associated with the appropriate system properties, allows a functional de-
scription of a system to be built independently of the structural design.
It will be seen that as the function depends on both headlamps’ main beam
filaments being active, if one lamp is on, the function is not achieved. Therefore
any fault that causes one lamp to stay lit the whole time (possibly a wire shorting
to ground) does not achieve any function (correctly) but the consequence of the
unexpected effect is lost, as it is associated with the achievement of the function.
One headlamp being full beam is still capable of dazzling oncoming drivers but
this is not reported. As implemented in the commercial tool (AutoSteve) there is
a way of avoiding this problem, by associating each lamp with its own function,
so the main beam function has two subfunctions, left main and right main. There
are objections to this solution, in that it complicates the functional description
and anyway as one headlamp on its own does not really fulfil any purpose (both
are required to drive after dark) its effect does not really constitute a function.
Attaching the unexpected consequences to the mapping between the part of the
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system that implements a function’s effect and the function avoids this difficulty
as each effect than has its own consequences of unexpected achievement. In the
Functional Interpretation Language presented here the same system’s functional







left_main_filament.current = active IMPLEMENTS left_main_beam
UNEXPECTED_CONSEQUENCE "oncoming drivers dazzled"
SEVERITY 6
DETECTION 2
right_main_filament.current = active IMPLEMENTS right_main_beam
UNEXPECTED_CONSEQUENCE "oncoming drivers dazzled"
SEVERITY 6
DETECTION 2
The two identical unexpected consequences could, of course, be a single sepa-
rate description, applied to both effects. In this case the consequence of either
headlamp being lit on main beam unexpectedly is not lost and the achievement
of the headlamps main beam function still depends on both lamps being lit cor-
rectly. There is still a rôle for subsidiary functions, discussed in the following two
chapters.
Where a function depends on more than one effect, it is possible that if both or
all of the effects are achieved unexpectedly, the consequences are different from
the unexpected achievement of one. For example if one brake light stays on when
the pedal is not pressed, it is wasteful and distracting to a following driver, but
at least some warning that the vehicle is slowing is given by the other brake
light working normally. If they both stay on, no warning is given. This is why
a description of the consequences of a function’s effects can be attached to a
description of purpose. It is likely that where all a function’s effects being achieved
unexpectedly have different consequences from any one of them, this will result
in the purpose not being fulfilled. It is still necessary in these cases to provide a
set of unexpected consequences to each mapping between effect and behaviour, to
capture the consequences of that effect alone being achieved unexpectedly. This
is discussed further in the chapter on functional decomposition.
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5.7 Functional description and report generation
Having discussed the relationship between the functional description and the sim-
ulation, allowing its interpretation, it is worth introducing how the functional
description is used to generate a design analysis report. This report will include
entries for all behaviours that result in unexpected functional states and the con-
sequences of these unexpected function states.
The reporting of the state of a function can readily be described in terms of the
state of the function, as described in Section 5.2 above. Let f be some device func-
tion associated some description of purpose and through that with consequences
of failure of the function cf . In addition, each effect is associated with the conse-
quences of unexpected achievement of that effect. In the simplest case, the effect
expression has a single element e with unexpected consequences ue. The report
will include an entry for each function that is in a state that is not consistent with
expected behaviour of the system. Let us use the notation R(f) to mean “the
resulting design analysis report includes f” and R(cf ) to mean the report includes
the consequences fop failure of f . The report will include references to functions
as follows.
R(f) if Fa(f) ∨ Un(f) (5.11)
So the report will include any function that is failed or unexpected. The report
should also include a reference to the individual effect e that led to this inconsistent
behaviour.
R(e) if (Tr(f) ∧ ¬e) ∨ (¬Tr(f) ∧ e) (5.12)
So any effect that is absent when it is expected or present when it is not triggered
will also be included in the resulting report. It should be noted that where an effect
expression includes several individual elements (as in the headlamp example) each
element is included following this rule, and therefore an element might be included
in a design analysis report even though it does not result in a function being either
failed or unexpected. For example, if one of the headlamps was lit unexpectedly,
this does not amount to the function being unexpected (as the effect expression
is false) but that headlamp being lit is still included in the report. The following
chapter discusses this. The use of these rules is illustrated in the example that
follows and forms the bulk of this section.
The report should also include the consequences of these inconsistent behaviours.
As the consequences of failure of a function are associated with that function
(through its description of purpose) the consequences of failure can be reported
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when the function is failed.
R(cf ) if Fa(f) (5.13)
Because the consequences of unexpected achievement of an effect are associated
with that effect’s mapping to the system model, this can be reported like this.
R(ue) if ¬Tr(f) ∧ e (5.14)
So the consequences of any effect are noted even if this does not amount to a
function being unexpected where a function depends on more than one element in
the effect expression. Note that while the preceding descriptions serve as formal
rules for the simple example used in this section, they are simplifications of the
rules used in the Functional Interpretation Langauge. In the case of 5.13, this
is because a function might be an Operational Incomplete Function, described in
Section 7.2, which has no associated description of purpose and therefore no con-
sequences of failure. A function might optionally be associated with consequences
of its being unexpected. This is discussed in Section 6.2.3. This entails additional
conditions in the rule derived from 5.14.
These formal rules give a more complete foundation to what is essentially the
same approach as is already used in the design analysis tool developed in earlier
work, but it does seem worth describing its use as an introduction to provide back-
ground to the extensions of the expressiveness of the approach that the present
Functional Interpretation Language supports. This will be done primarily using
the simple torch example used earlier. It seems worth recapitulating the functional
description and associated description of purpose together with the mappings be-






DESCRIPTION "Help the user see in the dark"
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE "User not helped to see"
SEVERITY 5
DETECTION 2
switch.position = closed IMPLEMENTS torch.switch_on
lamp.state = lit IMPLEMENTS torch.lamp_lit




The resulting report will typically be in a tabular format, with columns for failure
cause and effect, consequences (possibly) and severity and detection. In generating
a report in such a format, all that is required of the design analysis software is to
look up the functional model and so establish which functions are achieved, which
have failed (that is triggered but with the effect absent) and what, if any, effects are
unexpected. If the torch is designed as in the little schematic in Figure 5.1 then if
there are no component failures, the torch will work as expected. When the switch
is closed, the lamp will light. For FMEA, the design analysis report will include
lamp switch
wire A wire B
Figure 5.1: Circuit diagram for the torch example
the consequence of each failure of any component in the circuit. Here two failures
are included for brevity, wire A breaking (going open circuit) and wire B shorting
to ground. It will be seen that the result of running an electrical circuit simulation
on this circuit with wire A broken will show that no current will flow through the
lamp whether or not the switch is closed. The lamp’s behavioural model will
then show that it will not enter the lit state. The design analysis software can
then examine the functional description, which shows that when the switch is
closed, the function torch is triggered, but is not achieved because the lamp is
not lit. Likewise, the electrical simulator will show that when wire B shorts to
ground, current flows through the lamp (so it stays lit) whether or not the switch
is closed, as the switch is bypassed by the short to ground. On examining the
functional models, the software has shown that there are no functions that result
in the lamp being lit with the switch open, so the effect is achieved unexpectedly.
The functional models (and descriptions of purpose) already contain the text to
be incorporated into the design analysis report, so this can readily be generated,
and might resemble Table 5.2. In the first result, the failure effect field includes
the name of the failed effect, consistently with rule 5.11 above and also includes
the effect that caused the failure of the function, from rule 5.12. As the effect
has failed, rule 5.13 has the report including the consequences of the failure, in
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Sev DetFailure effect Cause Consequence
When switch_closed, function
torch failed because expected





When switch_open, function torch
was unexpected because






Table 5.2: Part of an FMEA report for the torch example.
the third column. The second result includes the unexpected function and the
unexpected effect that causes the function to be unexpected, from rules 5.12 and
5.13 but in this case the consequences are those of the unexpected effect, from
5.14.
A complete report will, of course, have other columns, including one for the
occurrence value (which is a property of the failure cause and so of the model
of the component concerned), one for the RPN value and various columns that
will be filled by hand, describing any action to be taken. Where generated text
is quoted in this thesis, a simple textual format has been used, as it was felt this
was easier to read. The textual form used for the first of the failures listed in the
table would read
Function see in dark not achieved because expected effect lamp lit was
absent. Consequences are: User not helped to see. Severity 5, detec-
tion 2.
These textual quotations from possible design analysis reports will generally be
shortened to include only the text required to illustrate the point being made.
In both cases it will be seen that most of the text is taken from an existing
model, either the functional description, the description of purpose, or the mapping
between system and function. Only simple linking words or phrases are added,
such as the ‘because’ linking the function failure with the missing effect. It will
be seen that the necessary text is easily generated and, indeed, this technique
is in use from the earlier work. In this case, the labels for trigger and effect
in the functional description have been used, but it will be appreciated that it
would be straightforward for the software to use the mappings between system and
functional models to generate text that includes the states of components in the
system model. The only novel feature here is the use of the effect label to give some
explanation of the failure of the function. This is clearly more interesting where a
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function depends on several effects, as the missing effect(s) can be specified. For
example, a report on the headlamp example might include “Function main beam
not achieved because expected effect left main beam was absent”.
As the design analysis report will include repetitious entries of failure effects,
even in this simple example any wire going open circuit will have the same effect,
the use of functional descriptions and associated models means that such text is
only written once, on creating the initial models. This both saves time, avoiding
repetitious work, and reduces the danger of inconsistency between similar failures.
For example, there is now no danger of the effects of wire B going open circuit
being any different from those of wire A.
In Table 5.2 the different entries in the report are associated with different states
of the torch’s functional model. Wire A going open circuit caused the function to
fail (trigger true, effect false) so the consequences are those associated with failure
of the function. In contrast, wire B shorting to ground caused the unexpected
achievement of the effect of the lamp being lit, so the consequences are those asso-
ciated with that effect. This relationship between the state of the function (failed
or unexpected) and the generated text can be generalised for a simple functional














Function F achieved unexpectedly because unexpected effect 
was present





Table 5.3: States of a function and the resulting text.
an automatically generated report is associated with the state of a function. In
the table, the consequences associated with any inappropriate result are treated
implicitly as a set that consists of a textual description, a value for severity and
one for detection. They are denoted by the abbreviated form of the functional
state (failed or unexpected) associated with the name of the function or effect
concerned, so Fa(F ) means the consequences associated with the failure of func-
tion F. The alternatives for the consequences of unexpected achievement are, of
course, because the function itself might or might not have a set of consequences
of unexpected achievement associated with it. In such a simple case, it is unlikely
that it would as they would, of course be much the same as the required ones of
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achievement of the effect. The notation used in this table and other similar tables
that appear in the following chapters is described in more detail in Appendix D
on page 287. The table illustrates the straightforward relationship between a
functional description and the generated text in a resulting design analysis report.
5.8 Notation used
Two notations are used from here on, a textual one that is consistent with the file
format for a functional description and a graphical notation intended to illustrate
the relationships between different elements of the functional description itself and
between that description and other related parts of the system model.
The textual notation has, of course, already been used in the example functional
description included above, and is also described in Appendix B. A brief summary
of the notation and conventions governing its use in this text seems useful here,
however, as it will be used in illustration throughout the remainder of the thesis.








DESCRIPTION "Allows driver to see road ahead after dark."
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE "Driver cannot see after dark."
SEVERITY 8
DETECTION 3
light_switch.position = heads IMPLEMENTS main_beam.lamp_switch_heads
dip_switch.position = main IMPLEMENTS main_beam.dip_switch_main
left_main_filament.current = active IMPLEMENTS main_beam.left_main
UNEXPECTED_CONSEQUENCE "oncoming drivers dazzled"
SEVERITY 6
DETECTION 2
right_main_filament.current = active IMPLEMENTS main_beam.right_main




The description of purpose and the mappings to the system model are not them-
selves part of the functional description itself. A blank line in the notation is
used to separate parts of a description that are separate. These might be sepa-
rate files, or possibly different entries in a database of functional representations.
Such implementation issues are discussed in Chapter 11. The textual elements
have been kept brief to save space and the arrangement of lines and indentation
are intended to assist with reading the descriptions. Keywords of the language
have been printed in block capitals to distinguish them from other elements of the
functional models, all of which are lower case.
This notation will be expanded in the following chapters to include other parts of
the language. There is a full listing of the language in Appendix B, on page 281.
5.9 Discussion
It seems worth recapitulating some of the general points this somewhat discursive
chapter has raised, and further describing the relationships between the different
models (or model fragments) used in the approach described above. This section
will also briefly summarise how the language meets the requirements enumerated
in Section 5.1.
The proposed approach to the use of this functional representation language for
interpretation of simulation in terms of purpose follows the functional labelling
approach of (Price, 1998) so that the trigger and effect are linked to the states (the
behaviour) of the relevant components in the system, and are used to interpret the
state of the simulation in terms of the achievement of the function, so they allow
achievement of the function to be recognised, fulfilling the first of the requirements
for a functional description.
The approach suggested in (Price, 1998) is that functional labels are attached
to the relevant component descriptions, specifically their outputs. The approach
described here reverses that in that the functional description is constructed in-
dependently of the system model, which is later attached to the functional model
(using IMPLEMENTS). This change in the use of functional description is sup-
ported by the explicit inclusion of the trigger and by the use of labels to mark the
expected trigger and effect associated with a function. The inclusion of the trigger
increases both the range of design analyses that are supported by the language
and also the range of systems that can be analysed. If the trigger is omitted, then
the preconditions for a function are derived from a simulation of the system when
working with no failures, which relies on the assumption that this is an accurate
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reflection of the intended behaviour of the system. This is consistent with failure
analysis, but not with design verification. Even for failure analysis, though, a
system function that is triggered by failure of some other system function (such as
a warning function) cannot be unambiguously derived from a failure free simula-
tion. This is because the triggering conditions will ever be achieved in the correct
simulation, and must be stated in terms of the state of the function on which the
function concerned depends. There is some other triggering condition needed to
trigger a fault mitigating function. This is discussed in Chapter 10.
The reversing of the earlier approach, so that system properties are attached to
an existing functional description rather than the other way around, means that
the functional model can be built independently of the target system, fulfilling the
fourth of the requirements listed in Section 5.1. This allows the language to be
used to support design activity as well as analysis. This independence from the
system enables the required functionality to be described in as much detail as is
necessary to specify functional aspects of the design. This was illustrated using
the torch example earlier. In that case, the functional description in which the
lit function was triggered by either a slider switch or by a push to make switch
(for shorter flashes) can be used to specify that a way of flashing the torch on is
a requirement. This could, of course, be done in more specific terms than in the




slider_closed OR button_pressed TRIGGERS lamp_lit
This fulfils the fifth of the requirements listed in Section 5.1 and supports the
use of the language for functional refinement of a design and enables its use as a
vehicle for clarifying design requirements. The use of labels for triggers and effects
also makes the functional description more self contained, which encourages reuse
of existing models.
The use of a separate description of purpose is another difference between the
present language and the earlier functional labelling approach. This further en-
courages reuse of existing models, as the description of purpose can be reused even
in cases where systems that fulfil that purpose need different functional descrip-
tions, such as the differences between a car’s and motorbike’s lighting systems.
The relationships between the functional description itself and the other models




























Figure 5.2: Model relationships using the proposed functional representation
The use of Boolean expressions uniting aspects of the required trigger and effect
allow the functional language to be used to describe functions that depend on
combinations of inputs and outputs of the system in a similar way to that proposed
in (Snooke & Price, 1998). How the language manages different aspects of this is
discussed in the next chapter.
The proposed language also has two other dimensions besides the hierarchy.
These are new. The intention is that they will be introduced here and then
discussed in greater detail in later chapters. These are
• The need to model intermittent and sequential behaviours and the ordering
of state transitions.
• The need to allow modelling of cases where a function is achieved but not in a
timely manner (typically late). This is increasingly important with the use of
Carrier Sense Multiple Access / Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) networks
to communicate between controllers and effectors within a system. This is
because such networks cannot guarantee the prompt arrival of a message.
The use of Controller Area Networks (CAN) in the automotive sector is an
example.
• The need to model functions whose achievement should depend on the
achievement or otherwise of some other function.
It can be argued that these provide additional functional relationships that are
orthogonal to the straightforward logical hierarchy in the existing language. They
add a temporal axis and a dependency axis that are both distinct from the hier-
archical function / subfunction axis.
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The approach proposed has the description of purpose that the function is to fulfil
as a separate model (file) and also allows for elements of the system’s behavioural
description to be attached to parts of the functional description. The models used




DESCRIPTION "Allows user to see in
the dark"
FAILURE "User cannot see"
   SEVERITY 5







UNEXPECTED "Drain on battery"
   SEVERITY 3






Figure 5.3: The relationships between the elements in the torch functional de-
scription
a more concrete rendition of the set of mode relationships shown in Figure 5.2
above. Here a thick walled box is used to denote a function, and arrows are
used to indicate links between separate model elements. There is a full key to
this and similar diagrams in Appendix C. While the figure shows a relatively
large number of models (or model fragments), they are relatively simple and,
as suggested above, reusable, so in use it will often be the case that a system
can simply be associated with existing functional models or, failing that, existing
descriptions of purpose. These can simply be retrieved from a library of models
and model fragments. The functional model itself is simplified by only having
to refer to inputs and outputs (or goal states) of the system as a whole. Those
components whose effects are internal need no functional representation. This
follows the functional labelling approach. Further simplification of the functional
description is achieved by separating it from the description of purpose.
How the language can be used to describe the function of static systems (the
second of the requirements listed in Section 5.1) was discussed in Section 5.3. It
could be argued that the use of the functional language to interpret the results
of a simulation is more applicable to dynamic systems, but it could be used to
interpret a simulation in which the goal was for nothing to happen.
As a functional description is free of details of the target system any appropriate
system property can be chosen as implementing the function’s triggers or effects.
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Effects will typically by associated with an output, such as of light in the torch
example, or with a goal state such as all doors being locked in a central locking
system. This supports the description of software components, either as part of a
larger system or separately. For example, a networking subsystem (such as CAN)





Here, the arrival of data to send is labelled by data_to_send and the func-
tion is achieved if all nodes on the network receive the message, labelled with
message_broadcast. Note that this model is simplified by the lack of any de-
tails of how the function is achieved, the function is achieved if the message gets
through. For example the protocol is not specified, though the functional descrip-
tion could be refined so as to suggest requirements that might influence the choice
of protocol.
Alternatively, an individual software component could also be associated with
appropriate functional descriptions. This might be done at a variety of levels,
such as an object in Object Oriented programming or an individual procedure
(or method). The use of the functional description with software is discussed in
more detail in Chapter 11. This is an important application of the third of the
requirements listed in Section 5.1, that a language be applicable to abstract as
well as physical systems.
The language as described in this chapter provides a basis for approaches to
fulfilling the additional requirements listed in the Introduction. How the language
does so is discussed in the following chapters.
While the use of Boolean expressions to represent the trigger and effect of a
system function allows functions that depend on more than one condition for the
trigger and effect to be described, this places limitations on the expressiveness of
the language, especially in its use for functional refinement of a design. There
are cases where a function is more accurately represented in terms of subsidiary
functions rather than combinations of triggers and effects. The following chap-
ter considers the different decompositions of function that might be used, and




In all but the simplest of systems, a system function will depend on more than one
trigger and / or effect and the use of Boolean expressions to describe the relation-
ship between elements in these complex triggers and effects has been introduced
in the previous chapter. This chapter will discuss the decomposition of function
in rather more detail, introducing and discussing the idea that a function might
instead be composed of subsidiary functions with their own trigger, effect and pur-
pose. This enables the Functional Interpretation Language to describe functions
that have several elements each with its own distinct purpose that nonetheless
contributes to the achievement of the main function.
The idea that a function can be thought of as being composed of either trigger
and effect or subsidiary functions differs from the approach in (Snooke & Price,
1998). In that paper, a function was considered to be composed of subfunctions.
For example, a car’s headlamp main beam function would be composed of left
main beam and right main beam subfunctions. This allowed the automatically
generated design analysis report to describe a failure in more detail, so if the
left headlamp failed then the report might state “function headlamps main beam
failed because left main beam failed”. The approach described here extends this
increased expressiveness by contrasting cases where a function is composed of
subfunctions with those where it is simply composed of triggers and effects.
The following section discusses subsidiary functions and this is followed by a dis-
cussion of how subsidiary functions are used to increase the expressiveness of the
interpretation of simulation, resulting in a more precise and detailed design analy-
sis report than is possible without their use. The theoretical basis for combination
of subsidiary functions is then discussed.
The simplest case of functional decomposition is where a function depends on
some expected combination of triggers and / or effects. For example, the recogniser
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Both trigger and effect have two elements both of which must be true for the
function to be achieved. The use of logical AND means, of course, that if one of
the headlamps fails to light in response to the switching on of the headlamps and
switching to main beam, the trigger is true but the effect expression is false and
so the function is said to have failed. This is consistent with Table 5.1 on page 92.
In this case, then, the failure of either headlamp cannot be distinguished from the
failure of both as either results in failure of the function. This is arguably appro-
priate in this case, as the loss of either headlamp renders the car unroadworthy,
but in some cases the resulting design analysis report will be more precise and
detailed if a distinction is drawn between failure of one of a function’s effects and
all of them. One approach to this is to link the effect with its own description
of purpose. Where an effect can be associated with both its own purpose and
with its own trigger it forms a subsidiary function, the subject of the next section.
This allows greater refinement of the failure of a function compared to the simple
binary Boolean true or false state of triggering and achievement of a function.
Specifically, it allows the report to
• Distinguish between partial and total failure of a function in appropriate
cases.
• Show the significance of alternative ways of achieving a function.
• Model differences between a function’s purpose and its expected behaviour.
The first two of these advantages are discussed in this chapter, the remaining one
is left until Section 7.5 in the following chapter.
One aspect of the use of logical operators that has not been raised is the rôle of
NOT. One possible use is to distinguish effects that are inimical to achievement of
a function as opposed to any effects that are irrelevant to a certain function. For
example, the purpose of a headlamps dipped beam function is to light the road
ahead without dazzling oncoming road users. Clearly, then, if a headlamp main
beam stays on, this latter aspect of the purpose is not achieved. This is distinct
from the case of the direction indicators, say, as they play no part in the purpose
associated with the dipped beam function, so they could be on or off, while the





AND NOT left_main_beam AND NOT right_main_beam
Therefore, of course, if either headlamp’s main beam stays on, the function will
have failed. In practice these cases need seldom be specified as any unwanted
effects will be unexpected and as such will appear in the resulting report. The
main beam staying on is not triggered so the effect will be achieved unexpectedly.
As the consequences of unexpected achievement are associated with the effect
itself, these consequences are noted even if only (in this case) one headlamp’s
main beam filament stays lit, so this will appear in the report independently of
the dipped beam function. The other possible use of NOT is to simplify cases where
a trigger or effect is not a binary state and one state is to be excluded. A possible
example is a fan heater where the element will not come on unless the fan is
running at either speed (slow or fast, or whatever range of speeds is supported),
so the heating trigger might be specified as follows.
heater_switch_on AND NOT fan_stopped
This use of NOT also helps in mapping the functional description to a simulation
that supports multiple levels of activity, as discussed in Chapter 11.
6.1 Subsidiary functions
While the idea of composing a function of triggers and effects combined using
Boolean operators has been introduced, there are cases where a function is bet-
ter decomposed in terms of subsidiary functions, each with its own trigger, effect
and purpose, beside contributing to the achievement of the top-level function.
One example of this might be the functional model of a hob where provided any
ring works, the hob can be used for cooking. In other words a top level function
cook_on_hob can be decomposed into four identical cook_on_ring functions, com-
bined using OR. Each ring’s behaviour is modelled in terms of function, because it
has its own trigger (the knob being turned on), effect (output of heat for cooking)
and purpose, the use of that ring for cooking. The benefit of this is that this
allows the functional model to capture the idea that if any one ring works, this is
a less serious failure than the loss of all the rings as some cooking is still possible
by using the other rings, though the failure might restrict the sophistication of the
cuisine.
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This introduces the most important benefit of the two alternative decompositions
of function, in terms of triggers and effects or in terms of subsidiary functions,
which is that it increases the expressiveness of the language. It does this by
enabling the description of cases where the failure of a subsidiary function has a
different consequence from failure of the top level function. There are two cases
where this typically applies. The first is where a system has alternative ways of
achieving the purpose of the top level function, as in the hob example mentioned
above. The other case is where the achievement of some of a function’s expected
effects can be regarded as mitigating the failure of a function and these can be
distinguished from functions where the loss of any effect is regarded as tantamount
to complete failure of the function. For example, a warning function might consist
of both audible and visual signals (such as a horn and a telltale lamp). In this case,
the failure of both means no warning is given while the failure of either one means
there is some signal, so this can be regarded as a less serious failure of the system.
This contrasts with functions where both effects can be regarded as tantamount
to complete failure of the function. An example is be the headlamp function
of a car already mentioned, where the loss of either the left or right headlamp
renders the car unroadworthy. How the use of subsidiary functions increases the
expressiveness of the language and hence of the automatically generated report is
discussed in Section 6.2.
In addition, the use of subsidiary functions is consistent with the idea of a func-
tion as having a distinct purpose. In building a hierarchical functional description,
the guiding principle is that if a distinct purpose can be identified with a subset of
a function’s effects, they can be modelled as a subsidiary function. For interpre-
tation of design analysis, an important aspect of this is identifying effects whose
failure has specific consequences, apart from those of the higher level function to
which the effect contributes. This is because the resulting design analysis report
will include entries for effects (or subsidiary functions) that are not present. If the
report is to be as specific and detailed as possible, then what it should contain is
the consequences associated with the actual missing function rather than a func-
tion higher in the hierarchy. To be consistent with the definition of function, a
subsidiary function should be associated with a description of purpose. It should
be noted, however, that even though a subsidiary function has its own purpose, its
achievement contributes to fulfilment of the top level function’s purpose, either as
a component, as in the warning system, or an alternative, as in the hob example.
It may well be the case that a system has several functions that, while related, are
not part of one hierarchical functional description. This is discussed in Section 6.4.
Where a function is composed of subsidiary functions these take the place of the
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trigger and effect expressions in the recogniser of the top level function. For
example, a car’s seat belt warning system that sounds a chimer and lights a
dashboard telltale if either front seat is occupied and its seat belt is unbuckled







Here, the warning function consists of two subsidiary functions, each of which
can be associated with a distinct purpose that contributes to correct fulfilment of
the top level function’s purpose. Each subsidiary function is a separate functional







The labels for trigger and effect can then be used to attach system properties
as described in the previous chapter. Note that the trigger expression has been
simplified here. This system is used as a worked example in Chapter 11 and
is discussed in more detail there. There is a description of the system itself in
Section 11.1.1 on page 233. It will be appreciated that in this case both the
subsidiary functions actually have identical triggers. An approach to eliminating
this redundancy is introduced in the following chapter.
Each function is associated with its own description of purpose. This might be a
component of the top level function’s purpose, as here, but it could also be a more
general purpose. For example, a plant monitoring system might use an audible
warning to draw attention to the existence of any of several faults in the plant,
while the nature of the fault is indicated by which of several warning lamps is lit.
In this case the audible warning function might have a purpose description based
on the need to draw attention to the presence of a fault and this function can be
reused in the various warning functions, in combination with the correct warning
lamp. The use of subsidiary functions and their associated descriptions of purpose
is discussed in the following section.
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6.2 Using subsidiary functions
This section discusses how subsidiary functions can be used to increase the expres-
siveness of the functional language and so of the automatically generated design
analysis report that is the final result of the analysis. The discussion is mostly
concerned with how this is used to describe failure of functions and subsidiary
functions, that is the effect and consequences of the failure of a trigger to result
in the expected effect. How functional decomposition relates to the unexpected
achievement of the effects associated with a function is discussed in a separate
subsection, Section 6.2.3.
That the hierarchical approach to function described in (Snooke & Price, 1998)
can provide a more detailed explanation of the failure of a system function has
been noted in the introduction to this chapter. The present approach builds on
that work by allowing the decomposition of a function into either a combination
of triggers and effects or into a combination of subsidiary functions, allowing those
effects that achieve some purpose of their own to be distinguished from those that
do not. The possibility of composing a function from subsidiary functions also
supports the use of the language for support of functional refinement as part of
the design process. In this section, the use of subsidiary functions to improve an
automatically generated design analysis report will be discussed.
Two contrasting examples might be used to illustrate the use of subsidiary func-
tions in design analysis. In a car’s headlamp system, each headlamp being lit on
main beam is, of course, necessary to achieve the “main beam” function. There
is no benefit in complicating the description by attaching a function to each in-
dividual headlamp’s output. There is never any reason to have one lit without
the other and as the loss of either renders the car unroadworthy, there is arguably
no benefit in distinguishing failures that result in the loss of one headlamp from
those that result in the loss of both.
This can be contrasted with a system where the consequences of failures of one
or other of the expected effects differ both from each other and from the failure
of both, even though both are required for full achievement of the function. A
possible example is a railway signalling system, where to direct an incoming train
to a certain platform the signaller must first set the road so the train runs into the
correct platform and then set the signals to allow the train driver to pull into the
station. Suppose the points all worked correctly but the signals failed, the train
could (subject to suitable operating checks being made) be called forward by hand
(maybe using flags). This is clearly less difficult to handle than total failure of the
system, so both points and signals fail. Associating the signal and point failures
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with their own subsidiary functions allows the design analysis report to draw this
distinction. Both of these examples are discussed in more detail below.
As a function can be composed of either effects or subsidiary functions combined
using AND or OR, this gives four gradations of the effect a failure that one a func-
tion’s effects has on the top level function. Each of these can be associated with
a different style of entry in the resulting design analysis report.
6.2.1 Subsidiary functions with AND and OR
The simplest case is where a function depends on two effects that are not associated
with any purpose of their own. This case is illustrated in Figure 6.1. Here,
IF EFFECT E2 IS ABSENT, OUTPUT IS
Function TOP failed
     because expected effect E2 absent.
Severity = sP
Detection = dP










Figure 6.1: Combining effects using AND
failure of either effect will simply result in failure of the top level function and
the consequences (together with values for severity and detection) are taken from
that function, as they must be, there being no others available. Note that in this
case, the expected effects share a trigger, though that itself might be an expression
using Boolean operators. The headlamps example mentioned above is an example








The associated description of purpose might look like this.
PURPOSE light_road_ahead
DESCRIPTION "Lights road ahead so driver can see obstacles"
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE
"Driver cannot see ahead. Legal implications"
SEVERITY 8
DETECTION 3
If some failure causes, say, the left headlamp to fail to light, the resulting design
analysis report will include
Function main beam not achieved because expected effect
left headlamp main was absent. Consequences are: Driver cannot see
ahead. Legal implications. Severity = 8, detection = 3.
These are, of course, the consequences associated with the light_road_ahead
purpose, associated with the main_beam function. As noted earlier, there is no
need to specify any difference between the consequences of the loss of one headlamp
and the loss of both, so the consequences and the severity and detection values are
the same in both cases. There is therefore no need for the additional complexity
in the functional description resulting from the use of subsidiary functions. It is
appreciated that in practice the failure of one headlamp is perhaps less troublesome
to the driver than that of both but the legal implications, if nothing else, make
the example applicable.
As has already been discussed, this contrasts with the case where a function
depends on two subsidiary functions. Here if one subsidiary function fails, the
consequences in the resulting report (together with the values for severity and
detection) are those of that subfunction. This is illustrated in Figure 6.2. In
this case, the resulting report can either include consequences of failure of the
top level function or the subsidiary functions. This can be illustrated using the







The function might be associated with this description of purpose.
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IF EFFECT E2 IS ABSENT, OUTPUT IS
Function TOP failed
     because function SUB 2 failed.
Severity = s2
Detection = d2
















Figure 6.2: Combining subsidiary functions with AND
PURPOSE guide_to_platform
DESCRIPTION "Allow a train to pull into the station platform"
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE "train cannot be accepted into station"
SEVERITY 9
DETECTION 3
Each subsidiary function has its own description, as a separate (reusable) data







It has its own description of purpose.
PURPOSE show_clear_road
DESCRIPTION "Allow driver to take train into platform"
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE "Need to flag train into platform"
SEVERITY 7
DETECTION 3
Now, if a power failure causes both the points and signals to fail, the resulting
report might read
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Function accept train has failed because functions set points and
set signals have failed. Consequences are: Train cannot be accepted
into station. Severity = 9, detection = 3.
The additional detail in the functional description allows the consequences of fail-
ure to only one of the subsidiary functions to be differentiated. If the signals fail
but the points can be set, the report might read
Function accept train failed because function set signals has failed.
Consequences are: Need to flag train into platform. Severity = 7,
detection 3.
So the consequences of the top level function are still included in the report if
both the subsidiary figures fail (so the top level function can be thought of as
having failed completely). However, if only one of the subsidiary functions fails,
the consequences of failure of that function are included instead, though the report
does, of course, still include an entry to the effect that the top level function has
failed. There are arguable difficulties with this approach. The use of AND suggests
that the top level function has failed and as such its consequences of failure should
be included in the report. This is not done simply because the report should
include the most specific results available. It will be seen that if the top level
consequences are given, then there is no gain in information resulting from the use
of subsidiary functions, a subsidiary function combined using AND will never have
its consequences included in a report, as they will invariably be replaced by those
of the top level function. In the approach adopted, the design analysis report does
still include a note that the top level function has failed. This approach allows
subsidiary functions to be used to describe cases where achievement of one of the
subsidiary functions can be thought of as mitigating the failure of the top level
function. There is more on such cases in Section 6.2.1.1.
Another use of subsidiary functions is where they constitute alternative ways
of achieving a function, as in the hob example mentioned earlier. This case is
illustrated in Figure 6.3. If one subsidiary function fails, there is no need for the
report to mention the top level function as it need not have failed. Naturally
in this case, then the consequences of failure of a subsidiary function are those
associated with that function. So the hob might have the following functional




IF EFFECT E2 IS ABSENT, OUTPUT IS
Function SUB 2 failed
Severity = s2
Detection = d2





















The function might be associated with this description of purpose.
PURPOSE cook_food
DESCRIPTION "Allow preparation of cooked food"
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE "Hob cannot be used for cooking"
SEVERITY 7
DETECTION 3







As the purpose of the two rings is identical and as descriptions of purpose are
separate models, they can share this description of purpose.
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PURPOSE cook_on_ring
DESCRIPTION "Use ring for cooking"
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE "Ring cannot be used, limits cooking"
SEVERITY 4
DETECTION 3
If the left ring fails to come on when triggered, the report might read
Function cook on left failed because expected effect heat ring absent.
Consequences are: Ring cannot be used, limits range of cooking. Sever-
ity = 4, detection = 3.
This is, of course, consistent with the use of OR in combining the subsidiary
functions. The cook_on_hob function is achieved as the other ring works correctly.
Naturally, if both rings’ functions fail, the top level function also fails and the
report will use that function’s consequences.
One interesting feature of the functional model described here, and its description
of purpose, is that it is not independent of the top level function. The consequence
of its failure is merely the restriction on cooking. In other words this description
of purpose can be written with the assumption that there is another ring so that
failure of this one does not eliminate the possibility of using the hob. It will be
seen that if the functional model was applied to a hob with only one ring, this
would still not matter, as failure of the ring would lead to failure of the top level
(cook_on_hob) function. There is, however, nothing to be gained by associating
a subsidiary function with a function’s one effect. This is consistent with the idea
that a subsidiary function contributes to the purpose of the top level function
rather than replacing it.
The final possible case is where a function depends on two effects combined using
OR. Here the loss of one of the effects has no consequences at all, as there are no
failed functions, as illustrated in Figure 6.4. This case is unlikely, simply because
it will be unusual that a trigger will trigger either one or both of two possible
effects, and the loss of one of the effect is of no consequence. A very weak example
might be where a room has two lamps, both triggered by the same switch and
either of which can be regarded as sufficient to light an occupant’s way around








IF EFFECT E2 IS ABSENT, OUTPUT IS
Effect E2 not present.
Severity = 0
Detection = 0










Figure 6.4: Combining effects with OR
The solitary description of purpose is as follows.
PURPOSE light_room
DESCRIPTION "Allows use to see around the room"
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE "Room unlit, user may collide with furniture"
SEVERITY 6
DETECTION 2
Here, then, if one lamp fails, the report will include no more than
Expected effect wall lamp on absent.
As this failure is not itself associated with a function, its failure is taken to be of
no consequence. The contents of the report outlined here assume that both effects
are expected which might not always be the case, it is not impossible that a given
trigger might be intended to trigger one or both effects non-deterministically. It
will be seen that the relation between trigger and effect is inappropriate as it
suggests that the trigger triggers one or both of the possible effects, whereas both,
of course, are expected. This highlights an interesting feature of this representation
of function, which is that as it includes both the relationship between trigger and
effect and effect and purpose, it arguably attempts to model two different (if
related) aspects of the system, that is its purpose and the expected behaviour.
Discussion of this is left until Section 7.5 on page 164.
The rule used for inclusion of consequences in the design analysis report is simple,
in that where a function is composed of two (or more) subsidiary functions com-
bined using either AND or OR, then where one of those subsidiary functions fails,
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then the consequences of the failure of the subsidiary function are included in the
report while if both (or all) of the subsidiary functions fail, then the consequences
of the top level function’s failure are included. The consequences are treated as
a triplet of the description, and the values for severity and detection and these
are not split, what is used in the resultant report comes from one description of
purpose.
There is an apparent difficulty with this approach, which is that the effects of
failure of a subsidiary function (or at least the consequences) are very similar
whether AND or OR is used. The only difference is the note in the resulting report
that the top level function has failed. As has already been discussed, it would
be consistent with the use of AND to simply use the consequences (and value for
severity) of the top level function given that that function is considered to have
failed. This would mean that the consequences of subsidiary functions would never
be used when they are combined using AND so the gain in expressiveness would
not be realised. It is accepted that the functional description will be built with
this in mind. For example, the consequences of failure of the signal subsidiary
function in the example above implies that the points function worked correctly
so the incoming train can reach the right platform.
Another aspect of the use of consequences of subsidiary functions is that the
value for detection should be that of the subsidiary function, simply because this
might be higher than that for the top level function, so the chosen approach avoids
the need to use elements from different descriptions of purpose (not that doing
so leads to any insuperable problems). For example, the failure of a function to
make a car visible is (arguably) less severe if only the tail lamps fail, but harder
to detect than if all the lamps fail.
It will be seen from the foregoing that subsidiary functions can be used to provide
a finer distinction between degrees of achievement of a function than is possible
with a straightforward Boolean description. This allows cases where a function is
partly achieved to be distinguished from cases of total failure and also to indicate
cases where alternative subsidiary functions allow a main function to be achieved.
6.2.1.1 Mitigation of failure
The use of the consequences of a subsidiary function in the design analysis re-
port allows the functional modelling language to describe systems where partial
achievement of a function is less severe than its complete failure, so achievement
of one of a function’s effects (subsidiary functions) can be thought of as mitigating
the failure of the main function. The railway signalling example used earlier is
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an example, in that it is more feasible to keep trains running if only the signals
fail than if the signals and points fail, though it will clearly create considerable
difficulties.
To reduce the apparent inconsistency with the use of AND in these cases, some
thought was given to the idea of specifically labelling the subsidiary functions as








All other parts of the functional description would be similar to the earlier ex-
ample. The idea here would be that, because hand signals could be used if the
signals failed, if the points work correctly, this mitigates the failure of the main
function, so if the signals failed, a mitigating subsidiary function was achieved and
the consequences of the failure of the signal subsidiary function would be included
while if the points failed, no mitigating function was achieved so the consequences
of the failure of the top level function would be used. The function would be
labelled as MITIGATING, rather than using a “mitigated AND” operator to allow
such asymmetric cases to be modelled. In the end this was not done as in practice
it adds little expressiveness to the language. If the consequences of the failure of
a subsidiary function really are identical to those of the top level function, then
either they could be repeated in the subsidiary function’s description of purpose or
the two functions might share the same description of purpose. Another approach
to this asymmetry in functional decomposition is to regard only the trigger and
effect whose failure does not amount to total failure of the top level function (the
signal function in this case) as a subsidiary function with its own purpose. This
does lead to problems with the use of the top level function’s TRIGGERS keyword
as one half of the functional decomposition requires it and the other does not.
How this can be solved is described in Section 7.2 in the next chapter.
6.2.2 Subsidiary functions and exclusive OR
Having looked at how the use of AND and OR can express a range of different
relationships between a function and its expected effects, it seems worth discussing
the place of exclusive OR in functional decomposition.
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The rule used for inclusion of consequences of failure of a subsidiary function
combined using AND or OR, use the subsidiary functions’ consequences if one fails,
the top level function’s if both fail is not suitable with XOR as if both subsidiary
functions are achieved, the top level function is inoperative. The relations between
the state of a top level function and those of its subsidiary functions is described
in Section 6.3 below. This relationship is more complex when XOR is used than
either of the other operators. The rule for inclusion of consequences of failure
is the reverse of that used with AND and OR, so if both subsidiary functions fail,
the consequences of those failures, or possibly the worse of them, is included and
the consequences of the top level function are included if one of the subsidiary
functions fails.
In practice, it is suggested, XOR will rarely be used to combine subsidiary func-
tions, though it is not impossible that a system has two mutually exclusive ways
of achieving some purpose. One possible case where it might be is where there
is a back up system that replaces the main system in event of a failure to that
system. An emergency lighting system is a possible case in point. Here XOR
might be used to specify that both systems’ effects being present is not consistent
with correct behaviour of the combined systems, so the emergency lights should
not be lit when the main lights are working. Another possible use is to model
software systems where there are two mutually exclusive ways of accessing data
to preserve its consistency, such as database transactions. XOR is of more use for
combining triggers (as in a lamp with two switches, such as a landing light).
The lack of any suitable example means that a discussion of the relationship
between subsidiary functions and their consequences and the top level function
is best left to the discussion of the theoretical basis for this relationships in Sec-
tion 6.3.3.
6.2.3 Functional decomposition and unexpected effects
Having discussed the use of functional decomposition to improve the description
of the effects of failure of a function it is time to consider the effects of the use
of functional decomposition on unexpected achievement of the effects associated
with a function.
As has already been described in Chapter 5, the consequences of unexpected
achievement of an effect are associated with the effect itself (or, strictly, with the
mapping between the functional description’s effect and the appropriate system
property) so that all unexpected effects are noted in the design analysis report,
even where an effect does not amount to achieving a function. However, as noted
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earlier in this chapter, it might be required to associate consequences of unexpected
effects higher up a functional decomposition, typically because achieving all the
effects of a function might result in different (more severe) consequences. For this
reason, a function’s description of purpose can, but need not, include a description
of consequences of unexpected achievement of that function’s required effects. This
description of consequences will typically include values for severity and detection
of the unexpected achievement of the effects. As noted earlier, this is why the
tables in Section 6.3 have alternative consequences for unexpected achievement of
a function.
The possibility of associating consequences of unexpected achievement of a func-
tion with that function entails the addition of rules for reporting of these conse-
quences, following from rule 5.14 in Section 5.7. If f is a function, then if it includes
unexpected consequences uf then these will be reported (annotated R(uf )) if the
unexpected effects are such that the effect expression of the function is true (that
is the function is unexpected).
R(uf ) if Un(f) and if (f includes uf ) (6.1)
Where includes is used to show that the function is associated with its own unex-
pected consequences. This also entails additional conditions applying to the rule
for reporting of an effects unexpected consequences, as these might be replaced by
the function’s consequences. The rule is that the unexpected effect’s consequences
are reported if the function is not unexpected (that is the effect expression as a
whole is still false) or if the function has no unexpected consequences of its own.
So unexpected consequences ue of an effect e, are reported as follows.
R(ue) if (¬Tr(f) ∧ e) ∧ (¬Un(f) ∨ ¬(f includes uf )) (6.2)
This is the complete version of rule 5.14 in Section 5.7.
An example of where this might be done is a car’s stop lights, where the stop
light function requires both stop lights to light in response to the trigger, pressing
the brake pedal. It will be seen that in this case, the consequences of one brake
light staying on (so being achieved unexpectedly) are less serious than those of
both staying on, as if one light responds correctly to the trigger, then a following
driver will still have some warning that the car is slowing while if both are lit the
whole time, no warning is given.
The rules used for which consequences are included in the report are the same
as that used for failure of a function. Where a function’s effects (or subfunctions)
are combined using AND or OR, if one effect is achieved unexpectedly, the unex-
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pected consequences of that effect are included and if both effects of a function
are achieved unexpectedly, then the consequences of unexpected achievement of
the function are included, provided, of course, that the function’s description of
purpose has a set of unexpected consequences. The reverse applies if XOR is used,
as is the case with failure of a function, so the function’s unexpected consequences
(if any) would be included if one but not both of the effects are unexpected.
This results in an apparent inconsistency in the case of unexpected achievement
of a function where OR is used, as the function’s effects might be achieved unex-
pectedly even if only one effect is achieved unexpectedly. This mirrors the similar
effect with failure of a function using AND, where a function fails if one effect fails
(provided, of course, that the effect is associated with a subsidiary function) but
the consequences of that effect’s subsidiary function are included in the report.
The reason for accepting this anomaly is the same as that for the difficulty with
AND, it leads to a more detailed report than if the consequences were dependent
of achievement or otherwise of the function itself.
As the unexpected consequences are initially associated with an effect, there is,
of course, no need for the effect to be associated with a subsidiary function. This
reflects the idea that failure of a function is considered working down the hierarchy,
while unexpected achievement works up the hierarchy.
Having considered the use of subsidiary functions in increasing the expressiveness
of the functional language and so of the resulting report it is time to consider the
relationships between the state of achievement of the top level function and the
states of the subsidiary functions. This forms the topic of the next section.
6.3 A logical basis for subsidiary functions
Where a function is composed of subsidiary functions, these are combined using
the logical operators in much the same way as triggers and effects are. Where
subsidiary functions are used, each will have its own trigger and effect, so a sub-
sidiary function can be in any of the four functional states illustrated in Table 5.1
on page 92. Therefore the state of the top level function must be defined in terms
of the states of the subsidiary functions. The rule used is that the truth of the
trigger of the top level function depends on the truth of the triggers of the sub-
sidiary functions combined using the operator that relates the subsidiary function
and the truth of the effect of the top level function is derived from the truth of
the effects of the subsidiary functions related using that operator.
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To put this more formally, let f be a function composed of two subsidiary func-
tions a and b related using some Boolean operator ⊗ so f is composed of a ⊗ b.
The rules for finding the state of f are as follows.
Tr(f) if Tr(a) ⊗ Tr(b) (6.3)
Ef(f) if Ef(a) ⊗ Ef(b) (6.4)
The function state can then be derived from these using rules listed in Appendix A
as A.7 to A.10.
It will be seen that this forces the same Boolean relation between the triggers
and effects of the subsidiary function. This limitation can be circumvented by
using trigger and effect expressions instead of the subsidiary functions (with the
loss of associated descriptions of purpose for the lower level functions). If the
descriptions of purpose are required, then incomplete functions, described in the
following chapter, can be used.
For example, if a function F depends on subsidiary functions C1 AND C2 the
top level function is only triggered if the triggers for both subsidiary functions
are true and only achieved if both the subsidiary functions’ effects are present.
If only one subsidiary function is triggered, the implicit trigger expression for F
is not true. Likewise if that subsidiary function’s effect is present, the effect of
F is still not true as it requires both. Therefore F is inoperative in this case.
The results of this approach are summarised in table 6.1. where the subsidiary
C 1 C 2 C 1 AND C 2 C 1 OR C 2 C 1 XOR C 2













































Table 6.1: Achievement of a function in terms of subsidiary functions.
functions are Child 1 and Child 2 and are related using the binary Boolean
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operators. It will be seen that some of the results are, perhaps unexpected, or at
least not intuitively correct. For this reason, fuller descriptions of the relationships
are given in following subsections, with brief discussions of the more surprising
results. However, the approach taken is consistent, both with itself and with the
idea that the four functional states are defined in terms of the truth of triggers
and effects.
In some cases (identified in the table by the resulting functional state being
in parentheses) a top level function might be in a state consistent with correct
operation of the system despite the fact that a subsidiary function is either failed or
achieved unexpectedly. In these cases the resulting design analysis report need not
include any reference to the top level function, so where, for example, a function
depends on two subsidiary functions combined using AND, if one subsidiary function
has failed and the other is inoperative, the report need only include an entry
for the failed subsidiary function. These points will, it is hoped be clarified by
the following subsections, which discuss the relationships between functions and
subsidiary functions for each logical operator.
The reporting of subsidiary functions follows the rule for reporting of functions,
rule A.11 in Appendix A. However, as described earlier, to capture the idea that
partial achievement of a function might mitigate its failure there are different rules
for reporting the consequences of failure of subsidiary functions. If f is a function
with its consequences of failure cf and composed of subsidiary functions a and b,
combined using AND or OR, and each with their own consequences of failure ca and
cb then the consequences of failure of f are reported (R(cf )) only if both subsidiary
functions fail.
R(cf ) if and only if Fa(a) ∧ Fa(b) (6.5)
If only one of the subsidiary functions, say a fails then its consequences are re-
ported, even if this means that f has failed.
R(ca) if Fa(a) ∧ ¬Fa(b) (6.6)
Where the subsidiary functions are combined with XOR, this rule is inappropriate
and instead we report the consequences of failure of f if only one of the subsidiary
functions fails.
R(cf ) if (Fa(a) ∧ ¬Fa(b)) ∨ (¬Fa(a) ∧ Fa(b)) (6.7)
The rules for reporting consequences of unexpected achievement of functions follow
the rules numbered A.14 and A.15 in Appendix A, as described earlier in the thesis.
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These reporting rules are illustrated in the tables that accompany the following
sections.
6.3.1 Subsidiary functions and AND
The relationships between the states of a function and its subsidiary functions,




























































Function C2 failed because expected
effect e2 absent
Function C2 achieved unexpectedly
because unexpected effect 2 present
Function F achieved
Function F failed because function C2
failed
Function F achieved unexpectedly
because function C2 achieved
unexpectedly
Function F failed because functions
C1 and C2 failed
Function C1 failed and function C2
achieved unexpectedly
Function F achieved unexpectedly









































Table 6.2: Functional decomposition using AND
tables in the following subsections) makes explicit the relationship between the
functional state (both of the top level function and the subsidiary functions) and
the trigger and effect. It also includes a brief rendition of the text that will be
included in a design analysis report and a brief notation showing how the report
will include the consequences of the functional state. There is a fuller description
of the notation used in these tables in Appendix D.
It will be seen that the top level function cannot be in a state that requires its
trigger to be true unless both subsidiary functions’ functions are true and also
that it cannot be in a state in which its effects are true unless both subsidiary
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functions’ effects are true. This is what would be expected, the top level function
is only achieved if both subsidiary functions are achieved.
It will be seen that where the top level function is in a state apparently consistent
with correct behaviour of the system (in this case inoperative) but one of the
subsidiary functions is not (it has failed or is unexpected) then the generated text
(for the design analysis report) need only refer to that subsidiary function. In such
cases, both in this table and in Table 6.1 above, the top level function’s state is
in parentheses to highlight this. Where the top level function has failed because
of the failure of one subsidiary function (in this case C2 ) the report can include
this detail and also include a specific set of consequences. The report uses the
subsidiary function’s consequences in cases where one of the subsidiary functions
is inconsistent (failed or unexpected) and uses the consequences of the top level
function where both subsidiary functions have failed or are unexpected. This
allows cases where achievement of one of the subsidiary functions mitigates failure
of the top level function to be distinguished, which is one of the advantages of using
subsidiary functions. As has been discussed, this representation of consequences
is (arguably) inconsistent with AND for failure of the top level function but if it
is not done, the expressiveness of the approach is reduced. The generated text
does include a note that the top level functional has failed. The table includes
alternatives for the consequences of unexpected achievement of functions, simply
because such consequences are required for individual effects but might not be used
higher up the decomposition. In such cases, the report will include the highest
available set of unexpected consequences.
It should be noted that the use of subsidiary functions is different from a function
that requires a combination of triggers and effects, as each subsidiary function’s
trigger is associated with that function’s effect. For example, if the hob’s functional
model did not use subsidiary functions, and the rings and their switches are simply
treated as triggers and effects of the cook_on_hob function, there is no way of
associating the switch with the correct ring. If either of the switches is on and
either of the rings is on, the function is achieved. This is another reason for
adopting subsidiary functions and an approach to using subsidiary functions to
associate triggers and effects where they are not to be associated with their own
descriptions of purpose is described in Section 7.2.
6.3.2 Subsidiary functions and OR
When the subsidiary functions are combined using OR then, following the rule that
the trigger and effect of the top level function depends on the triggers and effects,
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respectively, of the subsidiary functions, if either trigger is true, the top level
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Function F achieved because function
C2 achieved
Function F failed because function C2
failed
Function F achieved unexpectedly
because function C2 achieved
unexpectedly
Function F achieved
Function C2 failed because expected
effect e2 absent
Function C2 achieved unexpectedly
because unexpected effect 2 present
Function F failed because functions
C1 and C2 failed
Function C1 failed and function C2
achieved unexpectedly
Function F achieved unexpectedly
















































Table 6.3: Functional decomposition using OR
might be achieved despite failure of a subsidiary function, as in the sixth line of
the table. In such cases, the report need only refer to the failure of the subsidiary
function. The result of one subsidiary function failing and the other being achieved
unexpectedly (the ninth row of the table) is apparently anomalous. However the
result is consistent with the use of OR, in that the top level function is triggered
(one of the subsidiary functions is) and its effect is true (one of the subsidiary
function’s effect is true). In practice, too, this is a plausible result, in that the
purpose of the top level function can be fulfilled in this case. To demonstrate,
consider the hob example mentioned earlier. Suppose that a connection error in
an electric hob means that turning on the left front ring results in the right front
ring heating. Clearly in this case, the left front ring’s function is failed (triggered
but not effective) and the right front ring’s function is unexpected (not triggered
but effective). In this case, then a top level function for the hob as a whole is
achieved and, at least arguably, this is the on the grounds that this state allows
cooking to be done so its purpose is fulfilled. This is subject to the proviso that the
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cook notices that the wrong ring has come on. The precise effect of this will depend
on the type of hob, of course, as this state is fairly obvious with radiant rings,
less so with hot plates. This does leave the model builder to build the functional
model with this in mind, of course. This apparent anomaly is mitigated by the fact
that the generated text will refer to the inconsistent behaviour of the subsidiary
functions, as shown in the table.
The same rule for deciding which consequences are included in the report is
used here, so where one subsidiary function has failed (or is unexpected), its
consequences are used, while if both have failed (or are unexpected) the top level
function’s consequences are used. There is a similar inconsistency as is the case
with AND here, in that where one of the subsidiary functions is unexpected, so is
the top level function but the subsidiary function’s consequences are included in
the report. This is for the same reason, so that the report distinguishes between
cases where one or both subsidiary functions are unexpected.
6.3.3 Subsidiary functions and XOR
For a top level function using exclusive or (XOR) to be achieved, one but not both
of the subsidiary functions must be achieved, as shown in Table 6.4. In fact,
of course, the same unexpected result of one subfunction being failed and the
other unexpected as with OR is apparent here, and the same argument apply. It
will be seen that there are other apparently unexpected results here, such as one
subfunction’s inconsistent behaviour causing the other inconsistent behaviour in
the top level function, so that in the seventh row of the table, an unexpected
subsidiary function causes the top level function to fail. This is consistent with
the approach taken, as the trigger expressions combined using the operator resolve
to false, while the effect resolves to true. The opposite case is found in the sixth
row. It is suggested that while these results appear anomalous, they are therefore
correct and the report will be consistent with this.
As noted earlier, the rule used with AND and OR for including consequences in the
report (use the subsidiary function’s consequences if subsidiary function has failed
or is unexpected, the top level functions if both are) is clearly inappropriate here,
as it is only when one subsidiary function has failed (or is unexpected) that the
top level function fails (or is inconsistent). Therefore, for XOR, the rule is reversed
and the consequences of the top level function are included in the report when
both subsidiary functions have failed or are unexpected and the consequences of
the top level function when only one has. The approach taken here is that the





























































Function F achieved because function
C2 achieved
Function F failed because function C2
failed
Function F achieved unexpectedly
because function C2 achieved
unexpectedly
Functions C1 and C2 achieved
Function F achieved unexpectedly
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C2 failed
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F failed because function C2
achieved unexpectedly
Functions 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 and 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 failed













































Table 6.4: Functional decomposition using XOR
severe consequences (indicated by ‘max’ in the table) but, of course, both could
be included.
6.4 Relationships between system and function
It seems worth closing this chapter with a brief discussion of the relationship be-
tween the functional hierarchy and the system. Figure 6.5 shows the relationships
between the functional descriptions, descriptions of purpose and system attributes
for the hob example used earlier. In this case, a given ring’s function can be asso-
ciated with a subsystem of the hob in that not all the components of the hob are
involved in achieving that function. For example the failure of a wire connecting
the left ring with its knob does not affect achievement of the cook on right ring
function. However, there is unlikely to be a neat mapping between a functional
subsystem and a structural subsystem. Typically, the failure of some components
will affect several of a system’s functions, of course and it is possible that a physical










UNEXPECTED "Danger of burn to user"
   SEVERITY 8
   DETECTION 4
PURPOSE cook_food
DESCRIPTION "Allow preparation of cooked food"
FAILURE "Hob cannot be used for cooking"
   SEVERITY 7









DESCRIPTION "Use ring for cooking"
FAILURE "Ring cannot be used. Limits cooking"
   SEVERITY 4






Figure 6.5: Model relationships for the hob example.
a telephone being required in both the transmit and receive functions.
A further area to consider when discussing functional decomposition is the point
that the top level of a functional hierarchy relates to a purpose not to a physical
system. Some systems might well be cohesive enough to be analysed as a whole
even though they actually fulfil several different (if related) functions. For ex-
ample, it is quite likely that a car’s exterior lighting system will be analysed as
a whole as it is a cohesive structural design, but this system implements several
distinct functions, each fulfilling a distinct purpose. Some of these are listed in








left and right side lights and tail lights lit
left and right headlamps main beam
left and right headlamps dipped
left and right brake lights lit
right hand indicators flashing
left hand indicators flashing
Table 6.5: Functions associated with a car’s exterior lights.
some higher level purpose, with the proviso that dipped headlamps might be con-
sidered to contribute to the “make car visible” function. Therefore, they should
not be modelled as components of a system level function. That there is no need
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for a system level “exterior lights” function is made clear by the fact that there is
no single purpose that can be attached to it, other than the rather loose idea that
the car is not roadworthy if any of the lights is not working and this is captured
by the need to fulfil all the listed purposes.
This serves to highlight the idea that a functional hierarchy should have a clearly
defined purpose at the top and need not imply the correct working of the whole
system, as there is no necessary relationship between the structural and functional
decompositions of the system. Of course, if the system has parts that are not
necessary to achieve any function, these are likely to be redundant, though they
could of course be associated with fault tolerant back up functionality.
Another point that arises is that the listing of functions in Table 6.5 is only
one possible alternative functional description. An alternative might have two
“make visible” functions, a parked one requiring sidelights and tail lights and
a running one that adds dipped or main beam headlamps. This does suggest
that the building of an appropriate functional model requires some knowledgeable
judgement as to the correct relationships between the different functions and their
triggers and effects. However, this could be seen as emphasising the advantage
of this approach in that using functional description to interpret the results of
a simulation for design analysis does mean that these relationships need only be
described once, rather than repeating the description each time a given failure is
found, as would be the case if only the simulation were available.
The alternative decomposition, with the dipped beam contributing to both the
make visible and the light road ahead functions introduces the idea that a sub-
sidiary function might be associated with more than one top level functions. As
each function is a separate model, there is no difficulty in doing so. A possible
example is the plant monitoring audible warning function used as an example ear-
lier. As this same siren is used to draw attention to any one of a number of plant
failures, the effect might well be treated as a subsidiary function of each failure’s
warning function. It will be appreciated that there is a possibly drawback in doing
so, in that the severity of the failure of the warning siren might well be considered
to depend on which plant failure it is failing to draw attention to (so to which top
level function its failure is affecting). It might be better to use several subsidiary
functions and associate each audible warning subsidiary function with the same
effect (the siren) or even to dispense with subsidiary functions altogether in such
cases.
This chapter has described the decomposition of system functions in cases where
the subsidiary functions are themselves complete representations of function, with
trigger, effect and reference to a description of purpose. However, there are cases
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where a system function is better decomposed in to several subsidiary functions
that share one of these three elements. The next chapter considers such cases, and





While a subsidiary function might have its complete set of three characteristic
elements (the trigger, effect and purpose), as described in the previous chapter,
there are cases where one of these elements is common to some function’s sub-
sidiary functions and so the repetition of this element is redundant. The seat belt
warning example in Section 6.1 is a case in point as the audible and visual warn-
ing subsidiary functions will share a trigger. This suggests a rôle for incompletely
specified functions, allowing the repetition of common elements to be avoided.
Indeed, such representations are necessary for completeness of the language. The
use of Boolean expressions to relate subsidiary functions (as discussed in the pre-
vious chapter) limits such decompositions to cases where the same operator is
used for the triggers and effects of the subsidiary functions. The use of incomplete
representations of function allows functions whose triggers and effects are not to
be combined using the same operator to be related as subsidiary functions, with
their own descriptions of purpose.
The use of three elements in a complete function introduces the possibility of
incomplete functions (or incomplete representations of function) that specify the
relationship between any two of these elements. If function is seen as a relational
concept, then at least two elements are necessary, of course, so the function can
define the relation between them. The three possible pairings of elements are:-
• The relation between effect and purpose.
• The relation between trigger and effect.
• The relation between trigger and purpose.
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This in turn suggests that there are three possible classes of incomplete function.
Purposive incomplete function (abbreviated to PIF) relates an effect to a
purpose. It is used where several effects each have their own purpose (be-
sides contributing to that of a higher level function), but share the trigger
of that higher level function.
Operational incomplete function (OIF) relates a trigger to an effect with no
separate purpose. It is used to associate specific triggers with specific effects,
all of which contribute a higher level function
Triggered incomplete function (TIF) relates a trigger to a purpose. It can
be used where some common effect can be triggered in different ways and
where the trigger defines the purpose of the effect and so the function.
Each of these classes of incomplete function will be discussed in its own section,
before concluding the chapter with a discussion of how these incomplete functions
are used in differing functional decompositions.
The terminology used for the first two classes of incomplete function follows
the alternative definitions of function in (Chittaro & Kumar, 1998). A purposive
incomplete function expresses the relationship between behaviour (specifically ef-
fect) and purpose, consistently with that paper’s purposive definition of function
while an operational incomplete function describes the relationship between trig-
ger and effect (so input and output), consistently with their operational definition
of function. The triggered incomplete function does not follow so definitely from a
definition of function and there might be felt to be no need for that class of incom-
plete function as there is no direct relationship between trigger and purpose — a
trigger must result in an effect to achieve its purpose. The relationships between
trigger, effect and purpose are linear in that a trigger results in an effect that fulfils
a purpose. Earlier discussions of this approach to functional decomposition, (Bell
et al., 2005a; Bell et al., 2005b) did indeed only include discussion of purposive
and operational incomplete functions. However, there are reasons for the inclusion
of the remaining class, to be discussed in Section 7.3
7.1 Purposive incomplete function
A purposive incomplete function (PIF) maps between an effect expression (which
might, of course, combine individual effects using Boolean operators) and a specific
purpose. There is no trigger expression, allowing purposive incomplete functions
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to be used to describe subsidiary functions that share a triggering condition. This
avoids the redundant repetition of triggers noted in the subsidiary function ex-
ample mentioned earlier, the seat belt warning system. That same functional
description can be built using purposive incomplete functions instead of the (com-









Each purposive incomplete subfunction is a separate model wherein the recog-
niser is reduced to an expression describing the effect. The reference to a descrip-
tion of purpose is similar to that for a complete function. It will therefore have a set
of consequences of failure associated with it (and so with the purposive incomplete
function) and might also have a set of consequences of unexpected achievement of
the effect, in exactly the same way as a description of purpose associated with a
complete function. The audible_unbuckled_warning subfunction as a purposive





The difference between a purposive incomplete function and a straightforward
effect is the association with some specific purpose that contributes to that of
the top level function of which the PIF is a subsidiary function. A purposive
incomplete function can be thought of as inheriting a trigger from the function
of which it is a subsidiary function. This avoids the need to repeat an identical
expression for several subfunctions, avoiding the danger of inconsistency between
the expressions and also simplifying the mapping between system properties and
trigger, as only one such mapping is needed.
The relationship between trigger, effect and achievement of a purposive incom-
plete function is similar to that for a complete function, the only difference being
that the trigger is elsewhere in the function hierarchy. If the effect is true and the
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trigger false, the effect is unexpected. Whether the effect of the function of which
the PIF is a subfunction is also achieved unexpectedly will depend on the rela-
tionship between the function’s subsidiary functions and which of the subsidiary
PIFs’ effects are present. To define the relationship between a function and its
subsidiary PIFs more formally, let f be a system function with subsidiary PIFs p
and q, related using some binary Boolean operator ⊗.
In(f) ⇔ ¬Tr(f) ∧ ¬(Ef(p) ⊗ Ef(q)) (7.1)
Fa(f) ⇔ Tr(f) ∧ ¬(Ef(p) ⊗ Ef(q)) (7.2)
Un(f) ⇔ ¬Tr(f) ∧ (Ef(p) ⊗ Ef(q)) (7.3)
Ac(f) ⇔ Tr(f) ∧ (Ef(p) ⊗ Ef(q)) (7.4)
The trigger expression belongs to f , so we can consider f to be triggered. Notice
that the trigger cannot be associated with each of the PIFs (making them complete
subsidiary functions) as if they are combined using XOR then teh top level function
will never be triggered as both subsidiary functions’ trigger expressions will be
either true of false at any one time. This relationship is discussed further below.
In the seat belt warning system example, if the audible warning sounds despite
there being no unbuckled passengers then the seat belt warning function’s effects
are not achieved unexpectedly because of the lack of the visual signal. Similarly, if
the purposive incomplete function’s inherited trigger is true and its effect false, the
PIF has failed and whether the top level function has failed will, likewise, depend
on the state of other subsidiary functions and the relationship between them. In
this case, failure of either the audible or visual warning PIFs will amount to failure
of the belt warning function. However, it could be argued that the achievement
of either of the subsidiary functions mitigates failure of the warning function as
at least some indication is given, so the failure of the warning system might be
felt to be less severe than if both were lost. This is consistent with the idea of
using subsidiary functions to show cases where achievement of some of a top level
function’s effects mitigates failure of the function, as discussed in the previous
chapter.
The relationships between the state of a top level function and the states of its
purposive incomplete subsidiary functions are worth a brief description. The sim-
plest and most common cases is where the subsidiary PIFs are combined using
AND, as in the seat belt warning system discussed above, and the resulting rela-
tionships are shown in Table 7.1. When purposive incomplete functions are used,


































Function P1 achieved unexpectedly because
unexpected effect e1 present
Function F achieved unexpectedly because
functions P1 and P2 achieved unexpectedly
Function F failed because functions P1and P2
failed





















Table 7.1: Decomposition using partial incomplete functions with AND
derived from the truth of the subsidiary functions triggers as is the case where they
are complete functions. Where AND is used to relate the subsidiary functions, the
results are similar to those obtained using complete subsidiary functions, shown
in Table 6.2 on page 138, but without the need to include relationships where only
one of the subsidiary functions is triggered, of course.
The same relationship between the use of purposive incomplete functions and
complete subsidiary functions is also found where OR is used to combine the sub-
sidiary functions, as shown in Table 7.2, which can be compared with Table 6.3
































Function F failed because functions P1and P2
failed
Function F achieved unexpectedly because
functions P1 and P2 achieved unexpectedly
Function F achieved unexpectedly because






















Table 7.2: Decomposition using partial incomplete functions with OR
circuit where a switch is intended to switch on two lamps, either of which is suf-
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ficient to light an occupant’s way around the room. For example, if there was a














Because each light is associated with its own function, the failure of one light will
be reported, using that PIF’s description of purpose and consequences of failure.
For example, if the wall lamp failed the report might read
Function wall lamp failed because expected wall lamp on not present.
Consequences are side of room dimly lit. Severity 3, detection 2.
The consequences are, of course, those of the description of purpose associated
with the wall lamp function. This would clearly contrast in severity with failure
of both lamps leaving the occupant in the dark. If the lamps were simply effects
associated with the lights_on function, then if one failed the report would show
nothing, unless, of course, AND was used instead of OR, in which case the report
would show the room was not lit and could not distinguish between failure of one
lamp or failure of both.
This raises the interesting point that the relations between subsidiary functions’
purposes might differ from the system’s expected behaviour. In addition to en-
abling the report to show a more refined interpretation of the system behaviour
than a simple Boolean (“all or nothing”) functional description would allow, the
use if purposive incomplete functions allows the functional description to capture
differences between the intended purpose of a system and its expected behaviour.
In this case, the (main) purpose of the lamps differs from the expected behaviour
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of the system as the purpose is adequately fulfilled by one of the lamps, while
both are, of course expected to light up in response to the trigger. The idea that
a function represents both a relationship between behaviour and purpose and the
expected behaviour of a system is discussed further in Section 7.5.
The similarity between the results of using complete functions (repeating the trig-
ger) and purposive incomplete functions is lost when the relation is exclusive OR.
Table 7.3 shows that achievement of the top level function depends on the trig-

































Function F achieved because function P1
achieved
Function F achieved unexpectedly because
function P1 achieved unexpectedly
Functions P1 and P2 achieved unexpectedly
Function F failed because functions P1and P2
failed



















Table 7.3: Decomposition using partial incomplete functions with XOR
instead of PIFs, each subsidiary functions were complete functions each with its
own (identical) trigger, then as the two triggers from which the triggering of the
top level function will always share a value, the trigger of the top level function
will always be false so the top level function can never be triggered and therefore
never achieved correctly. This follows from the rule used that the truth of the
triggering of the top level function is derived from the truth of the triggering of
the subsidiary functions combined using the logical relation, so with XOR the top
level function is only triggered if one of the subsidiary functions is triggered. This
is shown in Table 6.4 on page 142. This difference does capture a real difference in
the meaning of the functional decomposition, contrasting a function that is trig-
gered by the trigger of one of its subsidiary functions with one that is triggered by
(implicitly) both, even though only one of the effects is expected. This also means
that partial incomplete functions are a necessary part of the functional language
because this case cannot be described without their use.
An example of a system that might use such a functional description is not
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easy to find as such a system uses a trigger with a non-deterministic effect. One
possibility is a game where a random (or pseudo-random) element is necessary.
A coin slot arcade game in which one of two model animals appears periodically
for a short time, the idea being for the player to score as many hits as possible
might be modelled in this way, in that a given trigger (either starting the game or,
during play, an animal returning to its hole restarting the timer and selector) will
result in either one but not both of the models appearing. This might be worth
modelling using PIFs rather than simply effects as some play is possible if only one
of the animals fails to appear. It is suggested that the somewhat contrived nature
of this example serves to demonstrate how rarely XOR will be used in combining
purposive incomplete functions.
In most cases, where XOR might be used to combine subsidiary functions, the
trigger should be refined to eliminate this non-deterministic nature of the system.
Main and emergency lighting systems might be considered to be PIF subfunctions
of a light room function, either being triggered by switching on the lights and
combined using XOR (or possibly OR). However, this fails to describe the fact that
the emergency lighting system should only be triggered if the main system fails, so
which system is triggered has a significance that is lost if XOR is used in describing
these functions. In other words which effect is triggered is not non-deterministic
and a correct description will have the emergency lighting function triggered by
the state of the main lighting system, avoiding such non-determinism. Purposive
incomplete functions are not appropriate in such cases, being intended principally
to allow subfunctions that combine to achieve a function and that share a trigger
to be described.
The discussion of relationships between states of purposive incomplete functions
and the top level function is concluded by noting that the rule for including the
consequences of failure of a function in the resulting design analysis report is,
as might be expected, the same as when complete subsidiary functions are used.
So when the PIFs are combined with AND or OR, the consequences are those
of the failed PIF if one fails and the top level function if both PIFs fail. If XOR
is used this is reversed (again as is the case with complete subsidiary functions)
so if one PIF fails the top level consequences are included and if both do, the
consequences of (one of) the PIFs. The unexpected achievement of PIFs is also
handled in the same way as is unexpected achievement of complete subsidiary
functions, so the consequences will depend as much on whether any have been
added for unexpected achievement of function or whether those associated with
individual effects are being relied upon.
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7.2 Operational incomplete function
An operational incomplete function (OIF) defines a relationship between a trigger
and effect that does not itself fulfil any purpose, but rather contributes to the
fulfilment of the purpose of a function of which it is a subsidiary function. This
might be felt to be inconsistent with the idea that any function is associated with
a purpose and indeed an operational incomplete function is best regarded as a way
of defining the expected behaviour of a system rather than its purpose. This raises
the interesting point that a system function might be thought of as describing the
system’s expected behaviour as distinct from relating behaviour to purpose and in
interpretation of simulation both of these might be of interest. This is discussed
later, in Section 7.5. A description of an operational incomplete function therefore
merely consists of a recogniser. An example of the use of operational incomplete
functions might be a room with two independent lamp circuits, each with a switch
and lamp. In this case, either will do to light an occupant’s way around the room
and arguably neither has a sufficiently distinct purpose of its own to justify the
additional complication of completing their functional descriptions. The room







Here, of course, the recogniser for the top level function is similar to cases where
the subfunctions are complete functions. The only difference is that these sub-





As an operational subfunction consists of a recogniser, there is arguably no need
to label it with the BY keyword. Because the subsidiary functions include both
triggers and effects, the relationships between achievement of the top level func-
tion and the subsidiary functions is identical whether the subsidiary functions
are complete functions or operational incomplete functions. They are therefore
as illustrated in the tables in Section 6.3. Because there is no purpose attached
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to an operational incomplete function, all consequences of failure are those of
the top level function, just as though the top level function was described using
triggers and effects. This means that the failure of one of a function’s OIF sub-
functions might not result in failure of the top level function, as in this example.
For example, if both room lights are switched on but the wall light has failed, the
room_light function is still achieved. This is, of course, no different from the case
where a function consists of several effects. Consequences of unexpected achieve-
ment can either be those associated with the relevant effect or, if the top level
function is achieved and it is associated with a set of consequences of unexpected
achievement, with the top level function. As there is no purpose associated with
an operational incomplete function, it will not have its own consequences of unex-
pected achievement. The rôle of an operational incomplete function is to ensure
that a trigger is associated with the right effect. Notice that in this example, the
wall light switch is associated with the wall light, while using OR to combine the







This is not equivalent to the use of the operational incomplete subfunctions as,
of course, either switch could trigger either light, which is not a good model of the
intended functionality. This could be avoided by having more than one TRIGGERS











It will be appreciated that these formulations give identical results if the trigger,
effects or subfunctions are combined using AND.
Although the use of the formulation above avoids the necessity for using opera-
tional incomplete functions, there are arguments for using them. Their use allows
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the idea that a function has one trigger and one effect (so TRIGGERS appears just
once) to be retained. Another advantage of the use of operationally incomplete
functions is that later in the design process, the design might become refined such
that these subfunctions might acquire a distinct purpose of their own, so they can
be promoted to complete functions. This is simply done by adding an ACHIEVES
clause with a reference to the purpose to the description of the operational incom-
plete function. For example, once the layout of the room in the example above
is known, it might become apparent that someone working at the desk will be
working in their own shadow if the ceiling light is in use, so the wall light acquires
a specific purpose, lighting work at the desk. If this functional refinement is done
without the use of operational incomplete functions, a good deal more rebuilding
of the functional models will be required.
The use of operational incomplete functions also allows a function to be decom-
posed such that only one of the subsidiary functions mitigates failure of the top
level function. This problem was touched on in Section 6.2.1.1 earlier. To use the







Now, if the points fail, the consequences of the main function will be included
in the report, as there are no others available, while if the signals fail, those
consequences are included, allowing the report to show that in this case, the loss
of functionality in the system can be worked around by hand signalling. In other
words, failure of the points amounts to complete failure of the system while failure
of the signals is only a partial failure. While such asymmetric functional models
will, it is suggested, be unusual it does seem worthwhile allowing the language the
flexibility to describe such cases. There is a fuller discussion of this in Section 7.4.1.
It will be seen that formulating the above example without using an OIF would
be somewhat cumbersome.
As a final note on OIFs, their presence makes it necessary to refine the formal rule
5.13 in Section 5.7, as it is possible that a function has now associated description
of purpose and so consequences of failure. To allow for this, the rule is changed
so that consequences are only reported if the fucntion includes them, as follows.
R(cf ) if Fa(f) and if (f includes cf ) (7.5)
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Where R(cf ) means the consequences of f are reported if f has failed and f inludes
such consequences (in its associated description of purpose).
7.3 Triggered incomplete function
As was noted in the introduction to this chapter, this last class of incomplete
function might be thought to be unnecessary, expressing as it does a relationship
which requires an intermediary element (the effect). Indeed it is likely that trig-
gered incomplete functions will be used a good deal less often than either of the
other classes of incomplete function. The principal reason for its inclusion in the
Functional Interpretation Language is completeness but there do exist systems
whose description might make use of such an incomplete representation of func-
tion. A very simple example is a door with a tumbler lock (such as a “Yale” lock)
where the releasing of the lock can be triggered either by using the key (with the
purpose of letting somebody in) or the knob, with the purpose of letting some-
body out. While there is arguably little need for such complication here, it will be
noticed that the consequences of failure of these two purposes (and so triggers) is
different and also that the consequences of failure of either one of the subsidiary
functions is less severe than both. If, say, some fault renders the key unusable,
someone wanting to get in could knock so that an occupant can open the door.
If neither trigger works, the lock needs removing to open the door. This example
might seem a little contrived, which does, perhaps, serve to suggest that this class
of incomplete function will seldom be used. It does seem possible that it might be
of some use in describing software systems, where the consequences of the output
of a certain module might depend on how the module was called.
Formally, a function f composed of two TIFs s and u combined using some
operator ⊗ has its function state defined following these rules.
In(f) ⇔ ¬(Tr(s) ⊗ Tr(u)) ∧ ¬Ef(f) (7.6)
Fa(f) ⇔ (Tr(s) ⊗ Tr(u)) ∧ ¬Ef(f) (7.7)
Un(f) ⇔ ¬(Tr(s) ⊗ Tr(u)) ∧ Ef(f) (7.8)
Ac(f) ⇔ (Tr(s) ⊗ Tr(u)) ∧ Ef(f) (7.9)
These are similar to the rules for PIFs, above, but now the triggers are associated
with the subsidiary functions and the effect with the top level function. A similar
point regarding the use of XOR applies here as applies to PIFs in that if the same
effect is associated with each subsidiary function, the top level function will never
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be effective as both or neither effect will be true at any time.
The description of a triggered incomplete function is not unlike that for a pur-
posive incomplete function but, of course, the TIF takes the place of the trigger









Here, lock_released is an effect with two purposes, which are distinguished by
the trigger used. The TIF’s description consists of a reference to a description of





The description of purpose (here let_in) is similar to one that might be associ-
ated with a complete function. It will not, generally, include a set of consequences
of unexpected achievement of the effect. As there is no effect in the function, it
would be inappropriate. If the effect (common to two TIFs) occurs unexpectedly
it could apply to either or both of the TIFs. This allows the hierarchical functional
description (and so the resulting design analysis report) to differentiate between
the consequences of the effect failing in response to each trigger.
The relationships between states of triggered incomplete functions and the top
level function are not dissimilar to those for purposive incomplete functions with
the obvious difference that as the effect is shared, it is inherited from the top level
function rather than the trigger. Combining triggered incomplete functions with
AND has the results shown in Table 7.4. The results are similar to those lines in
Table 6.2 on page 138 where both effects share a value. It will be appreciated
that where AND is used, both triggers are required to trigger the expected effect.
This leaves a limited rôle for combining triggered incomplete functions with AND
as it will never be the case that one or other of the subsidiary functions will fail.





















































Function F achieved unexpectedly because
effect e unexpectedly present
Un(F) or Un(e)
(no entry)
Function F achieved unexpectedly because
function T1 achieved unexpectedly








Table 7.4: Functional decomposition using triggered incomplete functions with
AND
effect appears in response to one of the two triggers, so the other TIF is achieved
unexpectedly. There is therefore the possibility of using TIFs combined with AND
where it is required to add consequences of unexpected achievement of a function’s
effects at this intermediate level in the functional hierarchy. It is therefore not
impossible that the description of purpose associated with a TIF will include a set
of consequences of unexpected achievement.
There is a more definite rôle for triggered incomplete functions combined with
OR, indeed the lock example mentioned in the introduction to this section is a case
in point. Here, again, the relationships between the TIFs and the achievement
of the top level function, shown in Table 7.5, are similar to those for complete
subsidiary functions, compare with table 6.3 an page 140. If one of the TIFs fails,
the consequences are those of the TIF while if both fail (neither trigger will result
in the expected effect) the consequences are those of the top level function. This
is consistent with the rule used with complete subsidiary functions and purposive
incomplete functions, and is also used where TIFs are combined with AND. This
leads to an interesting side effect with the lock example, as in this case it is unlikely
that both triggers will occur simultaneously. Therefore the interpretation must
allow for this and compare the results of the use of each trigger to establish that
neither results in the expected effect and therefore that the top level function’s
consequences are to be included in the report. There seems to be no problem with
this, provided the results of the simulation(s) allow this comparison to be made.
As is the case with purposive incomplete functions, the relationship between
subsidiary triggered incomplete functions and the top level function using XOR is





















































Function F failed because function T2 failed Fa(T2)
Function F achieved unexpectedly because
effect e unexpectedly present
Un(F) or Un(e)
Function F achieved






Table 7.5: Functional decomposition using triggered incomplete functions with
OR


















































Function F failed because function T2 failed Fa(F)
(no entry)
Function F achieved unexpectedly because
effect e unexpectedly present
Un(F) or Un(e)
Function F achieved unexpectedly because





Table 7.6: Functional decomposition using triggered incomplete functions with
XOR
other of two alternative triggers, rather then a top level function being achieved by
one or other of two subsidiary functions. If complete subsidiary functions are used
in place of the triggered incomplete functions, then if one subsidiary function’s
effect is present, so is the other. The two effects combined with XOR will, therefore
always resolve to false, so the top level function would never be achieved. This is
consistent with the rule used for functional decomposition, where the truth of a top
level function’s effect is derived from the truth of the subsidiary functions’ effects
combined using the relevant logical operator. A possible example of using TIFs
with XOR is the common arrangement for a landing light with two switches, and











It is at least arguably the case that the purposes of these two TIFs are not really
distinct, but it is possible that the functions are described this way to allow for
the idea that one of the switches failing to switch on the lamp is a less serious
failure of the system than both failing. This works because each TIF will include





As TIFs combined using XOR cannot be replaced with complete subsidiary func-
tions, because the resulting relationship with the top level function is different,
TIFs are a necessary component of the functional language, even though it is likely
they will only infrequently be used.
Where PIFs or TIFs are used in a functional decomposition, the rules for report-
ing failures of functions follow those for complete subsidiary functions, A.11 and
A.12 in Appendix A and the rules for reporting the consequences of these failures
follow A.18, A.19 and A.20.
7.4 Incomplete functions in functional decompo-
sition
The three classes of incomplete function are used as subsidiary functions of a
complete function to assist with the construction of a hierarchical functional de-
composition. A function can therefore be decomposed in five ways, using triggers
and effect, complete subsidiary functions, or any class of incomplete function, as


























Figure 7.1: Five functional decompositions
lined box while a thin box used for an associated description of purpose. Arrow
heads are used to distinguish relationships between model components that are
(or could be) seen as separate models, in different files. Incomplete functions are
shown by a broken outline and “operator” is used to indicate any Boolean op-
erator. Any “trigger” and “effect” in the diagram can, of course, be a Boolean
expression. There is a key to this and other similar figures in Appendix C on
page 286.
Where an effect is associated with a distinct purpose (so the consequences of its
failure are different from those of failure of the top level function), then either
a complete function or a purposive incomplete function is used, depending on
whether the effect is associated with its own trigger. Otherwise, the function is
simply composed either of trigger and effect or, if there is more than one of each
and they need associating, operational incomplete functions are used.
It is possible (though perhaps unlikely) that these decompositions might be
mixed, though it will be apparent that there are restrictions on this mixing. It
will be seen in figure 7.1 that three of the decompositions start with TRIGGERS
and the other two with a Boolean operator. It is possible to mix elements from
these related decompositions, so a purposive incomplete function can be paired
with an effect that fulfils no independent purpose, a complete subsidiary function
can be paired with an operational incomplete function and a triggered incomplete
function with a trigger expression that triggers the same effect. This might be
done in cases where a function depends on two effects, one of which has a clearly
defined purpose (or clearly defined consequences of failure) of its own while the
other does not. This allows functional decompositions that are not symmetrical,
in that one of the effects is more essential to correct achievement of a function
than the other.
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7.4.1 Asymmetrical functional decompositions
An advantage of the approach to functional decomposition described here is that
it allows functions that might be considered to be asymmetrical to be described.
What is meant by this are the cases where a function depends on two effects (say)
only one of which can be regarded as a subsidiary function or where a function
depends on two subsidiary functions only one of which is regarded as mitigating
the failure of the top level function. While such cases are likely to be unusual,
it not impossible that a trigger has effects of different degrees of significance in
achieving a function. A simple example might be a car’s brake lighting function,
where the car has a repeater in addition to the two required brake lights. As the
brake lights proper are legal requirements it could be argued that their failure is
more significant than failure of the repeater. This might be described by mixing


















DESCRIPTION "More visible warning of slowing vehicle"
FAILURE "No extra warning of slowing"
SEVERITY 3
DETECTION 6
It will be seen that in this case, failure of either brake light is treated as failure
of the top level function, while failure of the repeater is less significant, as the
consequences of its failure will be those of the failure of the purposive incomplete
function, presumed to be less severe than those of the main function.
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The easiest ways of describing these asymmetric decompositions are by combining
effects and purposive incomplete functions and by combining complete subsidiary
functions and operational incomplete functions. This was illustrated in Section 7.2.
It is also possible to combine triggered incomplete functions and trigger expressions
in the same way. While it will perhaps be an unnecessary refinement in the
functional description for interpretation of simulation, there might conceivably be
cases where it is of use in functional refinement of a design, by helping to identify
those effects that are seen as more essential to achieving some system function
and so possibly focussing the provision of additional fault tolerant functionality.
7.5 Differences between behaviour and purpose
The use of incomplete functions to represent the relationship between trigger and
effect and effect and purpose suggests that the complete representation of a func-
tion actually captures both these different, if related, relationships. This raises
the possibility that the relationship between the trigger and effect, the system’s
expected behaviour, does not require the same effect as the purposive relation-
ship. The most typical case of this is where a trigger triggers redundant effects.
A possible example where these two aspects of a function do not require the same
relationship between effects is where a room has two lights that share a switch.




However, it might be felt that either one of these lights being lit is sufficient
to fulfil the purpose of letting occupants find their way around the room. The
significance of this consideration being, of course, that a system failure that results
on the loss of one light is less severe than one that results in the loss of both.




This raises the question of whether in fact a complete function should be split
into a purposive and an operational component to capture this difference. While
such an approach is interesting, it is rejected because of the additional complexity
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required to capture what might well be regarded as a somewhat pedantic distinc-
tion (in that the functional description could readily be built around the expected
behaviour) and the relative rarity of such cases.
If it is felt necessary to include this distinction in the model, subsidiary functions
can be used by combining them with OR but having them share a trigger, so that



















For both subsidiary functions to share a trigger, both switch_on labels need
attaching to the same system property, of course. This being done neither sub-
function should be achieved without the other, but either can be regarded as
achieving the room_light function. If the wall_lamp function fails, for example,
the report will include
On switching the lights on, function wall lamp not achieved.
The consequences and severity will, of course, be those associated with that lower
level function.
In practice, similar results in the resulting report can be achieved more simply
using purposive incomplete functions. These can be combined using AND, to rep-
resent the expected behaviour, or OR, to represent the purposive relationship, as
the rule used for reporting on the failure of one subsidiary function means that
the results will be not dissimilar in both cases. As was discussed in the previous
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chapter, the only difference is the loss of the reference to the top level function
if OR is used. It is suggested that these approaches are sufficient for adequate
description of cases where the expected behaviour differs from the representation
of the purposive relationship and so there is little or no need to express these two
relationships distinctly in the functional representation.
So far the basis for the present Functional Interpretation Language has been
described, together with how system functions can be decomposed either into ex-
pected effects or into subsidiary functions, which need not themselves be complete
representations of function. There are other dimensions to functional decompo-
sition that might be required however. These are the requirement to specify a
temporal aspect to functional elements, either in terms of a function depending
on a sequence of subsidiary functions or effects or to allow the untimely (typically
late) achievement of a function to be described and also to allow functions whose
state depends on the achievement of some other system function to be modelled.
The following chapters examine how the present language addresses these needs,




Describing functions that depend
on terminating, intermittent and
sequential behaviour
The approach to functional decomposition described in the preceding chapters is
adequate for describing system functions where a trigger results in some effect
(whether output or goal state) that then lasts until some other trigger results in
some further change in the state of the system. For example a lamp that, having
been switched on, remains lit until it is switched off again. However, there are
many systems whose functionality depends on some terminating or intermittent
change of state, or a sequence of such changes, that cannot readily be described
using the conventional logical operators. A simple example is the confirmation of
remote locking by two flashes of all of a car’s direction indicators where the effect
of the confirmation function is completed and the system returns to a similar state
to that before the triggering of that function with no further external stimulus.
To describe functions that depend on such behaviour, some way of expressing
temporal relationships between successive effects is required. The conventional
logical operators lack any temporal element. For example, in defining a function’s
effects (or subfunctions) using AND, all that is stated is that the two effects should
both be present at some indeterminate time. This is appropriate for describing
persistent effects (such as a light staying on) as the results of the simulation can
be checked against the functional model at some suitable point in time. A suitable
point is once the system’s response to a triggering event (such as the simulated
throwing of a switch) is behaviourally complete and the system is in a steady state
awaiting the next stimulus. The simulation of a system’s response to a triggering
event is therefore implicitly placed in a single time slot, beginning with the trigger
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and ending once the system is in a steady state, whereupon the effects (outputs
or goal states) are compared to the system’s functional model to establish what
functions are achieved and what effects are unexpected. This is the approach
taken by the design analysis tool developed in earlier work at Aberystwyth and








Figure 8.1: Using logical operators resulting in a single time slot
represents time and the vertical axis the decomposition of the function’s effects
(or subsidiary functions). A thick line represents the presence of the named effect
and an arrow head its continuation beyond the time represented in the diagram,
as in this case where the main beam effects continue indefinitely. Here, the effect
is checked against the functional model at the end of the simulation step, taken
to be once the simulated behaviour of the system reaches a steady state. As the
expected effects are present at that point in time, the function is achieved, but it
will be seen that strictly speaking the model fails to specify that the two effects
start together and the possibility that they do not is ignored. This is unlikely to
be a problem in most cases. Typically the effects will start together but if they do
not, it does not affect the intended functionality of the system. For example, it
is possible (if unlikely) that the two headlamps in the example have their current
switched by different relays and that a fault in one of them delays that headlamp
switching to main beam so both effect do not start simultaneously. If the state
of the system is only checked at the end o the time slot, this will be missed.
This case does serve to illustrate the fact that the conventional logical operators
lack any temporal dimension. This approach is, however, clearly inappropriate
for modelling systems whose functions depend on effects that depend on some
behaviour that is completed before the system settles into a steady state. For
example, in the remote locking confirmation function mentioned earlier, the flashes
will be over before the system enters a steady state, so these effects will be missed
if comparison with the functional model is only made then. Consider a simple
warning system that, for simplicity, flashes a lamp and sounds a horn in response












Figure 8.2: Finding function at the end of simulation might miss significant effects
an illustration during this chapter, before discussing the modelling of sequential
behaviour with a more realistic case study. It will be seen that if these terminating
effects (which might, of course, be combined to create a sequence of several outputs
such as a number of repeated flashes) are not to be lost in comparison with the
functional description, what is required are operators that allow the ordering of
such effects to be specified and that also indicate the intermediate time steps which
require comparison with the functional model to ensure any terminating effects
that are found in running the simulation of the system are compared with those
specified by the functional description.
To meet this need, the functional language incorporates two sequential operators
similar to operators found in temporal logic. These are
• SEQ (or “strict sequence”) resolves to true if the following condition resolves
to true in the next time slot so the following state immediately succeeds the
preceding system state. This is similar to the N “in the next time step”
operator found in some temporal logics, such as Computational Tree Logic,
abbreviated to CTL (Emerson & Halpern, 1985).
• L-SEQ (or “loose sequence”) resolves to true if the following condition is true
some time after the operator’s place in the temporal sequence, similar to the
tense logic F “some time in the future” operator (Prior, 1957).
The use of a next time step operator entails the use of a model of time that consists
of intervals that meet such that one can be considered to follow immediately after
another. The interval model of time in (Allen, 1984) is such a model as while
he does not regard an interval as containing instants, he does have a relation
MEETS(a, b) that is satisfied if interval b follows interval a with no intervening
interval. In other words, (Allen, 1984) does not explicitly model instants, but that
relation implies the possibility of instantaneous transitions between intervals. The
notion of “properties” that can hold (or not hold) during an interval can be likened
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to system states that are true during an interval. There is a relation HOLDS(p, t)
that is satisfied if the property p is true in the interval t and its sub-intervals.
To answer difficulties found in modelling continuous change using this model of
time, it was refined in (Galton, 1990). In that model of time, intervals can contain
instants so, for example, the interval during which something is travelling North
can contain the instant when that object passes due West of some other object.
Allen’s HOLDS relation is subdivided into three relations.
• HOLDS-AT(p, I) is satisfied if p is true at instant I.
• HOLDS-IN(p, T ) is satisfied if p is true at some instant within interval T .
Therefore p need not be true throughout interval T .
• HOLDS-ON(p, T ) is satisfied if p is true at all instants within interval T , so
it is true throughout T .
As the Functional Interpretation Language was devised for functional modelling
of systems whose behaviour was expressible using state charts, the SEQ can L-SEQ
operators can be expressed in terms of intervals and properties. The Functional In-
terpretation Language sequential operators can be defined in terms of the MEETS
relation in (Allen, 1984) and the HOLDS relations from (Galton, 1990), as follows.
Let a and b be some specified system states (that are the required effects of some
function) and I1 and I2 are intervals of time. The relation a SEQ b is true if
an interval throughout which a is true is immediately followed by an interval
throughout which b is true.
a SEQ b if HOLDS AT(a, I1) ∧ HOLDS AT(b, I2) ∧ MEETS(I1, I2) (8.1)
The relation a L-SEQ b is true if an interval in which a is true at some point is
immediately followed by an interval in which b is true at some point.
a L-SEQ b if HOLDS IN(a, I1) ∧ HOLDS IN(b, I2) ∧ MEETS(I1, I2) (8.2)
As is the case in temporal logics such as CTL (Emerson & Halpern, 1985),
the sequential operators (both SEQ and L-SEQ) are unary so they resolve to true
provided the succeeding state resolves to true (in an appropriate time step). If the
preceding state is not achieved, the sequence has already failed, of course. This
means that a sequence can begin with the operator, referring to the first effects
triggered by the relevant triggering event, as here. This is illustrated in the section
discussing the use of SEQ.
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One question that arises from the similarity of these sequential operators to the
“future” operators from temporal logic is whether there is any need for equivalents
of the past operators. As the aim of these operators is to allow the functional de-
scription to describe a sequence of effects that can be matched by tracing forwards
through a description of the sequence of states of the behavioural simulation, it
is suggested that such operators are not necessary. This might be likened to their
absence in CTL (Emerson & Halpern, 1985) which also traces forward through a
graph of possible states of a system. One area where past operators might be used
is in adding the effect of an earlier trigger, such as an over-ride of some function
whose effects are permanent, or at least beyond the present use of the system.
This is a feature of the seat belt warning system discussed in Chapter 11 where if
the user buckles and unbuckles the driver’s seat belt five times in succession, the
system is permanently disabled and no warning will be given in future. Rather
than using “past” operators in the trigger of each function, it is possible to treat
this behaviour as an additional function of the system and use the goal state of
this function as the condition for the trigger of the warning function. The use of
functions in the triggers of other functions is discussed in Chapter 10.
The use of the sequential operators is discussed in the following sections before
considering how the language models sequences of effects that continue indefinitely
and illustrating the use of these features of the language with simple case studies.
8.1 The strict sequence operator
As noted above, the operator SEQ is used to specify changes that should imme-
diately follow one another. It can therefore be used to specify that the flash and
horn of the simple example warning system should be simultaneous, as illustrated
in Figure 8.3. If the flash and horn are treated as required effects of a warning






SEQ (warning_flash AND warning_horn)
SEQ (NOT warning_flash AND NOT warning_horn)
In this case, NOT is used to show that the effects should be absent during certain









SEQ (warning_flash AND warning_horn)
SEQ (NOT warning_flash AND NOT
warning_horn)
Figure 8.3: Specifying sequences of immediately successive effects
absence of the effects. In this case this is acceptable as we can regard the effects
as being either “on” or “off”, the lamp is either lit or not lit for example. The
use of NOT is discussed in subsection 8.1.2 below. The fact that the sequential
operators are unary means that they can be used at the start of a sequence as here.
This will frequently be the case as the initial state of the system will be defined
in some other functional description. In this case, SEQ is satisfied if the first state
transition following the trigger that involves any change in the effects included in
the functional model results in the state following SEQ being true. This allows SEQ
to be used to specify that two effects are achieved simultaneously in cases where
a single time slot is otherwise sufficient, such as shown in Figure 8.1 above. For
example, if it is felt necessary to specify that a car headlamps’ main beams come






SEQ (left_main_beam AND right_main_beam)
The fact that this specifies that a time step in which the headlamps are not on
main beam (implicitly) is immediately followed by one in which they are both
on main beam stipulates that the lamps come on together. The single time slot
is divided into two, the second of which must immediately follow the first as
illustrated in Figure 8.4. The the system states, and so the effects present, at
the beginning of a simulation step are unknown as that depends on the previous
trigger. In the headlamps example, the main beam function might either be
triggered by the dip switch being switched to the main beam position or by the









Figure 8.4: Using SEQ to specify effects that should start together.
first come on in main beam. Either of those triggering operations could therefore
make the function’s trigger true. The state of the headlamps at the time of the
triggering event is therefore unknown and so not part of this functional description.
The use of this operator both specifies the expected behaviour that achieves
the function concerned and indicates that the simulation step will have to be
divided into successive time steps, beginning with the triggering event and ending
with the system entering a steady state ready for the next triggering event. The
intermediate time steps are delineated by the occurrences of SEQ in the functional
description. This means that for interpretation using these sequential operators,
the simulation engine must provide a sequential description of the system states
associated with the simulation step rather than simply a description of the state
of the system at the end of the simulation. This means that the interpreter can
step through the description checking the state of the system at each step. The
step in the simulation preceding the first instance of SEQ and, especially, the step
following the final instance might be of zero duration as the system immediately
enters a steady state. The system might well enter a steady state immediately
following the ending of the flash and sounding of the horn in the simple warning
example.
The succession of system states specified by the functional description are, of
course, purely concerned with changes to the system’s effects, rather than any in-
ternal system states. For example, suppose the headlamp system in the example
above uses a relay to allow a relatively low current in the dashboard switch to
switch the higher current needed to light the headlamps. In this case, the sim-
ulation will start with the dashboard switch being changed, which will result in
current flowing through the relay’s coil. This will, in turn, cause the relay switch
to trip and allow current to flow through the lamps, resulting in the achievement
of the function. This results in an intermediate state in which current is flowing
through the coil, before the lamps light. As this change of state is purely internal
it does not affect the functional model. What is of interest for interpretation is
173
changes of system behaviour that changes the effector components, those that im-
plement some part of a function’s expected effects. The simulation side of a design
analysis tool will provide a complete step by step description of the results of the
simulation and the interpreter will ignore those steps that do not involve a change
in the effects generated by the system. This means, to return to the example,
that the intermediate state of current flowing in the relay coil does not affect the
truth of the SEQ operator as neither headlamp changes state. The behavioural
simulation can be expected to list all these changes of state (whether the effects
are internal or external) so the sequential functional description indicates which
of these changes are functionally significant. This is illustrated in the example
simulation in Chapter 11.
While SEQ will perhaps be most commonly be used to describe the succession of
effects required when a function depends on intermittent or sequential behaviour,
as discussed in (Bell & Snooke, 2004), there is no reason why the operator should
not be used to specify a sequence of subsidiary functions. Indeed, the simple
warning system might well have the horn and lamp associated with their own
purposive incomplete functions on the grounds that achievement of either effect
mitigates the failure of the warning function. As purposive incomplete functions
are used in place of effects in a functional description, the resulting functional






SEQ (PIF visual_warning AND PIF audible_warning)
SEQ (NOT PIF visual_warning AND NOT PIF audible_warning)
The subsidiary functions are then associated with their own descriptions of pur-
pose and effects as described in the previous chapter. The operators might also
be used to specify a sequence of triggering events required to achieve a function,
such as pressing and releasing a push switch that toggles a functional change. No-
tice that the subsidiary functions need to be associated with the presence of the






The sequence of subsidiary functions (and so their effects) must be managed by
the top level function to specify the temporal relationship between the two effects.
If the sequence of lamp on and lamp off is specified in the subsidiary function
(and likewise for the horn) then the functional description cannot specify that the
lamp and horn start and end simultaneously. To illustrate, if the sequences in the




show_warning_lamp SEQ NOT show_warning_lamp







This functional model fails to specify any relationship between timing of the
flash of the lamp and the sounding of the horn, as they are combined using AND.
This is discussed further in Section 8.2. One difficulty this gives rise to is that the
subsidiary function (and so the subsidiary purpose) is associated only with the
“active” effect, not with the expected sequence of effects. In this case, that does
not seem particularly problematic as it is the lighting of the warning lamp and
sounding of the horn that give the warning.
The use of the SEQ operator entails a discrete model of time where intervals are
divided by instantaneous “points” in time when a change might occur. This is
not dissimilar to the model of time in (Galton, 1990). This model of time is
more appropriate in some application fields than others, of course, and is usable
where a behaviour can be described using a state transition diagram. Strictly
speaking in many systems changes of state will not be instantaneous, such as where
a mechanical system accelerates to its operating speed, overcoming the inertia
of its resting components. This difficulty could be avoided either by specifying
intermediate states or by using the loose sequence operator, described below. In
many cases it would be quite appropriate to simply ignore the intermediate states,
so an electric motor might be modelled as either stopped (no current) or running
if there is current in the windings. The fact that when it starts running it is
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accelerating to overcome inertia in the mechanical part of the system can be
treated as insignificant. Including intermediate states in a functional description is
arguably an unnecessary complication, especially as these states do not, typically,
relate to any purpose (other than reaching the final state). The only reason for a
washing machine, say, having a “filling” state is to manage the transition between
empty (so the door can be opened or spin drying can take place) and full (for
washing or rinsing).
8.1.1 The sequence operator and temporal orderings
Because the strict sequence operator relies on a similar interval based ontology
of time to that in (Allen, 1984) the operator can be used to define the temporal
relations defined in that paper. There are thirteen of these relations, listed in
Table 8.1. Twelve of these actually pair off into six pairs. The table also shows





























(NOT x AND NOT y) SEQ (x AND NOT y) SEQ (NOT x AND NOT y)
SEQ (NOT x AND y) SEQ (NOT x AND NOT y)
(NOT x AND NOT y) SEQ (x AND NOT y) SEQ (NOT x AND y)
SEQ (NOT x AND NOT y)
(NOT x AND NOT y) SEQ (x AND NOT y) SEQ (x AND y)
SEQ (NOT x AND y) SEQ (NOT x AND NOT y)
(NOT x AND NOT y) SEQ (NOT x AND y) SEQ (x AND y)
SEQ (NOT x AND y) SEQ (NOT x AND NOT y)
(NOT x AND NOT y) SEQ (x AND y) SEQ (NOT x AND y)
SEQ (NOT x AND NOT y)
(NOT x AND NOT y) SEQ (NOT x AND y) SEQ (x AND y)
SEQ (NOT x AND NOT y)
(NOT x AND NOT y) SEQ (x AND y) SEQ (NOT x AND NOT y)
Description
Table 8.1: Using SEQ to describe different temporal relations
strict sequence operator allows the correct ordering of the starts and ends of each
effect to be specified. In describing these relationships, the initial state has been
included to avoid any possible suggestion of ambiguity. The terms for the relations
are actually taken from (Gerevini & Schubert, 1995) but the notion of causality
implicit in these terms is not appropriate in this case. For example, the relation
in which both effects start together and x finishes before y is called “x starts y”
which suggests that x is the cause of y. This will not be the case when describing
a function’s effects as they will share a trigger. Where functional modelling is
used for interpretation of simulation, there is no need for any notion of causality
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in the functional description, beyond the notion of a trigger. A full causal chain
(or net) can be derived from the behavioural model of the system if it is required.
The causal aspects of the relationships in (Gerevini & Schubert, 1995) are what
distinguish the individual elements in the paired relationships.
It will be seen from Table 8.1 that SEQ can be used to describe any of these thir-
teen temporal relations when combined with AND and NOT, though this summary
does depend on the effects being of a binary (on or off) nature. The use of NOT is
discussed further below. It will also be appreciated that while sequences of effects
have been kept short here, for simplicity and clarity, there is no reason why they
should not be of arbitrary length, described simply by including repeated states
linked using the sequence operator (or the loose sequence operator).
8.1.2 Using logical NOT
In the examples used above, logical NOT has been used to specify the absence
of a particular effect, specifically (in the example) that once the simulation step
finishes, neither the warning lamp should be lit nor the horn sounding. This is
appropriate in this case as each effect can be regarded as being binary in nature
- the lamp is either lit or not lit and the horn either sounding or silent. These
two alternative states can be associated with the presence or absence of current,
if the simulation is to be qualitative, or with suitable ranges of current if the
simulation is numerical. This use of NOT saves any need to specify an “off” effect.
Many effectors can be described in these terms (such as a flashing lamp alternating
between on and off) but others cannot be so described. For example a windscreen
wiper system might have two speeds, slow and fast, and an intermittent wipe
feature that alternates between slow and stopped. Clearly in this case NOT slow
cannot be used as having the intermittent wipe alternate between slow and fast
would fit that description. Therefore it might well be the case that a “null” effect
in which nothing is done might be necessary. The use of such a null effect could
be avoided by use of NOT, of course, by combining all the available effects, so
the windscreen wipers being stopped can be written as NOT slow AND NOT fast
but this will become decidedly cumbersome in cases where an effector has several
effective states.
The description of functions that depend on an intermittent behaviour that al-
ternates between an active and passive state (such a lamp flashing) is perhaps the
most likely reason for using NOT in functional descriptions. Another possible use
(which has less to do with describing intermittent behaviour) is if it is desired to
include the absence of a specific behaviour that is inimical to achievement of a
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function. For example, as the purpose of dipped headlamps is to light the road
without dazzling the driver of oncoming traffic, if either headlamp’s main beam fil-
ament remains lit, the purpose is not achieved (as drivers will be dazzled). It might
therefore be considered appropriate to include the absence of such inimical effects
in the functional description. The headlamps dipped effects therefore reading
left dipped AND right dipped AND NOT left main AND NOT right main.
This is generally unnecessary because the main beams being lit will be included
in the design analysis report as unexpected effects. Relying on these inimical ef-
fects being marked as unexpected also has the advantage of distinguishing between
the consequences of failure of a function because expected effects are missing and
failure because unexpected effects are present. Therefore such complication of a
functional description is seldom beneficial. One case where it might be useful is
where a function has a likely side effect that must be avoided and whose effect is
not covered by any other function, so will not otherwise appear in the functional
model.
8.2 The loose sequence operator
The strict sequence operator described above is appropriate for describing inter-
mittent behaviours that can be described as switching immediately from one state
to another, using an interval ontology of time, but is not useful for describing
changes that entail an intermediate state that is not part of the functional model.
For example a washing machine’s full state cannot immediately follow its empty
state as the filling operation will not take place in an instant. There is an interme-
diate “filling” state that is an inevitable part of the behaviour of the machine. The
transitions between empty, filling and full could be specified using SEQ. However,
it is arguable that the filling state need not be specified in the functional model.
The only effect of that state is internal in that its goal is for the machine to be
full. These cases can be described using the “loose sequence” operator, L-SEQ. An
expression using this operator resolves to true if the succeeding expression resolves
to true at some time in the future. Therefore, there can be intermediate states
that need not be specified in the functional description, such as the filling state
in the washing machine example. This increases the flexibility of the language,
the model builder can decide whether or not these intermediate states should be
included in the functional description.
This operator allows two effects (or subsidiary functions) to be temporally related
in a less constrained manner than SEQ allows, as illustrated in Figure 8.5. In










L-SEQ (warning_flash AND warning_horn)
L-SEQ (NOT warning_flash AND NOT warning_horn)
Figure 8.5: The loose sequence operator allows less closely constrained temporal
relationships
active at the same time at some period of the simulation, but they need not start
and end simultaneously because the period where one or the other is active is
covered by the undefined intervals between both effects being active and both
being passive. The use of L-SEQ avoids the need to specify intervals where one
or other of the effects is present, though this could be done using SEQ and OR.
This complicates the functional description and where effects are binary (“on” or
“off”) in nature this complication can be avoided. A possible example is a system
that requires two valves to open to allow flow between two reservoirs. In this case,
it is likely to be unimportant which valve opens or closes first, provided there is
a period in which both are open, so the flow is possible. This allows a further
set of less closely constrained temporal relationships to be described, as shown
in Table 8.2. This set of partly ordered relationships can be described using a
combination of SEQ and L-SEQ, where L-SEQ is used to describe those aspects of
the relationship where the order need not be specified, provided that there is no
danger of unwanted intermediate states being missed. The only exception is the
case where two terminating effects are temporally unrelated, where two separate
sequences are combined using AND. This means that both effects must have been
achieved at some point during the simulation but the ordering is unimportant.
Either can occur before the other or they can occur together, in which case they
need not start or end simultaneously. This can be likened to the discussion at the
beginning of this chapter, in which it was noted that AND has no temporal aspect,
but complicated by the presence of two sequences of effects. This allows branching
of time to be represented, as in such temporal logics as CTL, where it is not the
case that some event must always be before, after or simultaneous with some other
event. This case is illustrated in Figure 8.6. While this is illustrated using SEQ,






























and x ends-before y
x must-overlap y
both x and y must occur at
some stage in the simulation
step
There must be an overlap
between x and y but either
can start or end first
both x and y must start
together but the ordering of
the ends is unspecified
both x and y must end
together but the ordering of
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x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 but the
ordering of the ends is
unspecified
x must end before y but the
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x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and end before y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end before or after y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Interpretation
(NOT 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 AND NOT y) SEQ (x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NOT y) SEQ (x AND y) L-SEQ
(NOT x AND NOT y)
(NOT x SEQ x SEQ NOT x) AND
(NOT y SEQ y SEQ NOT y)
(NOT x AND NOT y)
L-SEQ (x AND y)
L-SEQ (NOT x AND NOT y)
(NOT x AND NOT y)
SEQ (x AND y)
L-SEQ (NOT x AND NOT y)
(NOT x AND NOT y)
L-SEQ (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 AND y)
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x AND NOT 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)
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) L-SEQ (x
AND 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x AND y) SEQ
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x AND NOT 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)
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x AND NOT y) SEQ (x AND
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y) L-SEQ (NOT x AND 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) SEQ
(NOT 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y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Description









(warning_flash SEQ NOT warning_flash) AND
(warning_horn SEQ NOT warning_horn)
Figure 8.6: Two temporally unrelated effects.
The L-SEQ operator needs using with care where the effector components have
more than two effective states, as the state of the system between the trigger and
achieving the specified state are not specified, so the functional description would
be satisfied if a motor jumped into running fast between being stopped and slow
(for example), where slow was the required effect. Where such multiple effective
states are a problem, SEQ and OR can be used to further constrain the behaviour
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so that only the correct states are allowed, while leaving the order in which the








(NOT warning_flash AND NOT warning_horn) SEQ
 (warning_flash OR warning_horn) SEQ
 (warning_flash AND warning_horn) SEQ
 (NOT warning_flash OR NOT warning_horn) SEQ
 (NOT warning_flash AND NOT warning_horn)
Figure 8.7: Using OR to constrain unordered sequences
formulation means that the system cannot enter any effective states other than
those specified in the functional description.
Where an intermittent or terminating effect depends on one effector with two
possible states (particularly active and passive states) then the sequence and loose
sequence operators are equivalent. Note, however, that despite the one change
of a binary effective state in many of the temporal relationships in Table 8.1,
L-SEQ cannot be used because the unspecified temporal intervals might include an
unexpected state, such as both effects being present before the one required effect
is.
While both the SEQ and L-SEQ operators will frequently be used to relate effects
required for some system function, it is possible that they are used to relate
subsidiary functions with their own description of purpose. In such cases, the
same rule for inclusion of the consequences of failure of a function is used as
for subsidiary functions combined using AND or OR, so if one of the subsidiary
functions fails, that function’s consequences of failure are included in the design
analysis report while if more than one fail, the top level function’s consequences
are included. This case will generally only arise if one of these operators is used
to combine purposive incomplete functions, so the sequence is launched using a
single trigger.
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8.3 Describing functions that depend on cyclical
behaviour
The sequential operators described above are appropriate for the description of a
function that depends on a sequence of effects (outputs or goal states) that termi-
nates with the system settling into a steady state with no further triggering input.
However, a system function might also depend on some sequence of behaviour that
continues until some further trigger results in the behaviour terminating. A simple
example is the flashing of a car’s direction indicators until they are cancelled either
by the driver switching off the indicators or by the self cancelling mechanism after
completion of the manoeuvre.
Such functions are described by wrapping a non-terminating sequence of effects
(or subsidiary functions) in a “cycle”. The first state within the cycle is preceded
by the CYCLE keyword and the state that is followed by a return to the first state is
followed by the NEW-CYCLE marker. How this is used to describe a simple direction










CYCLE (left_rear_on AND left_front_on)
SEQ (NOT left_rear_on AND NOT
left_front_on) SEQ NEW-CYCLE
Figure 8.8: A cycle of behaviour that continues until a further trigger.
alternate between both left hand indicators being lit and unlit (simultaneously
as SEQ is used) and this behaviour will continue until the triggering condition
becomes false. In this case, the function will be triggered by the indicator switch
being moved to the “indicate left” position and it will stay triggered until either
the switch is moved again or the self cancelling mechanism ends the function. This









SEQ (left_rear_on AND left_front_on)
SEQ (NOT left_rear_on AND NOT left_front_on)
NEW-CYCLE
in this case, the use of NOT for the effects is safe as they can be regarded as binary
in nature (either the indicators are lit or not). The actual trigger conditions can
be specified using IMPLEMENTS in the usual way on mapping the system model to




This supposes that the target system has a component called indicator_switch
with the possible positions CENTRE, LEFT and RIGHT. The mapping between
the functional and system models for the self cancelling feature is perhaps a little




Implementing this in the simulation might prove problematic. For modelling the
self cancelling of direction indicators it is arguably sufficient to treat the steering
wheel as having three positions, for turning left, turning right and straight ahead
and the act of returning the wheel to straight ahead, having first turned left, will
trigger the self cancelling of the direction indicators, hence the need to specify
the act of turning the wheel left beforehand. If the wheel is modelled as having
three discrete positions, SEQ and L-SEQ are equivalent, as it is impossible to have
the wheel steering right without it first being centred in the straight ahead posi-
tion. The use of these operators in specifying the triggers of functions and other
temporal aspects of their description is discussed further in Section 8.4 below.
This use of CYCLE to indicate a continuing cycle of effects or subsidiary functions
can be likened to a “while loop” in a programming language where the condition
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upon which the loop depends is the triggering precondition of the function. This
is consistent with the idea that a functional description uses an external view of
the system, so the external nature of the loop’s condition is appropriate. In such
cases the simulation will not reach a steady state at the end of a simulation step.
If the simulation is not then to continue indefinitely, the simulation engine must be
capable of recognising such cases and stopping the simulation. Such requirements
of the simulation are discussed in Chapter 11.4.
Another possible use of CYCLE is to abbreviate a long repeating sequence of effects
that does terminate by associating the CYCLE with a count. For example, suppose
a washing machine sounds a chimer three times to indicate completion of the wash












This could be shortened by using a cycle that only repeats three times instead










These formulations are identical, all this use of CYCLE does is shorten the de-
scription of the repeated sequence of effects. In other words, the cycle should
start with the system achieving the first listed effect and the cycle should end
with the system in the state associated with the effect preceding the NEW-CYCLE
flag after the correct number of repetitions.
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These sequential (and cyclical) operators introduce a temporal dimension to the
functional modelling language. How this affects the nature of a trigger is discussed
next while the extension of this temporal aspect to allow the language to describe
untimely achievement of a function is discussed in the following chapter.
An alternative approach to modelling cyclical behaviours for interpretation of
simulation might be to use an abstract state that encompasses such behaviour,
so a direction indicator might have a flashing state that abstracts the cycling
between on and off. This is similar to the approach in (Keuneke & Allemang,
1988). This approach is feasible provided there is no danger of a system fault
(either in design or arising from component failure) that results in a behaviour
that is hidden by the abstraction. For example, if we treat the indicators as either
off or on (implying that when on they are flashing, the functional description
will be unable to distinguish between correct system behaviour and the behaviour
arising from some fault in the flasher unit that results in the indicators lighting
up but not flashing.
8.4 Temporal aspects of a function’s trigger
In the preceding chapters, a trigger was treated as some condition that was (and
implicitly remained) true if the function was to be achieved. For example, a switch
being (and remaining) closed to switch on the torch’s lamp. However, the use of the
sequential operators introduced in this chapter suggests that a trigger be treated
as an event as much as a persistent condition, so the sequence of effects associated
with a function is started in response to the event of triggering the function, which
might or might not imply a persistent change of state of the component associated
with the trigger. The washing machine example above is a case in point, where
the three chimes are triggered by the event of completion of the wash cycle, with
no specific component state being associated with this trigger. This confirmation
function is actually triggered by the achievement of the washing function; such
functional dependencies are discussed in Chapter 10. Implicit in this treatment of
a triggering condition is the idea that the function’s effects will, once triggered,
run to completion. In the washing machine example, the chimes will continue,
even though the user might respond to the signal (maybe by opening the door to
unload the machine) before its sequence of effects is complete.
The approach taken with the functional modelling language is that once an ex-
ternal event makes a triggering condition true, it is considered to remain true until
some other external event causes it to become false (like the self cancelling of the
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direction indicators). This is consistent with the functional description viewing
the system as a black box as the functional description need not take into account
whether some triggering action causes a persistent change of state of any compo-
nent in the system. One example to which this applies is the dip switch of some
cars. In this case, the action of pulling and releasing the dip switch causes the
headlamps to dip if they are on main beam or switch to main beam if dipped.
This could either be accomplished by the dip switch having a toggle so that if
the switch is open pulling and releasing it closes the switch and vice versa or
the switch itself might simply be a “pull-to-make” passing contact switch and the
pulse of current resulting from the switch beng pulled and released causes an inter-
nal component (such as an electronic control unit) to toggle between two possible
states. From the external point of view, that of either the user of the system or
the functional description, it does not matter which of these implementations of
the expected behaviour is actually used. Notice that if the dip switch is “pull-to-
make”, then there is no persistent change of state associated with the switch so
it is not appropriate to use the switch state as a persistent precondition for the
dipped headlamps function. This is another case where a sequential operator is
needed in describing a function’s trigger.
This means that if a sequence of effects is to be ended by some user action,
this must be explicitly included in the function description. This has already
been shown, of course, in the direction indicator example used earlier, as such
a cancelling condition is necessary for a cycle of effects that will otherwise never
terminate, as in that case. It could, however, also be used in the case of a sequence
that will terminate of its own accord if not cancelled. For example a simple
electrical kitchen timer might sound a series of bleeps until cancelled or up to a
certain number of such bleeps has been emitted, whichever happens sooner. This










The act of pressing a button on the timer will implement the cancelled trigger
condition so will stop the bleeper sounding even if the expected number of bleeps
have not been sounded. This raises the need to trace back through the description
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of the sequence of states arising from the simulation to establish whether or not
the terminating condition becomes true, in this case whether the cancelling button
is pressed. The use of these sequential operators already entails such a sequen-
tial description of the simulation for interpretation but this raises the difficulty
of incorporating the later external triggering event into the simulation. This is
problematic if a simulation of the behaviour is associated with a single triggering
event on the system, which remains in the state it was eft in by the previous
simulation. For example, in the case of the timer, a simulation will be run after
starting the timer, so it should end with the timer sounding. The next simulation
might be of what happens when the cancel button is pressed but then some way is
needed, in the simulation tool, of specifying that this action takes place while the
timer is still sounding (or not, as the case may be). In practice such a timer might
well stop sounding after a certain time has elapsed since the sequence of bleeps
began, if it isn’t cancelled. How this is described in the Functional Interpretation
Language is the subject of the next chapter.
8.5 Using the sequential operators
As the example functions used to illustrate the use of the sequential operators have
been unrealistically simple, it seems worth discussing their use in the context of a
more realistic case study. The seat belt warning system that has been mentioned
earlier and is used as a complete case study in Chapter 11 is a useful example of
a system whose functions require the use of the sequential operators. The system
lights a telltale on the dashboard and sounds a horn three times if the driver or
front seat passenger has not buckled their seat belt once the car has moved off.
There is a fuller description of the system’s intended functions in Section 11.1.1.











(horn SEQ NOT horn SEQ horn SEQ NOT horn
SEQ horn SEQ not horn)
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The trigger for this function is itself quite complex and is discussed in Chap-
ter 11 so it is not considered further here. The effects specified are as shown in









dashboard_lamp AND (horn SEQ NOT horn SEQ horn
SEQ NOT horn SEQ horn SEQ NOT horn)
horn horn
SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQ
Figure 8.9: Using the sequence operator in the seat belt warning system.
on and the starting of the horn’s sequence. While such synchronisation is likely
to be unnecessary, if it is to be specified the effect might be changed to
SEQ (dashboard_lamp
AND
(horn SEQ NOT horn SEQ horn SEQ NOT horn
SEQ horn SEQ not horn))
The other parts of the functional description are identical to that above so have
been omitted. The lamp should come on simultaneously with the start of the first
sounding of the horn. This is similar to the way the headlamps should come on to
main beam simultaneously was specified above and is illustrated in Figure 8.10.
Another possible improvement is to use a counted cycle to shorten the description
of the horn sequence, as was discussed in the washing machine example. This will
result in the following effect.
SEQ (dashboard_lamp
AND
CYCLE[3] SEQ horn SEQ NOT horn NEW_CYCLE)
There is arguably no need to add SEQ at the start of the sequences of horn
sounding above as the horn is a single effector with a binary effect - sounding or
not sounding - it is either on or off so the first sounding can be taken to immediately










SEQ (dashboard_lamp AND (horn SEQ NOT horn SEQ
horn SEQ NOT horn SEQ horn SEQ NOT horn))
horn horn
SEQ SEQ SEQ SEQSEQ
Figure 8.10: Synchronising the horn and lamp in the seat belt warning system.
specify the sequential relationship between the last effect in the cycle and the first
effect of the next iteration. The nature of the horn’s effect also means that L-SEQ
could be used in the horn sequence but not to specify that the sequence and lamp
should start simultaneously.
In all these variants of the seat belt warning functional description, purposive
incomplete functions could be used in place of the individual effects so that the
description captures the idea that the presence of either one of the effects mitigates
the failure of the main function, as described in Section 7.1.
In practice, the horn sequence of the actual seat belt warning system is timed,
so the horn sounds intermittently for a set period of time before stopping. How
such cases are modelled is discussed in the following chapter.
While the discussion in this chapter has, like (Bell & Snooke, 2004), concentrated
on the use of the sequential operators to describe effects of a function, which is
perhaps their most common use, it is possible to use them for describing other
parts of a functional description. The possibility of the effects being replaced by
purposive incomplete functions has already been noted, and as these simply take
the place of an effect in the top level function’s description, this substitution is
simple.
Where the triggering of a function depends on two actions taken in a certain
order, the sequential operators can be used to specify the intended order. The
steering left and returning to straight ahead to implement the self cancelling of
the direction indicators is a case in point as is the pulling and releasing of the dip
switch in the dipped headlamps example discussed in the previous section. Either
SEQ or L-SEQ might be used as appropriate. One interesting example where L-SEQ
is appropriate is the dip switch example as the dip switch will typically be on the
stalk attached to the steering column housing that also switches the indicators.
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In such cases it will presumably be the case that the operation of dipping the
headlamps should still be triggered even though the indicators are switched on (or
off) between the pulling and releasing of the dip switch.
It is also possible to use these operators to specify a sequence of complete sub-
sidiary functions (or operational incomplete functions) that must be achieved (in
the specified order) to achieve the main function. A possible example of this use of
these operators might be the signalling example discussed earlier, in Section 6.2.1.







This, of course, merely specifies that the points and signals should both be set
and does not specify in which order these operation be carried out. It might be
considered necessary for the functional description to specify that the points be
set first in which case, the two subsidiary functions will have to follow each other







In practice, this is unlikely to be necessary as a railway signalling system will
incorporate safeguards to prevent the signals being set unless the points are already
set, but this does serve as an illustration. In this case SEQ was used to specify
that no other functions should be triggered between the two specified. Again here
it is likely that triggering some other function will be impossible, or will render
completion of the sequence impossible because of the interlocking of the signalling
system. For example if some other route is set between setting the points and
signals, it is likely that the signals can no longer be set in case there is a conflict
between the newly set route and the original route set as part of the present
function.
It will be appreciated that these sequences of events are likely to be constrained
by the timing of individual effects (for example, each flash of a direction indicator
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must last a certain period). How these timing constraints are represented in the




The introduction of representation of functions that depend on sequential effects,
leads naturally on to the idea that a functional description might be required
to specify the duration of each element in such a sequence. An example might
be so that the duration of each flash of a sequence of flashes can be specified.
Another reason for specifying the timing of achievement of a function is so that the
functional description can be used to highlight cases where a function is achieved
correctly (that is, in response to its trigger) but in an untimely manner. This
will typically be because the effect is delayed, so the function is achieved late,
but might be because an expected delay is absent (or reduced) so the function is
achieved early.
The increasing use of networks for the transmission of control signals and data
is a possible cause of change to the timing of the achievement of the expected
effect of some function. This is, of course, especially likely if the network is of
non-deterministic message latency, such as the collision detection and resolution
protocol used in the CANbus (Bosch, 1991) common in the automotive sector.
In such carrier sense multiple access collision detection (CSMA/CD) networks,
any node can transmit a signal at any time so if two nodes attempt to transmit
simultaneously the signals collide. Unlike in the CSMA/CD protocol used in
Ethernet, in CANbus and similar protocols the transmitters are given a priority
rating and so only the lower priority message is lost and must be re-transmitted
later. This does, of course, result in a delay to that message and this might
in turn lead to a delay in response to a control input. Therefore heavy use of
the network could conceivably lead to undue delays in response to relatively low
priority operations. For example, where the driver’s control operations for a car’s
lighting are transmitted between electronic control units by such a protocol, some
delay in, say, the headlamps dipping might be encountered.
192
Where a function’s effect depends on a sequence of outputs (or goal states) then
it is also possible that the timing of the members of this sequence is significant.
A simple example is the timing of a car’s direction indicators. A fault in the
flasher unit might result in the flashing being unexpectedly rapid, which failure
is of some significance if only because there are legal restrictions on the timing of
these flashes.
These two cases highlight the need for a functional description to be able to spec-
ify any requirements in timing so that the design analysis tool can indicate that
these are not being met, if some function is achieved late, for example. These spec-
ifications of requirements in timing of achievement of a function are referred to as
“temporal constraints” (on correct achievement of the function). This chapter dis-
cusses how they are specified in the functional modelling language and then some
questions that arise are discussed in the light of the chosen approach. Alternative
approaches are considered in that discussion.
9.1 Representation of temporal constraints
As stated above, rather than discussing alternative approaches to specifying tem-
poral constraints, the chosen approach will be described next, allowing it to be
used as a starting point for this discussion. This description will be centred on the
specification of timing of effects of a function relative to the event that triggers the
function, as this is the most common use. This does, of course, imply the presence
of a triggering event which can be used as the basis for timing the achievement of
a function’s effects. This is similar to the idea that a trigger starts the first time
slot in a simulation step in the use of the sequential operators as discussed in the
previous chapter. So, for example, rather than a switch being closed triggering
the function, for the present purposes, the action of closing the switch (which can
be regarded as momentary) is what triggers the function.
Where a function’s timing is significant there are naturally two ways that it can
deviate from the specified timing. It can either be too late or, more rarely, too
early. The most common case of a function’s effect occurring too early is when
it results in a terminating effect ending too soon, such as a light’s flashes being
made too short. To distinguish between these cases, a temporal constraint can
have either one or both of these two keywords.
• AFTER, is used to specify a minimum delay before the effect should be
achieved.
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• BEFORE to specify a deadline by which the effect should be achieved.
One or other of these constraints, or both, are added to the functional description
immediately following the element to which they apply. They are separated from
the functional description itself by being placed in square brackets. Each temporal
constraint is followed by the specified time itself. For the purpose of this descrip-
tion numerical values of time are used but possible approaches to representation
of time are discussed in Section 9.3 below. While these constraints are likely to
be used with the sequential operators described in the last chapter, adding ex-
pected durations to the time slots into which these operators divide the intended
behaviour, they can be used together with other operators, or, of course where
no logical operator is required. A simple example might be the headlamp dipping
function of a car where CANbus is used to carry control messages in the lighting
system, introducing a the possibility of delay in response to the driver’s action of









This specifies that for the function to be achieved in a timely manner, the post-
condition left_dipped AND right_dipped must resolve to true within 250 mil-










Figure 9.1: A simple temporal constraint on achievement of a function.
time constraint refers to the achievement of the required effects, not to the end of
the simulation, which will typically follow the achievement of the effects more im-
mediately than in the figure. If the post-condition does not become true until after
the time limit, the function is achieved late. Therefore the functional description
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allows the design analysis to distinguish between cases where the function fails
(the post-condition does not become true) and where the function is achieved, but
late. In this case, there is no need to specify a time that should elapse before the
effect is achieved, so AFTER is not included in the temporal constraint. Note that
the position of the temporal constraint is significant. For the constraint to be met,
the condition specified by AND must be true, so both headlamps must dip in time.
As was discussed in the previous chapter, this description does not specify that the
headlamps actually dip simultaneously merely that they have both done so within
the time specified. The sequence operator SEQ can be used if it is required that
the headlamps do dip simultaneously, as discussed in Section 8.1. If the temporal
constraint is placed after one of the effect labels, it would apply only to that label.
This is unlikely to be appropriate in the headlamp example, but a warning system




In this case, the horn must sound within 250 milliseconds but the lamp treated
as not being subject to any temporal constraint, perhaps because it is the horn
that first draws attention to the subject of the warning. Note that to save space,
the example functional descriptions in the rest of this section will only include the
effect as that is where the temporal constraint will generally be added. However,
there are cases where a trigger might consist of a timed series of operations (such
as switch being pulled and released within a certain time. This will be discussed
further.
The most common use for the AFTER constraint is to specify a minimum duration
for a transient effect (such as a flash). Suppose, for example, that the warning
system above was to sound its horn three times and it was necessary to specify
the duration of each sounding. This might be done as follows.
light_telltale
AND
SEQ sound_horn [BEFORE 250ms]
SEQ NOT sound_horn [AFTER 800ms BEFORE 1200ms]
SEQ sound_horn [AFTER 500ms BEFORE 700ms]
SEQ NOT sound_horn [AFTER 800ms BEFORE 1200ms]
SEQ sound_horn [AFTER 500ms BEFORE 700ms]
SEQ NOT sound_horn [AFTER 800ms BEFORE 1200ms]
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As the sequential operators are unary, placing the temporal constraint after the
operator means the same as placing it after the effect label or expression to which
the operator applies. The temporal constraints constrain the timing of the ends of




























Figure 9.2: Adding temporal constraints to a sequence of effects.
the horn should first sound within 250 milliseconds of the trigger, and should stop
sounding after at least 800 milliseconds but before 1200 milliseconds and so on.
The temporal constraints of some event in the sequence specify the duration of the
preceding interval. In general, a range of times for the events will be specified (as
here), so as to avoid the danger of insignificant changes of timing being recorded
on the resulting design analysis report. It will be seen that each time constraint
is timed from the previous one. This is necessary because if there is any tolerance
in the required timings, as in this example, then these tolerances will accumulate
during the sequence, as illustrated in Figure 9.3, which contrasts the tolerances of
timing of the horn on and off intervals using the two possible ways of specifying
the timings. In the top line of the figure, the timings are specified relative to
timetrigger
0-250








Figure 9.3: Accumulation of tolerance if timing is taken from the initial trigger.
the previous event (starting with the trigger) while in the lower version, the same
range of timings is used, but all relative to the trigger. It will be seen that to
preserve the degree of tolerance of variation of duration of each period the overall
tolerance gets so large as to allow any individual period to have a duration of zero.
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This specification of timing is simple where the strict sequence operator (SEQ)
is used, of course, because the transition between the preceding and succeeding
intervals is treated as instantaneous so the temporal constraint is unambiguous.
However, the loose sequence operator (L-SEQ) has to be used with care where
time constraints are to be used. In this case, the time constraint naturally applies
to when the operator becomes true, so to the end of the undefined transitional
interval associated with L-SEQ, as illustrated in Figure 9.4. This has the drawback
that when successive effects are joined using L-SEQ, the timing of the later effect
cannot be used to limit the duration of the preceding effect, as the timing of
the start of the undefined interval implicit in the use of L-SEQ is not specified. A
possible example might be an automatic machine tool where the machining should
not start until the workpiece has reached the correct operating speed after starting
the motor and the correct operating speed has to be maintained for a sufficient
period to allow the machining to be completed before stopping the rotation so the
workpiece can be removed from the machine. In this case, SEQ cannot be used
to join the successive goal states (stopped and running, where running is defined
as running at the correct operating speed) as there will be a period during which
the piece is accelerating and another when it is slowing down. If SEQ is used
(implying the acceleration and deceleration are instantaneous) than the result of
the simulation will be “out of step” with a simulation that includes the correct
sequence of states. It will also lose either the distinction between running at the
correct operating speed and some other speed, or running at this (slower) speed
and being stopped. This sequential effect might (näıvely) be described using
L-SEQ, as shown below, with the time constraints that the workpiece should reach
the operating speed in 3 seconds and run for at least 8 seconds.
stopped
L-SEQ running [BEFORE 3s]
L-SEQ stopped [AFTER 8s]
This is illustrated in Figure 9.4 where it will be seen that as the time constraints
apply to when the operator becomes true, there is no specification of when the
deceleration should start. The duration of the running state is undefined, the
same functional description would be fulfilled by the case in Figure 9.5 which
differs in having the deceleration taking longer at the expense of the duration of
the period the machine is running at the correct operating speed. Indeed, in this
case the functional description would be fulfilled be the workpiece momentarily
reaching the operating speed and immediately starting to decelerate.
There are various ways of avoiding this problem. The simplest is arguably to





















Figure 9.5: L-SEQ does not specify duration of preceding effect.
used, as now the transitions between the intended goal states can be treated as
instantaneous, though at the expense of complicating both the functional descrip-
tion and the mapping between it and the system model. The resulting description
of the function’s effect might look like this.
stopped
SEQ accelerating
SEQ running [BEFORE 3s]
SEQ slowing [AFTER 8s]
SEQ stopped
In both this description and that above, the timing of the sequence starts with the
trigger becoming true. As temporal constraints are taken from successive timed
steps, the amount of time spent accelerating is undefined, provided the operating
speed is reached within 3 seconds, and the time taken for the workpiece to come
to a stop is also undefined. Temporal constraints could be added to either or both
of these events.




SEQ running [BEFORE 3s]
SEQ NOT running [AFTER 8s]
This loses the distinction between accelerating and slowing and stopped, signifi-
cant because it is only once the workpiece is stopped that it can be removed from
the tool. A possible, if slightly cumbersome, solution might be to use NOT running
in the place of accelerating and slowing, though stopped SEQ NOT running is
rather a meaningless distinction, since if stopped is true, so is NOT running. How-
ever, it is not the case that stopped is necessarily true when NOT running is true,
so the distinction between those states is not itself meaningless.
The language could be extended to avoid this difficulty with the use of L-SEQ and
temporal constraints. Two possibilities are to add a duration to allow the temporal
constraint to be associated with an interval rather than a transition event. This
is rejected as in general, such durations can be defined using a combination of
BEFORE and AFTER. Using durations of intervals in the temporal model to specify
temporal constraints is discussed in Section 9.2. An alternative would be to allow
an L-SEQ operator to be associated with two (pairs of) temporal constraints, one
of which specified when the undefined interval should start and one that defines
when it should finish. Either or both could be specified for a given instance of
L-SEQ, so for the example used above, the description of the effect might be as
follows.
stopped
L-SEQ running [END BEFORE 3s]
L-SEQ stopped [START AFTER 8s]
Here START is used to indicate that the undefined period starts consistently with
the temporal constraint and END that that interval should end consistently with
the constraint. In this case, then, the workpiece reaches the operating speed before
3 seconds have elapsed since the trigger became true and the (implicit) slowing
of the workpiece will not start for another 8 seconds. They could, of course, be
used together to restrict the duration of the undefined period associated with
L-SEQ. These additions to the language have not been adopted as they add no
expressiveness over and above the careful use of SEQ, as outlined above.
The warning system mentioned earlier is a case where a cycle might be used to
avoid a repetitive description of the horn sounding. This raises the difficulty that
the first sounding of the horn will typically have a different temporal constraint
from the later ones, that take place within the cycle. The approach taken is to





SEQ sound_horn [AFTER 500ms BEFORE 700ms]
SEQ NOT sound_horn [AFTER 800ms BEFORE 1200ms]
NEW_CYCLE
This is perhaps not completely clear. The rule is that the cycle begins when the
first effect (or expression) listed within the cycle is true (so in this case, the horn
starting to sound) which in this case should happen within 250 milliseconds of the
trigger. The timing associated with that first effect are for its later occurrences
within the cycle. In other words the cycle’s temporal constraint overrides the first
effect’s temporal constraint for the first occurrence. Naturally, this approach will
work either for a counted cycle as here or to specify a timing for a cycle that is to
continue until some future triggering event causes it to stop.
Another possible case that involves timing of a cycle is where the cycle should
continue for a specified period of time before stopping. For example, a horn might
sound intermittently for a period of (say) between ten and fifteen seconds after
which it stays silent. This can be described by specifying the state that follows




SEQ sound_horn [AFTER 500ms BEFORE 700ms]
SEQ NOT sound_horn [AFTER 800ms BEFORE 1200ms]
NEW_CYCLE
SEQ NOT sound_horn [AFTER 10s BEFORE 15s]
This specifies that the state following the cycle should be achieved between ten
and fifteen seconds following the start of the cycle. It s unaffected by the timing
constraints within the cycle. This is perhaps not dissimilar to the scoping of
variable within an iteration in a program. There is, of course, a possible difficulty
here as the cycle might correctly stop after ten seconds with the horn already silent
so the cycle appears to have ended early, despite the absence of any fault. The
simplest approach to this problem is simply for the resulting design analysis report
to show the apparent early end to the cycle and as it arises from no malfunctions
for it to include timing tolerances with the cycle as the cause of the apparent fault.
In the description of CYCLE in the previous chapter, the functional description is
taken to remain in the state immediately before the NEW-CYCLE operator once the
cycle finishes. Of course, where a cycle’s end is triggered by an external timer,
200
any of the effects listed within the cycle might happen to be active. Therefore
the effect that is expected after the time has passed is specified in the functional
description, as in the example above. This specification of the terminating effect
will generally not be needed when the cycle is dependent on the truth of some
triggering condition, such a switch position.
It is appreciated that the construction used for specifying temporal constraints
is not easily read, as the timings associated with an expression that includes some
effect are those for the duration of the preceding effect, but this could be hidden
from the user and the meaning, though perhaps unclear, is unambiguous. An
alternative approach would be to specify a duration for each effect, so associating
timings with intervals rather than transitions, but this introduces complications
of its own. This alternative approach is discussed in Section 9.2, that discussion
includes reasons for preferring the chosen approach, as described here.
While this discussion of temporal modelling has been concerned with the timing
of a function’s effects, it is entirely possible that a function might be triggered by
a temporally constrained sequence of events. A simple example is where shutting
down a personal computer requires the power button to be pressed for a certain
length of time to avoid the danger of an accidental knock to the button resulting




press_power_button SEQ release_power_button [AFTER 5S]
TRIGGERS
close_down_computer
It is appreciated that the effect will typically be a good deal more complicated
than shown here. This raises the difficulty of how the simulation manages these
temporal triggers. Typically, the simulation runs in steps, each triggered by a
single triggering action (such as pressing the power button) but this is not appro-
priate here. Short of having a real time simulation there is no ideal solution to
this problem. One possible answer is to work around the problem by having the
two actions combined as one trigger, but this does not allow the system to model
what happens when the button is not pressed for long enough. Of course, even
though the interpretation of simulation might be unable to take full advantage
of this extra expressiveness for this reason, it is quite possible that such tempo-
ral triggers are included if the language were used for refinement of a functional
specification in design of a system.
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9.1.1 Consequences of untimely achievement of function
The advantage of the temporal constraints described here is that the functional
model can distinguish between failure of a function and its untimely achievement.
One consequence of this is that the resulting design analysis report will need to
distinguish between the consequences of untimely achievement of a function and
its failure. These will typically differ, with the untimely consequences being (in
general) less severe as actual failure.
The suggested approach to this is to allow the mode builder to specify a separate
set of consequences for late or early achievement of a function if these are felt
necessary. If these are not added to the model, the design analysis report can still
include details of the temporal failure (such as the function being achieved late),
but without any consequences. Where no specific consequences are added, the
value for severity can be treated as having the value 1 (the lowest possible, so it
will result in the temporal failure having a low risk priority number. In many cases
this would seem to be appropriate, so there might be no need to demand the extra
work of the model builder, in adding the additional consequence. However, the
possibility of adding the additional consequences exists where the consequences
of temporal failure of a function are felt to be sufficiently significant. This is
illustrated in Section 9.4, below.
9.2 Temporal constraints using duration of in-
tervals
The approach adopted, as described above, associates temporal constraints with
the transitions between system states. Therefore, the temporal constraint for the
simple headlamp example specifies that the transition between the headlamps not
being dipped and being dipped must be completed before 250 milliseconds have
passed since the trigger condition became true. An alternative approach would,
of course, be to specify the temporal constraints in terms of the time the system
should remain in a certain state, so specifying them in terms of the intervals rather
than the transitions of the temporal model. This might be done either instead of
or as well as the chosen approach.
As observed above, the use of intervals addresses the difficulty of reading the
functional description in the rather un-intuitive layout described above. This
difficulty is especially apparent in reading the examples that include a cycle of






SEQ sound_horn [>= 800ms <= 1200ms]
SEQ NOT sound_horn [>= 500ms <= 700ms]
NEW_CYCLE
Where ‘greater than or equal’ and ‘less than or equal’ are used to specify the
minimum and maximum tolerable durations respectively. There is a considerable
problem, however, with using this approach instead of the preferred association of
temporal constraints with transitions. This is the difficulty of specifying the timing
of the undefined interval between the trigger and the first effect. In the example
here, there is an interval between whatever action triggers the warning function
and the lighting of the telltale and the start of the horn sounding cycle. There
is no label for this interval with which the temporal constraint can be associated
and, worse, there are actually two concurrent intervals, only one of which (in this
case) has an associated temporal constraint. As the state of the effects of the
system are derived from the previous function (before the trigger event) the label
for this initial interval cannot be unambiguously defined. Consider the dipped









Here, the trigger depends on two switches and in general one of the two conditions
will be true before the trigger itself becomes true. Either the dip switch will be
in the dipped position with the headlamp switch set for sidelights only or the
headlamps switch is on and the dip switch set to main beam. Therefore the state
of the system at the start of the functional description is unknown. Therefore
there is no easy way of attaching a label to this initial interval. In this case
the headlamps should be either off or on main beam, which could be combined
(using OR) to specify the initial state, but this will not always be the case. At
least in this case the initial interval has a clearly defined end. In many cases
this might well not be so. Consider the simple warning system, where a temporal
constraint was associated with the sounding of a horn, but not with the lighting of
the telltale lamp. To describe this in terms of intervals requires two (concurrent)
initial intervals, labelled (presumably) with the assumed state of the respective
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effects to allow the temporal constraint associated with the horn starting to sound
to be specified. This might be described like this.
some_malfunction
TRIGGERS
NOT light_telltale SEQ light_telltale
AND
NOT sound_horn [< 250ms] SEQ sound_horn
There seem to be several objections to this. One obvious one is the additional
complexity of the description compared with the equivalent description specified
in terms of transitions. Another is the inclusion of effects that are not properly
associated with the trigger. The trigger here does not trigger the lamp being off
and coming on, as the description appears to state, rather it is assumed that the
lamp is already off. Of course it might not be, either because of some malfunction
such as a wire shorting to ground or because some other function that is already
achieved required the same lamp to be lit.
In addition to this difficulty with the use of intervals, the approach does not solve
the difficulty with the use of loose sequence (L-SEQ). L-SEQ implies an undefined
interval, in the functional description and this interval does, of course, remain
undefined whether intervals or transitions are used as the basis for specifying
temporal constraints. The machine tool example used above might be described
like this using intervals.
stopped [< 3s]
L-SEQ running [> 8s]
L-SEQ stopped
The same objection applies here. An interval will be regarded as starting once the
condition becomes true and continues until the condition is no longer true so the
machine is regarded as stopped until L-SEQ running is true (which must happen
within three seconds) and this interval continues until L-SEQ stopped becomes true,
so there is still no specification of the duration of acceleration and deceleration,
so the period the machine is running at the operating speed is undefined, just as
is the case when transitions are used. The difficulty here is that there needs to
be a mapping between the operating speed (a numerical value) and the state (a
Boolean value). This can be managed by defining the acceleration and deceleration
as distinct states as described earlier.
The use of intervals rather than transitions still implies a model of time consisting
of intervals separated by (instantaneous) transitions. The timing of the start and
204
end of the interval being regarded as instantaneous. This is arguably an inevitable
result of treating an effect as a Boolean (on or off) property of the system. Suppose
an effect was a sinusoidal wave, such as perhaps a varying frequency in an audible
warning). The functional description might simplify this by treating the sound
(in this case) as being of high or low frequency. There will, of course, then be
an instantaneous transition between the high and low frequencies (or frequency
ranges) at some point on the upward and downward slopes of the curve.
It will be seen from the foregoing that while the use of intervals as the basis for
temporal constraints does have the advantage of making the functional description
clearer in the case of functions that use timed sequences of effects, there are
considerable disadvantages of that approach, so the use of transitions is preferable.
As the two approaches depend on a similar model of time (of intervals divided by
instantaneous transitions) they could be mixed, by being offered as alternatives.
This is not done merely to simplify the language.
9.3 Possible representations of timings
While the examples used in this chapter have all included a numerical represen-
tation of time, it seems natural to allow for the possibility of a qualitative model
of time, if only for consistency with the possible use of the Functional Interpre-
tation Language in concert with a qualitative simulation. This section discusses
approaches to this, following a brief discussion of some apparent difficulties with
temporal constraints.
Where time is specified numerically, as above, this leads to the introduction of a
hard deadline which, if met is fine, but if missed results in the temporal failure of
the function. In the headlamps example if the lamps dip in 250 milliseconds, this
is fine but if they are found to take 251, the function is deemed to be achieved
late. There is no way of avoiding this problem, it is at least in part a consequence
of blending a numerical model with a qualitative one, where a function is either
achieved or not. The argument that “if 250 milliseconds is OK why not 251?”
breaks down, of course because it can just as well be applied to 251 and 252, and
so on, so some arbitrary end point is required. Using a qualitative model of time
provides a partial answer to this question, as will be discussed later.
The use of a range of acceptable values for a temporal constraint does mitigate
this, but does not eliminate it, of course. In the horn sequence above, the horn
can stay on for any time between 800 and 1200 milliseconds, so some deviation
from the supposed intended duration of one second is tolerated, but still 1200
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milliseconds is acceptable and 1201 is not.
An alternative approach to specifying a range of times might be to start with
the intended time and allow a variation, so instead of specifying the end of the
horn sounding as AFTER 800ms BEFORE 1200ms it might be specified as “1000ms
+- 200ms”. Naturally, different times could be specified for each direction of
variation or they could possibly be shown as a percentage variation. These are
not adopted as they offer no real advantage over the approach described earlier.
Note that they do not address the hard deadline problem. “1 second + 10 percent”,
say, still means that 1100 milliseconds is acceptable while 1101 is not, so all these
variations do is disguise the hardness of the deadline.
As was noted, a qualitative model of time might be a way of mitigating this
difficulty. Approaches to qualitative modelling of time are discussed next.
9.3.1 Qualitative modelling of time
There are two possible qualitative models of time that might be considered. One
is to specify times by order, so some effect must be achieved before some other
event in the simulation. This is not appropriate in most cases, including all the
examples discussed in this chapter. One case where it might be is a car engine
management system, where the system has to decide on the timing of the spark for
ignition before a certain point in the cylinder’s crank cycle. Is is possible even here
that this will not be regarded as a functional description because the behaviour of
the engine management system might simply be incorporated into the simulation
of the engine. If this is not done, then the timing of the cycle must be represented
as some sort of deadline. It is therefore suggested that this approach to modelling
time is not really appropriate for functional description, where function is regarded
as modelling an external view of some system.
The other approach to qualitative modelling of time is to use an order of mag-
nitude approach, following (Raiman, 1991). Here changes of timing within one
order of magnitude are allowed, but not changes of timing that cross into another
order of magnitude. This is consistent with Raiman’s approach, where an order
of magnitude is regarded as negligible to the next bigger order of magnitude. For
example, a function might be specified as being achieved if the effect is true within
milliseconds, but not if it takes seconds. This is used with qualitative behavioural
modelling in the design analysis tool developed at Aberystwyth. Here a relay (for
example) will have a delay of milliseconds between the coil becoming active and
the switch closing. Therefore some system function that depends on the relay will
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be achieved within milliseconds. If some fault causes the system function not to
be achieved until seconds have passed the function is achieved late.
One difficulty with this approach for specifying temporal failures of functions
is the difference between likely order of magnitude. A function that should be
achieved in, say, 50 milliseconds might take 500 and still be within the order
of magnitude despite the tenfold increase in the delay. This approach arguably
depends on the order of magnitude behavioural modelling. If it was used to draw
qualitative distinctions between different periods where the simulation itself uses
a numerical model of time, the question of where the borders of the qualitative
periods are placed arises. Is a period of 500 milliseconds counted as milliseconds
or as half a second? There must then be such boundary times. Maybe 499
milliseconds is treated as belonging to the millisecond interval while 500 is treated
as half a second in the seconds interval. It will be seen that this reintroduces the
strict deadline problem discussed earlier, but there are fewer of these deadlines.
However, they are not specified by the model builder on a case by case basis, the
model relies on the assumption that any delay within a specific order of magnitude
time slot is acceptable and any that crosses the boundary between adjacent time
slot is not.
It would be possible to introduce a bigger set smaller intervals, perhaps, such
as milliseconds, tens of milliseconds and so on. This increases the sensitivity of
the temporal functional description at the expense of introducing more boundary
times.
9.4 Timing constraints in use
While the discussions above have been illustrated using simple examples and more
complex examples of the use of the functional language are discussed in Chap-
ter 11, it seems worth providing a simple illustrative example of how the temporal
functional modelling might be incorporated into design analysis.
If we reuse the simple headlamp dipped example, where the vehicle’s lighting
system makes use of a CANbus (or similar network protocol) to pass control
messages across the lighting system. This raises the possibility that a delay to a
message, because of its being retransmitted after collisions, results in a delay in
achieving a function’s effects. The functional description has been shown before,










So once the trigger condition becomes true (either by switching on the headlamps
or by dipping them) both headlamps should be dipped within 250 milliseconds.
There are, of course, different possible consequences depending on whether the
headlamps were off or on full beam before. This is mitigated by the fact that
a headlamp remaining on full beam will be treated as an unexpected effect. An
extract from the resulting design analysis report might look like that in Table 9.1.
In the table, it will be seen that the consequences of a failure (excess traffic on
















Table 9.1: Part of a design analysis showing late achievement of a function.
the network) that result in late achievement of a function are distinguished from
those of one that result in its failure. In this case, the temporal failure assumes
that the headlamps were on full beam, and properly the report might include this.
It has been omitted for simplicity.
As was suggested in Section 9.1.1 above, it might be felt that the consequences
of temporal failure of a function are not so severe as to require the inclusion of an
additional set of failure consequences, so they might be omitted. If this were done
in this case, the corresponding extract from the resulting design analysis report
might look like that in Table 9.2. Here default values of 1 (the lowest possible)
are used for the indicators of severity and detection. This results in the failure
having a low risk priority number (RPN), of course.
Incidentally this example raises a difficulty with modelling systems that depend
on a network as the failure that results in the late achievement of the function
might well be outside the system, such as some other node on the network trans-
mitting more often than intended. One possible approach to this in simulating
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Table 9.2: Part of a design analysis showing late achievement of a function with
no specified consequences.
the system is, of course, to treat the network as a component, one of whose failure
mode behaviours is to delay messages. A more sophisticated approach might be
to combine the simulator with a tool capable of modelling the network so that
possible heavy loading resulting in message collisions can be modelled. To do this
realistically, however, implies a model that simulates all the systems associated
with the network, so that loading are correctly simulated. It also seems to imply
running the simulation in real time (or a scale model of real time).
The inclusion of temporal constraints discussed in this chapter allows functions
that have to be achieved in a certain time to be described and their temporal
failures (such as being achieved late) to be distinguished from failure and also
increases the precision of description of functions that depend on sequential effects,
as described in the previous chapter. The remaining class of function that the
language should be able to describe is the class of functions that depend on the
state of some other system function. These functions and how they are described





This chapter discusses classes of function that depend on the state of some other
system function and how the Functional Interpretation Language can be used to
describe such functions. Previous chapters have dealt with operators that allow
triggers and effects (or subsidiary functions) to be combined so as to describe a
single top level function with a clearly defined purpose. In other words triggers,
effects and / or subsidiary functions are combined in a single functional hierarchy
(that might have a temporal dimension described using the operators and temporal
constraints already discussed) so they are all concerned with the fulfilment of some
purpose that is associated with the top of the functional hierarchy. However, there
are many cases where a system includes functions (or effects) that achieve some
distinct purpose from some system function but are related in some way, and which
might well be triggered by the achievement or otherwise of that other function. A
warning lamp that lights when some expected system output is not achieved is a
simple case in point. Here, the warning lamp does not contribute to fulfilling the
purpose of the main function (that which the combination of trigger and effect was
expected to fulfil) but rather it has its own purpose, being to draw attention to the
failure of the main function. The idea that some effect might be associated with
some other function’s effect but with a distinct purpose is simply illustrated by a
car’s blue dashboard lamp that shows the headlamps are on full beam. Clearly
this lamp contributes nothing to the purpose of lighting the road ahead (it is too
feeble and in the wrong place!) but there is also an association between that
lamp and the headlamps themselves. In practice, of course, this is simply that it
shares a trigger with the headlamps main beam’s function and, indeed, it might
well be regarded as being part of a separate system; the dashboard electrics as
opposed to the exterior lighting system. However, if such a warning system is
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more sophisticated, it cannot be tested independently of the main system as the
working of the main system will affect the working of the associated system. For
example, if the dashboard light only lit if the headlamps were actually lit on main
beam rather than that effect being triggered. In this chapter the term dependent
function is used to refer to a function that relates to and depends on the state of
some main function.
The thesis will discuss four categories of “dependent function” that are to be
considered in addition to the function that fulfils the main purpose of the system.
This function (referred to here as the “prime function”) will, typically, be the
function on which the dependent function depends. These four categories are:-
• Warning or telltale functions whose purpose is to increase the detectability
of achievement or otherwise of the core function, such as the warning lamp
mentioned above.
• Fault tolerant functions that allow the system to continue to (at least par-
tially) fulfil its purpose despite the failure of some prime function. A “limp
home” function, such as a car’s brakes reverting to conventional operation
if the sensors for anti-lock braking fail is a case in point.
• Interlocking functions that enforce correct achievement of one function’s
effects to ensure that some other function does not have unintended conse-
quences. A railway signalling system is an example, where it is a function
of the system to prevent setting the signals for a route unless the points are
already set for that route.
• Recharging functions that return the system to a state ready for a repeat of
the prime function, such as the refilling of the cistern after the flushing of a
W.C.
This chapter will discuss each of these classes of function in turn, considering their
relationships with the core function and how the functional modelling language
can describe them, as well as any other problems that arise. There will follow a
discussion of the effects such relationships between functions have on the functional
models associated with a system.
In the following sections, tables are used to classify these different categories
of dependent function and the notation used in these tables might warrant some
explanation. The function on which the dependent function depends (so whose
state triggers the dependent function, the prime function is called P and it has two
elements, the trigger (t) and the effect (e), so Pt means the trigger (precondition)
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of the prime function resolves to true (that function is triggered) and Pe means
that the prime function’s effect is present. For example, a function that is triggered
when the prime function is triggered and its effect fails (maybe its purpose is to
warn of failure of the prime function) can have its trigger expressed as Pt ∧ ¬Pe.
This means, of course that the prime function’s precondition (trigger) is true but
its post-condition (effect) is false.
10.1 Warning or telltale functions
The first category of functions can be considered to be dependent on some other
function is that of telltale (or warning) functions. The purpose of such functions is
to increase the detectability of the state of the prime function with which they are
associated. To this end they will have some effect that is audible or visible to the
operator of the system. Possible relationships between such functions and a prime
function are listed in Table 10.1. Given that a prime function is achieved when
its trigger Pt and its effect Pe are true, then we might classify telltale functions
by which of the prime function’s conditions are used in its trigger. There are also
cases where the trigger and effect of the prime function are true but the expected
behaviour is not, because the effect is achieved by an alternative fault mitigating
behaviour. These cases are listed in Table 10.1 together with the straightforward
examples. By way of further illustration, these classes of telltale function are listed
Class Trigger Prime function state
input telltale Pt Prime function triggered
no input telltale ¬Pt Prime function not triggered
output telltale Pe Prime function’s effect present
no output telltale ¬Pe Prime function’s effect absent
behaviour warning ¬Pb Unexpected behaviour detected
confirmation Pt ∧ Pe Prime function achieved
failure warning Pt ∧ ¬Pe Prime function failed
unexpected warning ¬Pt ∧ Pe Prime function achieved unexpect-
edly
off confirmation ¬Pt ∧ ¬Pe Prime function inoperative
limp home warning Pt ∧ Pe ∧ ¬Pb Prime function achieved by unex-
pected (fault tolerant) behaviour
fault tolerant confirm Pt ∧ Pe ∧ Pb Prime function achieved by expected
behaviour
Table 10.1: Telltale and warning functions
below, with examples where appropriate.
212
Input telltale is triggered whenever the prime function is triggered and should
be achieved regardless of the post-condition of the prime function. An ex-
ample is the main beam telltale on a car dashboard that lights whenever the
light switches are set for main beam.
No input telltale is triggered whenever the prime function is not triggered re-
gardless of its post-conditions. One possible example is an electrical appli-
ance that has a telltale lamp to indicate that it is plugged in but not switched
on.
Output telltale is triggered by the post-condition of the prime function, regard-
less of its precondition, so the prime function might be achieved unexpect-
edly.
No output telltale is triggered by the failure of the post-condition regardless of
its precondition, so the prime function might be failed or simply off.
Behaviour warning is triggered by the failure of the behaviour (presumably
according to some detectable internal state) of the prime function, so either
misbehaviour is detected or the function is not active.
Confirmation This is triggered by the truth of both the pre- and post-conditions
of the prime function, so it confirms that it is active and achieved correctly.
Failure warning is triggered if the trigger of the prime function is true but the
effect is false, so the function has failed.
Unexpected warning is triggered if the prime function’s trigger is false and the
effect is true, so that function is achieved unexpectedly.
Off confirmation is triggered if both the pre-and post-conditions of the prime
function are false, so the prime function is inoperative.
Limp home warning is triggered if the pre- and post-conditions of the prime
function are true but there is a fault in its internal behaviour. An example
would be a warning lamp showing that a fault tolerant system was running
without some expected sensor data, so there is a loss of redundancy.
Fault tolerant confirm is triggered if preconditions, post-conditions and be-
haviour are all active as expected. It therefore confirms that a fault tolerant
system is working normally, not in a fault tolerant mode. It might be used
in safety critical areas in preference to a “limp home warning” as in that
case a failure in the warning system might mean loss of safety in the fault
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tolerant system going undetected whereas a failure of a fault tolerant con-
firm system will at least make it apparent that there is a failure (either in
the main system or the telltale).
It should be pointed out that some of these classes of function are included for the
sake of completeness. It is unlikely (but not impossible) that all of these classes
will actually be found in use.
It will be seen from Table 10.1 that all combinations of a prime function’s trigger
and effect are covered so there is no need for any other classes of telltale function
associated with failure of the prime function’s behaviour provided we are willing
to accept that the function operating with trigger and effect conditions satisfied
implies correct behaviour and conversely that the absence of either trigger or
effect implies incorrect behaviour. Given these assumptions, a telltale that the
correct behaviour is taking place is identical to the confirmation function (pre-
and post-conditions both present) and adding incorrect behaviour to the failure
and unexpected warning functions creates conditions that will be satisfied similarly
to the conditions without any express inclusion of the (internal) behaviour. Note
that the use of behaviour of the prime function (as opposed to trigger or effect)
as a trigger of the telltale function implies that there is some mechanism that
detects the loss of some (internal) behaviour. A fault tolerant system detecting
the absence of sensor data is a possible case in point.
It will be seen that where the telltale function is dependent purely on the prime
function’s trigger and effect, its trigger can be described in terms of the state of
the prime function. If keywords describing the state of a function’s trigger and
effect are added (so a function is said to be TRIGGERED when its trigger is true
regardless of the state of the effect and EFFECTIVE if its effect is present regardless
of the state of its trigger) then this description of the trigger of a dependent
function can be extended to the simple cases where only the trigger or effect is
used as the trigger of the dependent function. Of course, no claims can be made
for the completeness of this set of telltale functions where the conditions are not
atomic. It might be the case that they are triggered either by a specific output
state, such as the oven light coming on whenever the heater is on and going off
when the heater is off (the oven has reached the right temperature) or because a
subset of the prime function’s post-conditions is sufficient to trigger the telltale
function. Consider, for example, the idea of the car main beam warning being a
confirmation function, so it comes on when the headlamps really are on main beam.
If its purpose is to warn the driver that oncoming traffic will be dazzled, it might
well be intended that it lights whenever one or both headlamps are on main beam,
as one headlamp is enough to dazzle oncoming drivers even though the headlamps’
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prime function is not achieved. This means that this collection of telltale functions
can only be regarded as a complete set if it is sufficient to model them in terms
of the state of a function, rather than any specific state of the effects of the
prime function. Because the triggering of a dependent function might depend on
a different combination of effects than are required to achieve the purpose of the
prime function, it becomes necessary in some cases to define the trigger of the
telltale function in terms of specific effects of the prime function rather than in
terms of the state of the function itself. This is discussed below. This means
that some way of unambiguously linking a systems’ functions is required, so the
correct triggers and effects are unambiguously identified. This allows the prime
and dependent functions to share the mapping between the functional and system
models, eliminating redundancy of description and the possible errors in mapping
between the models. Approaches to this are discussed at the end of this chapter.
The significant difference between these functions and the prime function, in
general, is that they are not simply triggered by a user’s input to the system. This
means that the trigger needs to be explicit in the functional description. While
for failure analysis of prime functions (that are dependent on no other function),
the triggering condition for a function can be derived from a simulation of the
system behaving correctly, this is not the case if there are dependent functions.
Consider a plant warning system, which lights a telltale if an expected effect of
some prime function is absent. In the correct simulation, the expected effect
of the prime function will never be absent, so the telltale function will not be
triggered. Unless the trigger condition of the telltale function is explicitly stated
in the functional description, it will not be clear whether the effect of the telltale
function is expected or not. This raises the more general point that the telltale
function cannot be evaluated independently of the prime function, except in the
case of the simple input triggered ones. It is useless to model the output of the
prime function as an external “input property” (trigger) of the dependent function
as the aim of testing these functions is to show that failures of the prime function
will be detected correctly. They depend on some mechanism for detecting the
state of the prime function and if that function is reduced to a switch then that
mechanism will not be simulated.
As the Functional Interpretation Language includes the trigger and effect of a
function it is simple to incorporate either the state of the prime function or its
trigger and effects in the trigger of the telltale function. For example, consider a









As the failure of either navigation light needs to be detected by the telltale







As FAILED is defined as the trigger being true and the effect false, this is identical





NOT (port_light AND starboard_light)
TRIGGERS
warning_lamp_lit
In this case, the description in terms of the prime function is simpler, but if a
combination of trigger and effects of the prime function are used, it is possible to
specify a different combination than results in achievement of the prime function.
The warning lamp that either headlamp is on main beam, mentioned earlier, can
be described by replacing the AND used in the main beam function with OR, so








Here the warning function is triggered by the effects of the prime function, which
case highlights the need to trigger the dependent function with the trigger and
effect of the prime function, or some combination of its trigger and / or effects.
As telltale functions that warn that some unusual behaviour is causing the effect
of the prime function imply that there is some means of detecting that this is
the case, that can be incorporated in the warning function’s trigger. This might
typically be done by specifying the failure of some internal component’s function
(or effect). These cases are discussed in the following section on fault mitigating
functions, which also depend on some internal failure being detected.
10.2 Fault mitigating functions
Another area where functions might relate closely is where the failure of a prime
function is mitigated by fault tolerant behaviour. Possible cases are listed in
the table in Table 10.2. These functions relate to a prime function with trigger
Pt, effect Pe, normal behaviour Pb and purpose Pp. In all cases, of course, the
purpose of the fault mitigation function is to enable the continued fulfilment of the
purpose of the prime function, at least to a limited extent — possibly at a reduced
efficiency or for a limited time. Cases where a fault mitigating function results
Class Trigger Effect Purpose
backup output Pt ∧ ¬Pe backup Pp
fault tolerant Pt ∧ ¬Pb Pe Pp
limp home Pt ∧ ¬Pb ⊂ Pe ⊂ Pp
Table 10.2: Fault tolerant functions
in partial fulfilment of the prime function’s purpose (such as an anti lock braking
system working conventionally, with no automatic anti lock control) are indicated
using the subset symbol. In contrast to the functions listed in Table 10.1 above,
it is possible that there are other triggers for a fault tolerant function. However,
such a function will certainly share a trigger with the prime function and also
depend on the loss of the required effect or of internal behaviour (such as a sensor
failing). Where Pe is used in the effect column of the table, the same effectors are
taken to be delivering the effect of the fault tolerant function as would be the case
if the prime function was achieved. The backup effect in the top row implies the
use of different effectors, such as an emergency lighting system. The ⊂ symbol is
used to indicate cases where the fault tolerant function only partly achieves the
effects, and therefore partly fulfils the purpose of the prime function, such as the
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loss of anti-lock brakes. The table is illustrated using textual descriptions of these
classes of fault tolerant function:-
Backup In this case the purpose is (at least) partly fulfilled by some separate
system that automatically switches in on failure of the main system. An
emergency lighting system that lights routes to fire escapes after failure of a
building’s main lights is an example.
Fault tolerant Here the output of the system is identical to the prime function’s
output, but there is a loss of behaviour, covered by redundancy within the
system. A brake by wire system continuing to work despite loss of a sensor’s
data is a possible example. It is likely that this will be regarded as a “limp
home” mode, because the loss of redundancy means that another system
failure might lead to dangerous loss of functionality.
Limp home The output of the fault tolerant function is not identical to that of
the main system, but is sufficient to allow continued operation of the device.
An engine management system failing in such a way that a default value for
ignition timing is used instead of a calculated optimal value is an example,
as is an anti-lock braking system falling back on braking conventionally
following loss of sensor data.
In practice, as observed in (Manzone et al., 2001), the classes of function labelled
as “fault tolerant” and “limp home” are both intended for use to allow limited
further use of the system. It is, of course, necessary in many areas (such as aviation
and automotive) that a system will tolerate one failure for at least long enough
for the user to deal safely with the consequences (such as for the aeroplane to
land). The distinction drawn here is that a limp home function implies reduced
functionality while a fault tolerant function allows the device to work normally
(at least apparently) albeit for a restricted time and with a loss of tolerance of
further failure.
It will be seen that the “limp home warning” function in Table 10.1 is identical
to a confirmation function for the fault tolerant function (its precondition is that
of the fault tolerant function combined with that function’s postcondition using
logical AND). It is likely that such a telltale will be the only sign that the system
is not working normally, it being needed to warn the operator that the system
requires attention before some other component failure causes the system to fail.
One difficulty with describing such functions is that the trigger of the fault mit-
igating function might depend on detecting some internal aspect of the system
behaviour. For example, the trigger and effect of a fault mitigating function of
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an engine management system in a car are apparently identical to those of the
prime function, the only difference might be a loss of performance and increase
in fuel consumption. However, in such systems the system itself must have some
component that detects the loss of behaviour that leads to the adoption of the
fault mitigating strategy, so it seem not unreasonable to incorporate that in the
functional description. It is at least possible that in such cases the difference in
effect between the prime and fault tolerant functionality will be ignored. For ex-
ample the function of the engine might be to drive the car and the aim of the
fault tolerant engine management function is to enable the engine to continue to
achieve that function despite the loss of sensor data.
The example of a car’s anti-lock braking system reverting to conventional braking
if sensor data is missing has been mentioned. This is an example where an internal
component failure will trigger the loss of the prime function and its replacement














This will be triggered instead of the prime anti-lock braking function, then if
the anti-lock braking controller fails to receive the expected data from any of
the wheel rotation sensors. There seems to be no real difficulty with this model,
except for its relative complexity. The sensor data should be mapped to the
system model as input to the controller module as then any failure that results in
the loss of the data (whether to the sensor itself or to the network linking it to
the controller) will result in the loss of the data and so the triggering of the fault
tolerant function. The realistic approach to modelling these internal failures is at
the component that detects the failure, not the component that causes the failure.
It will be appreciated that this functionality cannot readily be modelled without
a fair degree of knowledge of the likely design of the system.
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One point that arises is that specification of the trigger of a dependent function
in terms of function can lead to different expected behaviour compared with spec-
ifying its trigger in terms of triggers. For example, an emergency lighting system
(an example of a “backup function”) might be specified as being triggered when
the prime function is triggered but the effect is absent. Therefore the emergency
lighting function should be triggered by all the lamps in the main lighting system
failing at the same time. In practice the emergency lighting function is likely to
be triggered by the detection of failure of the main power supply, so the function
will not actually be triggered by the failure of the lamps. Arguably, this makes
the backup function independent of the prime function as the trigger and effect
are both different but it does illustrate that triggers need to be chosen carefully,
unless the idea is to capture the possibility that certain main system failure will
not result in apparently expected behaviour of the dependent function.
It is worth noting that this discussion of fault tolerant functions excludes manual
backup systems as these can be regarded as independent of the main system. An
example might be a reserve parachute with its own rip cord which the parachutist
will activate on finding a problem with the main canopy. This can be considered
an independent system (though it clearly has a closely related purpose) except in
any cases where it is desired to simulate some interlock mechanism that prevents
both main and backup systems being active at once. Arguably, the enabling of
the backup mechanism is then a backup function of the main system though it
does, of course, not itself have any output unless some telltale is associated with
it, to both warn the operator that the prime function has failed and to show that
the backup can be used.
10.3 Interlocking functions
This category of dependent function differs from the others discussed here as while
in the other categories, the prime function is (part of) the trigger, in this case,
the state of the function upon which the interlocking function depends prevents
the triggering of the interlocking function unless that function is achieved. A
rather weak example is the exiting of a computer application being prevented
when there is an open file that has not been saved since the last edit. This is a
slightly untypical example because the likely result is a distinctive effect (a dialog
box giving the user the chance to save the open file) rather than simply preventing
the closing of the application. In a hardware system, a more likely case is that the
dependent function is simply prevented by the non-achievement of the function
upon which it depends. A better example (if less familiar) is a railway signalling
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system, where the interlocking system makes it impossible to pull the levers (in a
old fashioned mechanical system) to clear the signals for a given route unless the
points have already been set correctly for that route. A related example might be
the accessories in a car that will not operate unless the ignition has been switched
to the right position, so power is available. This differs from the signalling example
in that the driver can switch on the windscreen wipers (say) before starting the
car, but they won’t come on until the car is started (or at least the process of
starting the ignition is in progress). This case does differ in that the ignition
switch simply gets added to the trigger for the wiper circuit, whereas in both the
unsaved work and signalling examples, the relationship between the functions is
more complex.
The signalling system is simpler to model as if the interlocking function is blocked,
nothing will happen. Given the setting of the points concerned is described in a




FUNCTION route_set ACHIEVED AND pull_lever
TRIGGERS
signal_cleared
Naturally in this case, the route and signals concerned would need to be specified,
but it is suggested that this simple example illustrates the point that the trigger of
the interlocking function depends on achievement of another function, that upon
which the interlocking function depends.
The unsaved work example is more complicated as here there will be an alter-
native effect if the user attempts to close the application if there is unsaved work
that will be lost. The simplest approach is to have two functions in this case.
The closing function might look similar to the signalling example above, though
in practice it might be better associated with the system state that is the effect








This is complicated slightly as while the effect no_unsaved_work is a result of
achievement of the save function, it is also true if no changes have been made to
any file since opening the application. This illustrates the need for the functional
language to be able to have effects (or states) in common with several functions,
which is the most significant effect that the idea of dependent functions has on
the Functional Interpretation Language. While the functional description above
serves to show that the application should not close if there is unsaved work, it
does nothing to specify what should happen if the user tries to close the application




clicking_exit AND NOT no_unsaved_work
TRIGGERS
FUNCTION save_option_dialog
So all clicking the exit button achieves itself is the display of the options dialog







This leads to yet another pair of related functions, of which save_and_close







It might well be the case that there is no need for the save_option_dialog
function, indeed it is arguable whether it is really a separate function as opposed to
the means by which the save_and_close and close_losing_changes functions
are made usable. The use of this set of functions depends in how detailed a
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functional model is required, to what extent the means of accessing the closing
functions needs specifying in the functional model.
In the example, it is assumed that names are unique and can be used to match
functions and effects unambiguously, as well as matching descriptions of purpose
(which separate models). This suggests that there is a case for separating all
elements of the functional description, or at least for allowing one function to un-
ambiguously refer to another function’s trigger or effect. This both reduces the
work in carrying out the mapping between the trigger and effect and the system
model, as there is no need to reproduce the same mapping for each function. This
also reduces the danger of mappings that should match not doing so following
an error in making the mappings. This is discussed in Section 10.5 below. An-
other point worth making in passing is that the functional model (or that part
of it illustrated here) of the software example might seem complex, but that is
(arguably) an inevitable result of the complexity of intended behaviour of many
software systems. Indeed, the need for a functional interpretation language to
model such systems was one of the motivations for the present work.
10.4 Recharging functions
While there are various examples of systems that include a recharging function,
the purpose is similar in all cases, being to return the system to a state where it is
ready for a repeat of the prime function. Examples include the refilling of a cistern
after flushing a W. C., motorised winding on of the film and cocking of the shutter
of a motor driven camera and reloading a gun. A failure of the recharging function
means that the prime function can not be achieved subsequently to the failure of
the recharging function. These functions appear to share a trigger with the prime
function, so pressing the shutter release causes the camera to both expose a frame
and to wind on to the next. This can be contrasted with a camera with a manual
wind where the two functions are clearly separate. This example does perhaps
also suggest that the recharging function is to be considered a separate function
even when it does share a trigger with the prime function. The purpose (and
consequences of failure) are different for the prime and recharging functions. If
the prime function fails then the purpose of the system is unfulfilled (the photo
has been missed, for example) while when the recharging function fails, at least
at first, the main function is achieved (so the photo was taken) but the system
is not ready for the next use, the next photo will be missed. This assumes that
before the failure of the recharging function, the system was in a state ready for the
achievement of the prime function which it should be if the recharging function was
previously working correctly. It would be possible to use subsidiary functions to
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As the two desired effects are associated with their own subsidiary functions,
each failure can be associated with its own consequence, so the expose_frame





It will be seen that there is a difficulty here as the purpose of the expose_frame
function is essentially the same as that of the take_photograph function. It is at
least arguable that in this case, the top level function does not really have a single
clearly defined purpose, but rather a combination of the purposes associated with
the two subsidiary functions.
A more practical objection to this approach is that the two subsidiary functions
do not really share a trigger. The wind_on function is actually triggered by the
achievement of the expose_frame function. If that function fails then there is
no call for the camera to wind on. If the functional description treats both as
sharing a trigger, then can the failure of one or both be distinguished? After all,
if the shutter (say) fails then the camera might well not wind on either. This
could, perhaps, be worked around by modelling the recharging function in terms
of the state of the system after the achievement of the function, so the shutter is
cocked and an unexposed frame is behind the shutter, rather than the expected
behaviour, the action of winding on. A related difficulty, though, is that in this
case, the unexpected achievement of the recharging function will be missed if,
say, the film winds on despite no frame being exposed when the shutter release
was pressed. If the recharging function is considered purely in terms of the goal
state (as suggested above) then the fact that a frame is wasted (to continue with
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the camera example) is missed. Indeed, the fact that the recharging function is
achieved unexpectedly is missed because if it is described as sharing a trigger with
the prime function (pressing the shutter release) then it is apparently achieved,
both trigger and effect are true. If it is described as triggered by the achievement
of the prime function then if that function fails, the recharging function is correctly
shown as being unexpected.
It is therefore suggested that, while the approach described above might give an
adequate model in some cases, it is more correct to regard the recharging function
as a dependent function of the prime function.
This can simply be done by describing the recharging function with the trigger
and effect of the prime function (or even just its effect) as the trigger of the
recharging function. Whether the prime function’s trigger is included will depend
on what the recharging function is expected to do if the prime function is achieved
unexpectedly (so was not triggered). In general, it is likely that the recharging
function will be expected in this case, but it might not be if there are safety
issues. For example, it might be intended that a gun will not automatically reload
following an accidental discharge. The pair of functions for the motorised camera














This is arguably a rather simplistic attempt at a functional description of a
motorised camera. It does imply that if the shutter trips unexpectedly (an ad-
mittedly unlikely failure) the film should not wind on. Arguably, of course, if
the shutter tripping was unexpected, so was the winding on and also, since the
frame previously in the gate might have been exposed, the fact that the film is
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wound on is a benefit. A worse difficulty is that the expose_frame function might
actually require more effects than in the model above. If the camera is a single
lens reflex, the mirror will be moved and the lens diaphragm adjusted. How these
effects are incorporated into the expose_frame function will affect the trigger of
the wind_on function. It is likely that its trigger will be the effect of the shutter
opening and closing, even though the failure of one of these other effects might
result in failure of the expose_frame function. There is no reason why this cannot
be described using the functional language, but it does emphasis the point that a
complex system might require a complex functional description. It is suggested,
however, that this does indicate a rôle for the functional language in refining a
proposed system design, if only by ensuring that problems like that mentioned
are considered as part of the functional design of the system. Thus is discussed
further in the chapter on evaluation of the functional language, Chapter 11.
One area that does vary from system to system is that some systems might allow
a sequence of repetitions of the pair of functions (such as a photographer shooting
a series of photographs by keeping the shutter release pressed) and others allow no
such repetition, such as the W. C. example. These cases can be described using a
cycle of the prime and recharging functions. For example, suppose the camera is











This is similar to the simple case described above, so similar difficulties apply. An
additional problem is that strictly, the achievement of each function triggers the
other. If, say, the wound_on function fails, it is not the case that the shutter will
continue to trip repeatedly. This is a further example of the ambiguity introduced
by having the two functions share a trigger. These complexities are discussed
further in the following chapter, where the functional language is evaluated by
describing some case studies.
Having discussed possible categories of dependent function and how they can be
described using the Functional Interpretation Language, some matters that arise
can be now discussed.
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10.5 Relations between functions
The examples discussed above highlight the need for functions to be able to refer
to elements of some other function associated with the same system. For example,
all but one of the functions in the closing application example discussed earlier
refer to the effect labelled as no_unsaved_work. Strictly speaking, of course, this
is a state of the system, which is either true of false, and the effect (of the save
function) is to make that state true. This sharing of elements of function leads
to the need to ensure that these elements are unambiguously identified. The
approach suggested is to associate an element with its (original) parent function,
separating them with a dot. So if the no_unsaved_work effect’s truth is associated
with the save function, other functions can refer to the element unambiguously
as save.no_unsaved_work. This notation is similar to that used to refer to a
function’s trigger or effect in mapping between the functional and system models.
All such qualified instances of the element are then mapped to the system model
together, ensuring the mapping is identical. In addition functions are labelled
as such (as are incomplete functions as PIFs, OIFs and TIFs) to indicate both
the need to look up that part of a system’s functional model and to specify that
the label is not to be mapped to a system property, which would be needed if
it is a trigger or effect. These labels have already been used in the discussion of
functional decomposition in Chapter 6.
Rather than specifying the prime function’s trigger and effect in the trigger of
a dependent function, this might be specified in terms of the prime function’s
state. This does depend on the trigger for the prime function being identical
to the combination of trigger and effects associated with the appropriate state
of the prime function. The use of TRIGGERED and EFFECTIVE allows this even
in the case of simple telltales. To give a simple example, a car’s main beam
warning lamp’s function can have the trigger FUNCTION main_beam TRIGGERED
which simply means that the telltale lamp’s function shares the trigger expression
with the indicated function. The keyword EFFECTIVE is used to show that a
function is triggered by the truth of some other function’s effect expression. This
avoids the need to repeat the possibly complex conditions associated with the
prime functions trigger (or effect).
All these relationships are between function associated with one system, of
course, as there is nothing to be gained by specifying relationships with a sys-
tem that will not be simulated. If the prime function’s system is not simulated,
there will then be no way of finding whether the dependent function’s triggering
conditions have been met. This leads to the idea that there is a fuller set of rela-
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tionships between functions than the decompositions in Chapter 6 but this fuller
set incorporates the decompositional relations. It will be seen that the set of rela-
tions in a functional decomposition is defined by a specific purpose, while that of
this more general functional relationship is defined by the system with which they
are associated. This system might, of course, be intended to fulfil several distinct
purposes so the general set of system functions might include several functional
decompositions as well as relations expressing other functional dependencies.
One interesting area of relations between functions is where a warning function
affects the detection value of the consequences of failure of a description of purpose
associated with a prime function. An approach to describing this relation is to
replace the detection value in the consequences of failure in the telltale function’s
description of purpose (which will refer to that of the prime function) with a
revised (higher) value for the prime function’s detection. For example, a warning
function’s description of purpose might be written like this.
PURPOSE warn_of_failure
DESCRIPTION "Warn user system has failed"
FAILURE "User not warned of system failure"
SEVERITY 3
DETECTION PURPOSE system_purpose.FAILURE.DETECTION 9
Here, system_purpose is the description of purpose associated with the prime
function and so its value for detection is then changed to the specified value rather
than the (presumably) lower value in that description. A similar approach can be
used if the telltale function is triggered by the presence rather than the absence
of the prime function’s effects, only now the changed detection value might be
that for unexpected achievement of an effect (or a function, if its description of
purpose includes consequences of unexpected achievement). This approach to
describing description of telltale and warning functions is, of course, available as
an alternative to the usual use of the detection value. The usual approach can be
used in those cases where it is felt more appropriate.
10.6 Simulation of dependent functionality
One aspect of the modelling of these dependent functions is that many of them
are triggered by failure in a system. This means that the triggering of these
functions cannot be derived from the simulation of the system’s behaviour with
no component failure in failure analysis as the function will not be triggered in
that simulation. This has already been mentioned and is a reason for including
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the trigger of a function in its description, even though it might be considered
unnecessary for failure analysis.
Another result of this dependence on failure in the simulation of the system
is that simulations of the system with component failure are required for design
verification of the subsystems that implement these dependent functions. Clearly
the functioning of a fault tolerant system function will not be tested without
testing the whole system with some failure that should result in the loss of the
prime function. Indeed, the incorporation of such dependent functions can be
seen as blurring the distinction between design verification and failure analysis.
Another aspect of this is that failures that cause the dependent function to fail (in
failure analysis) will only be detected if the system is simulated with some failure
that would otherwise trigger the dependent function, in addition to the failure in
the subsystem that implements the dependent function.
A point that arises from this is that in general a subsystem that implements a
dependent function can be specified in terms of the state (or triggers and effects)
of the prime function, but it will in many cases actually be triggered by some
detection device within the system. This leads to the possibility that the actual
effects of a prime function are absent, but this is undetected by the device that
triggers the dependent function. This might result from careless design so if the
warning lamp in the navigation lights example mentioned earlier was triggered by
the presence of current in some part of the circuit common to both navigation
lamps (to obviate the need for two detectors) then, of course, the failure of one
lamp will be missed as current will still flow in that part of the circuit. If the
warning function is described in terms of the effects of the prime function, this
failure of the warning function will be detected on running a failure analysis of the
system and will be included in the resulting design analysis report. The design
analysis system can distinguish those system failures that cause both the prime
and dependent functions to fail from those that cause the failure of only one or
the other. The navigation lamp example with one detector, as described above
illustrates this, as a failure that causes one navigation lamp to fail will also cause
the warning system to fail, if it is defined in terms of the prime function. Notice
that if one lamp fails the warning function is triggered (the prime function has
failed) but it too will fail (its triggering condition is true and it effect absent) so
this can be included in the design analysis report, highlighting the inadequacy of
the design of the warning system.
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10.7 Uses of modelling of dependent functions
The uses of modelling dependent functions have been touched upon in passing
throughout this chapter, but it seems worth finishing with a summary of these.
Clearly, if a system that incorporates dependent functions is to be described
accurately, then these functions need to be described accurately in turn. This
depends on the subsystems that implement these dependent functions being de-
scribed alongside and simulated as part of the system that implements the prime
function on which the function depends. It has already been noted that the idea of
defining a dependent function in terms of the prime function on which it depends
is interesting for design verification as it can be used to highlight those system
failures that result in the dependent function not triggering even though its trig-
gering condition is true. This was illustrated using the navigation light example
in the previous section so will not be repeated here.
Another possible use of the Functional Interpretation Language for modelling
dependent functions (though it applies to other functions as well) is that it could
be used, independently of its use for interpretation of simulation, for refining the
design of such functionality. For example, a dependent function might (initially)
be defined in terms of the prime function (so a failure warning function is trig-
gered whenever the state of the prime function is failed) but might be refined to
depend on the actual trigger and effects of the prime function. Initially defining a
dependent function in terms of the state of the related prime function could high-
light cases where the implementation of the dependent function fails to achieve
the intended purpose, so it is not triggered when it was expected for example.
Indeed, it would even be possible to describe the dependent function twice, once
in terms of the state of the prime function and once in terms of the dependent
function’s actual trigger to emphasis such mismatches as part of the process of
design verification of the system that implements the dependent function.
One point that emerges from the foregoing discussion of dependent functions
is that they illustrate the distinction to be drawn between the functional and
physical decompositions of some product. The system that implements a warning
function, for example, might be considered quite distinct from the system that
implements the prime function (though clearly some connection will be required)
but the functionality of the product as a whole depends on the correct functional
relationship between these systems so even though they might be structurally
separate, they are functionally related. An example is the incorporation of a
dashboard warning lamp into the instrumentation system on the structural side
and the exterior lighting system on the functional side. This does mean that for
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correct design analysis of dependent functions, the modelling of the system must
follow the functional decomposition of the product as a whole.
Having considered the uses of the Functional Interpretation Language in design






While earlier chapters have made use of examples to illustrate the discussions
therein, these examples have been somewhat fragmentary in nature and it seems
well worth illustrating the use of the language with some more fully explored case
studies. There are two primary motives for this. The first is to evaluate the use
of the language in design analysis of systems of realistic size and complexity. The
other motivation is that this offers the opportunity to combine the aspects of the
work that have been described and discussed in different chapters of the thesis,
drawing together the different areas of the language, so as to give a better overview
of the language as a whole. The evaluation will, naturally, be done primarily in
terms of the language’s intended use for interpretation and automation of design
analysis. However, the use of the language in related tasks (such as diagnosis)
will be discussed as will the possibility of making use of the language in refining
the functional specification of a system as part of the design process. Finally,
the chapter will consider the relationship between the functional language and the
simulation engine (or engines) used to generate the simulation whose interpretation
the language is to enable.
One difficulty in selecting suitable example systems is that such a system needs
to be complex enough to support the arguments made, while being simple enough
for these arguments to be readily followed. It is hoped that the examples chosen
are appropriate. They are mostly familiar examples, so an informal grasp of their
functionality should be easily acquired.
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11.1 The Functional Interpretation Language
and design analysis
This section will explore the use of the language in more depth than was done
in the illustrative examples in the text, by describing how the language might be
used to describe the required functions of a relatively simple real-world system
as well as discussing how the use of the language works in concert with a model
based (or indeed a mathematical) simulation of the system under analysis. The
use of the Functional Interpretation Language for interpretation of simulation can
be illustrated by a system from one of the industrial partners on the SoftFMEA
project, under the auspices of which much of the present work was carried out.
This is a system that warns the driver of a car when s/he has not buckled the seat
belt, or the front seat passenger (if any) has not done so. It does this by lighting
a dashboard lamp and intermittently sounding a “chimer” for a period, before the
chimer falls silent. This system has been used in fragmentary examples earlier in
the thesis, but it will now be discussed in more detail.
11.1.1 Seat belt warning system
This is an example of an electrical system of the type that the design analysis tool
developed in earlier work in Aberystwyth (AutoSteve) was intended to model.
However, its behaviour proved too complex for the existing design analysis tool
and, indeed, the failure to model this system correctly was one of the motivations
for starting on the work described in this thesis. The schematic circuit diagram
is shown in Figure 11.1. This schematic was redrawn from one supplied by one of
the SoftFMEA project’s industrial partners. It was changed because the original
system included other functionality. The electronic control unit (ECU) labelled
“RCU” (the Restraint Control Unit) is also responsible for controlling the car’s
airbags. It was part of the design brief for the original seat belt warning system
that it should use existing components where possible. The schematic in Fig-
ure 11.1 separates out the parts of the original schematic that are concerned with
the seat belt warning system. For simplicity, only those components referred to in
the text are named. The actual schematic will identify all components and might
be slightly complicated by including connectors and several wires in series where
a run is so divided. The connecting pins have been labelled to allow direction
and flow of current to be identified. It is, perhaps, worth observing that all the
connections are electrical, rather than being network bus connections, for example



























































Figure 11.1: Schematic for the seat belt warning system.
as CIRQ, (Lee, 1999a), or a numerical tool, such as Saber (Saber, 1996). Such a
simulation is briefly described in the following section.
One shortcoming of the way this schematic has been drawn is that the speed
sensor does not have the behaviour of its input. It is essentially treated as a switch
with two possible states, one for when the car is travelling below the threshold
speed and one for when it is travelling at or above that speed. The speed is
simply set manually in running the simulation. Ideally, some way of modelling
the actual behaviour of the speed sensor would be incorporated, but this would
further complicate the schematic and it was not included in the industrial partner’s
original schematic from which the belt warning system schematic was drawn.
The main function of the system is, of course, to warn the driver that his or her
seat belt in unbuckled and to give a similar warning if the front seat is occupied
by an unbuckled passenger. In addition there are two other functions (in the sense
of intended behaviours) of this system that can be informally stated as follows:-
• The system is to be capable of being temporarily disabled, so the car can be
manoeuvred without the system being activated. This temporary disabling
to last until next time the engine is stopped and re-started.
• The system can be permanently disabled. Strictly speaking this means
disabled until the disabling is manually overridden whereupon the system
should function normally.
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The functional modelling of this system was actually derived from knowledge of
system’s (intended) behaviour, expressed in state charts describing the system.
These showed that the trigger for the temporary disabling of the seat belt warning
function is the buckling and unbuckling of the driver’s seat belt within a fixed time
and the indefinite disabling was triggered by repeated buckling and unbuckling of
the driver’s seat belt, five repetitions being required. How these can be described
in the Functional Interpretation language and how this is used to interpret the
simulation is illustrated in Section 11.1.3.
11.1.2 Simulation of the seat belt warning system
The Functional Interpretation Language is intended to be independent of the sim-
ulator used, in that the functional models can be mapped to system properties
associated with either a qualitative or a numerical simulator, for example. How-
ever, for the purpose of this illustration, it does seem worth briefly describing the
simulation of the example system. The seat belt warning system is electrical but
with significant software components, the ECUs. For the sake of this illustration,
a multiple level qualitative circuit simulator such as MCIRQ, (Lee et al., 2001)
is used, combined with state chart models of the more complex components (the
ECUs), as described in (Snooke, 1999). However, to save space in the description,
the behaviour of the ECUs will be described without state charts.
The qualitative circuit simulator uses four levels of resistance in this case, INF,
HIGH, LOW and ZERO where wires and closed switches have the value ZERO,
components such as the lamp and chimer have the value LOW and the internal
resistance of solid state components (such as the ECUs) is modelled as HIGH.
Open switches are treated as being INF. Each path from power to ground has
as its overall level of resistance that of the highest component resistance and this
is associated with a level of current of NONE, LOW, ACTIVE and SHORT. To
simplify component models, when the current through the lamp is ACTIVE it
is taken to be lit and likewise when the current through the chimer is ACTIVE,
it is sounding. Control of the intermittent chiming is managed by the GEM.
Each switch has positions associated with a different level of resistance. The
“driver buckle” and “pass buckle” have positions labelled buckled (associated with
a resistance of INF) and unbuckled, when the resistance is ZERO. The “seat mat”
has positions occupied (ZERO resistance) and unoccupied (INF resistance). The
values for these switches are chosen because if they were reversed any breakages
in the wires connecting those switches could result in false warnings. As they are,
such failures disable the system, avoiding potentially distracting behaviour. The
235
ignition switch has a resistance of INF in positions ‘p’, ‘a’ (accessories) and ‘s’
(start) and a resistance of zero in ‘r’ (run). This means that the whole system is
only active when the engine is (or should be) running. The switch that is between
pins 3 and 4 in the “ign relay” has a resistance of zero when the current through
the coil, between terminals 1 and 2 is ACTIVE.
As MCIRQ models circuit behaviour in terms of resistance and current, the
behaviour of the ECUs has to be described in these terms. This would be done
using state charts, but as this illustration is not concerned with the disabling
functions (which entail one of the ECUs having some internal memory) textual
descriptions will suffice. These are described using dependency expressions in
terms of current i and resistance r rather than voltage as this is what the simulator
supports. In all these cases, the resistance that is dependent on the current is INF
unless the current expression is true. The internal resistances are named after the
pins they can be taken to join, so (p, 1) joins the pin connected to power to the
pin numbered 1. Currents are indicated by → so (p → 1) means current flowing
from p to 1. In each case, the expressions are local to the component concerned,
named in the commentary so the name has been omitted from the expression.
The BMU (belt minder unit) passes a current to the pin connecting it with the
GEM if there is LOW current between its power pin and the pass buckle pin and
if there is LOW current between the two seat mat pins, indicating that the seat
is occupied but the seat belt not buckled.
r(p, 1) = HIGH if i(p → 5) == LOW ∧ i(p → 6) == LOW
The RCU passes current to the GEM if there is LOW current between its power
pin and the driver buckle pin.
r(p, 4) = HIGH if i(p → 3) == LOW
The speed sensor is treated as a switch with the states fast (zero resistance between
power and the GEM pin) and slow (INF resistance).
The GEM allows current to flow between its lamp pin and ground if there is
current between the sensor pin and ground and between either the RCU pin and
ground or the belt minder unit pin and ground (or both).
r(4, g) = ZERO if i(3 → g) == LOW∧(i(1 → g) == LOW∨i(2 → g) == LOW)
When the GEM enters that state it will also reduce the resistance between the
chimer pin and ground to ZERO for six intervals of 600 milliseconds, separated
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by interruptions of 300 milliseconds. The use of current rather than voltage is a
limitation of the simulator used.
The simulation can be run using a sequence of circuit states, such as switch
positions. As most of these give uninteresting results, the sample output listed
below is from one specific state. It also is run on the circuit operating correctly,
with no component failures. The output is further simplified by only listing the
current values for those components named on the schematic. In practice it would
list values for each resistance in the circuit, including those internal to the ECUs.
It is hoped that this representation of the output is sufficiently detailed despite
these simplifications. This sample lists the output of the simulator the engine
running, the car going fast, the driver buckled and the passenger unbuckled and
also that the change from the previous simulation is that the car is now going fast
(so the speed sensor state has changed).
Input system state:
ignition switch.position = run
driver buckle.position = buckled
pass buckle.position = unbuckled
seat mat.position = occupied
speed sensor.state = fast
Result: step 1
ign relay 1 to 2 current = ACTIVE
ign relay 3 to 4 current = LOW
lamp current = ZERO
chimer current = ZERO
driver buckle current 1 to 2 = ZERO
pass buckle 1 to 2 current = LOW
seat mat 1 to 2 current = LOW
wire A current = ZERO
wire B current = ZERO
wire C current = ZERO
BMU p to 1 current = LOW
BMU p to 2 current = LOW
BMU p to 3 current = LOW
BMU p to 5 current = LOW
BMU P to 6 current = LOW
BMU 4 to g current = LOW
RCU p to 3 current = ZERO
RCU p to 4 current = ZERO
RCU 1 to g current = LOW
RCU 2 to g current = LOW
speed sensor p to 1 current = low
GEM 1 to g current = ZERO
GEM 2 to g current = LOW
GEM 3 to g current = LOW
GEM 4 to g current = ZERO
GEM 5 to g current = ZERO
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step 2: current LOW in GEM 3 to g changes resistance
of GEM 4,g and GEM 5,g to ZERO.
Changes are:
lamp 1 to 2 current = ACTIVE
chimer 1 to 2 current = ACTIVE
wire A splice 2 to chimer current = ACTIVE
wire B splice 1 to splice 2 current = ACTIVE
wire C lamp to GEM current = ACTIVE
GEM 4 to g current = ACTIVE
GEM 5 to g current = ACTIVE
step 3: after 600mS, GEM changes resistance of GEM 5,g to INF.
Changes are:
chimer current = ZERO
wire A current = ZERO
GEM 5,g current = ZERO
step 4: after 300mS, GEM changes resistance of GEM 5,g to ZERO.
Changes are:
chimer 1 to 2 current = ACTIVE
wire A splice 2 to chimer current = ACTIVE
GEM 5 TO g current = ACTIVE
step 5: after 600mS, GEM changes resistance of GEM 5,g to INF.
Changes are:
chimer current = ZERO
wire A current = ZERO
GEM 5,g current = ZERO
step 6: after 300mS, GEM changes resistance of GEM 5,g to ZERO.
Changes are:
chimer 1 to 2 current = ACTIVE
wire A splice 2 to chimer current = ACTIVE
GEM 5 TO g current = ACTIVE
step 7: after 600mS, GEM changes resistance of GEM 5,g to INF.
Changes are:
chimer current = ZERO
wire A current = ZERO
GEM 5,g current = ZERO
step 8: after 300mS, GEM changes resistance of GEM 5,g to ZERO.
Changes are:
chimer 1 to 2 current = ACTIVE
wire A splice 2 to chimer current = ACTIVE
GEM 5 TO g current = ACTIVE
step 9: after 600mS, GEM changes resistance of GEM 5,g to INF.
Changes are:
chimer current = ZERO
wire A current = ZERO
GEM 5,g current = ZERO
step 10: after 300mS, GEM changes resistance of GEM 5,g to ZERO.
Changes are:
chimer 1 to 2 current = ACTIVE
wire A splice 2 to chimer current = ACTIVE
GEM 5 TO g current = ACTIVE
step 11: after 600mS, GEM changes resistance of GEM 5,g to INF.
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Changes are:
chimer current = ZERO
wire A current = ZERO
GEM 5,g current = ZERO
step 12: after 300mS, GEM changes resistance of GEM 5,g to ZERO.
Changes are:
chimer 1 to 2 current = ACTIVE
wire A splice 2 to chimer current = ACTIVE
GEM 5 TO g current = ACTIVE
step 13: after 600mS, GEM changes resistance of GEM 5,g to INF.
Changes are:
chimer current = ZERO
wire A current = ZERO
GEM 5,g current = ZERO
The simulation works by running the circuit simulator on the circuit in the state
corresponding to the input settings and then checking the component behavioural
description to see if any component’s internal state changes. In this case, the
current flowing in the GEM from the speed sensor results in the lamp’s path to
ground being completed and the intermittent chiming sequence being started. This
result in current starting to flow through the lamp and chimer. Successive steps
simply alternate the resistance of the chimer’s path to ground between ZERO and
INF, according to the timing of the GEM’s behaviour.
It will be seen that despite omitting many of the components (the wires) and
the reasonable simplifying assumption that only those current values that change
between steps are included in the next step, the output of the simulator is substan-
tial. This extract is for one switch setting, and with no failures. For an FMEA, the
output will include a sequence of switch settings repeated for each failure mode
as well as the correct simulation. Even with this relatively simple system, it will
run to several hundred pages. This illustrates the value of interpreting the output
so only the significant results are shown.
Despite the advantages of combining the simulation with the interpretation en-
abled by the use of the FIL, there are occasions when running the simulation alone
is sufficient, such as checking the behaviour of the system in one specific state.
This could be illustrated by colouring the schematic to show the current flows.
Having described a suitable approach to simulation of the example system, it is
time to consider the functional modelling needed to allow interpretation of these
results.
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11.1.3 Functional description of the seat belt warning sys-
tem
The main function of the this system has already been used to illustrate various














Strictly speaking, of course, this does not capture the condition that the ignition
is on, though it might be argued that since the car is moving, the ignition will
be on (unless the car is rolling down hill, of course). The trigger is a moderately
complex expression because the triggering of the warning function does depend
on a variety of factors. It will be noted that the factors given here do not include
the possibility of disabling the warning system. This will be discussed later. It
will also be seen that the effects associated with the function have been labelled
as purposive incomplete functions (PIFs) as each can be regarded as fulfilling its
own aspect of the purpose of the function or, pragmatically, that the failure of
either one of the effects is less serious than the failure of both, as discussed in
Chapter 7. It is worth noting that the function need not have been described
in this way. If the designer who was creating the functional description felt that
the consequences of the loss of either one of the effects were as serious as those
of the loss of both, the effects could have been described as such, rather than as
subsidiary functions.
The purpose the give_warning function fulfils might be described like this.
PURPOSE warn_unbuckled
DESCRIPTION "Warns driver that seat belt needs buckling."





As was discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, these consequences will be included in the
design analysis report if the trigger results in neither effect (PIF) being achieved.
In the case of a failure analysis (such as FMEA), this might result from wire
B breaking (going open circuit) so supply to both the chimer and the lamp is
interrupted.
As they are PIFs, there are separate functional descriptions for the effects of the





This quite simple. Being a PIF it has no trigger expression of its own, it “inherits”
the one from the top level function, which is shared with the other PIF. As a
subsidiary function, show_warning_lamp is associated with its own description of
purpose.
PURPOSE visual_unbuckled_warning
DESCRIPTION "Visually warns driver that seat belt needs buckling."




As this description of purpose is only used if the other subsidiary function is
present, it can be described making that assumption and it is also acceptable to
draw on some knowledge of the nature of the other associated effect (the other
subsidiary function). In this case, it is known that the sound_chimer subsidiary
function is not persistent, so if the driver is concentrating on the manoeuvre being
carried out so that s/he fails to hear the chimer, no warning will be noticed. It is
suggested that the presence of the chimer both reduces the severity and detection
values for the failure of this subsidiary function because the sounding of the chimer
will draw attention both to the triggering of the main function and to the absence
of the expected dashboard lamp.
The sound_chimer subsidiary function is a good deal more complex, depending
as it does on an effect that is intermittent in nature and that terminates in a
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passive state (with the chimer silent). For this reason, this function has been used
as an example in Chapter 8. In that chapter, a simplified version of the sounding
function was used, in which a fixed number of “chimes” were counted. In the
actual system, the behaviour was governed by timing, so the chimer sounds for
a set period of time and is silent for a set period of time and this alternation
continues for a set period of time, whereupon the chimer remains silent. There






SEQ chimer_on [AFTER 250ms BEFORE 350ms]
SEQ NOT chimer_on [AFTER 500ms BEFORE 750ms]
NEW_CYCLE
SEQ NOT chimer_on [AFTER 5s BEFORE 7s]
This is, unfortunately, an example of the Functional Interpretation Language
that does not read easily, as was discussed in Chapter 9. The intended behaviour
is that the cycle of chimer on and chimer off starts with the chimer coming on
within 250 milliseconds of the trigger of the top level function becoming true and
each sound of the chimer should last for a period of at least 500 milliseconds but no
more than 750, before a silence of between 250 and 350 milliseconds. Finally, the
chimer should fall silent and remain silent after at least 5 seconds of the chiming
sequence but after no more than 7 seconds. This means that there will be at
least five chimes but there might be as many as nine (though in that case, the
final one should be cut short). This functional description is written with the
assumption that the chimer can be regarded as being either sounding or silent. As
the show_warning_lamp function has no temporal constraint, the lamp can come
on at any time before, during or after the chiming sequence. As the two PIFs share
a trigger, if any temporal relationship between these functions was required, this
can be achieved as each timing sequence will start from the same triggering event.
One point that arises from this description is that the functional description need
not specify which component is responsible for the timing of the chimer sequence.
It might be governed by the GEM or by some timing device in the horn itself.
The audible_unbuckled_warning description of purpose is very similar to the
visual_unbuckled_warning one associated with the lamp subsidiary function,
but it is given here for the sake of completeness.
242
PURPOSE audible_unbuckled_warning
DESCRIPTION "Audibly warns driver that seat belt needs buckling."
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE




The same comments apply as to the earlier description of purpose. It will be seen
that this means that if either of the effects is achieved correctly, the consequences
of failure of the system, as shown in the resulting design analysis report, are less
severe than if both fail. For example, the consequences of the horn sequence failing
while the lamp comes on correctly (for example, if wire ‘A’ breaks), are those of
audible_unbuckled_warning so the risk priority number (RPN) is likely to be
lower than if both fail. The RPN might be raised by a high occurrence factor if
the subsidiary function depends on a particularly unreliable component, of course.
This completes the functional description for the seat belt system’s primary
function, all that is required is to link the triggers and effects to the correct
system properties. This will be discussed once the system’s other functions (the
temporary and permanent disabling functions) have been described. These do,
of course, affect the primary function as they prevent its being achieved or more
strictly its being triggered.
These two functions are arguably somewhat problematic as they do not really
have a purpose of their own. Rather they negate the purpose of the primary
function. Related to this is the fact that their effect is best regarded as an internal
system state, the only effect is the absence of the otherwise expected effects of
the give_warning function. The temporary disabling function is triggered by






SEQ give_warning.driver_unbuckled [before 2000mS]
TRIGGERS
temp_disabled
Here the driver_unbuckled trigger from the main function has been reused, to
ensure that both triggers map to the same system property. Also, there is no
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temporal constraint on the buckling of the seat belt (NOT driver_unbuckled be-
coming true) but it has to be unbuckled again within two seconds. The associated
description of purpose can be given as follows.
PURPOSE no_warning
DESCRIPTION
"Avoids distraction by belt warning system during manoeuvres."
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE "Driver distracted while manoeuvring.
Increased risk of collision."
SEVERITY 5
DETECTION 2
As this function’s effect is an internal system property, it needs to be linked to
the give_warning function to achieve any real purpose. This is done by adding














One difficulty with this function is that the disabling of the system is described
by the temporary_disabled function, but not how the temporary disabling of the








It is worth noting that these descriptions imply that the state of the ignition
is irrelevant, except in this case, so the driver could, in principle, buckle up,
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unbuckle within two seconds and only then start the engine and still have the seat
belt system temporarily disabled. This arguably implies that the components
concerned can change state even though they are not connected to the battery
through the ignition switch, which is not the case in the schematic shown, so it
will be the case that careful verification of the system’s design will show that the
temporary_disable function is not correctly implemented. It is felt that this is
an appropriate simplification of the functional modelling here, though this might
or might not be felt to be the case in actual practice.
The description of purpose associated with this function might be given as fol-
lows.
PURPOSE enable_warning
DESCRIPTION "Ends disabling of seat belt warning system."
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE
"System unable to warn driver of unbuckled seat belt."
SEVERITY 5
DETECTION 2
The need for a description of purpose for the end_temorary_disable function is
arguably problematic, as illustrated by the weakness of this description of purpose.
These functions do have a purpose so associating them with a description of that
purpose is not unreasonable. The difficulty is more the fact that these functions’
purposes really relate to the purpose of the give_warning function. There is also
the difficulty of distinguishing between the failure of the give_warning function
and the failure of the enable_warning function, both of which result in no warning
being given when expected. One way of distinguishing these cases is to regard the
enable_warning function as having failed if the temp_disabled effect is true.
The permanent disabling function is sufficiently similar to the temporary dis-
abling one that there seems little to be gained by adding those examples. Indeed,
there seems little reason why those functions should not share the one descrip-
tion of purpose. Therefore, in the interest of brevity, that function will not be
described. It will also have a similar cancelling function, unless, of course, it is the
case that permanent disabling is literally true and once triggered nothing should
enable the seat belt warning system for the rest of the life of the car. This then
completes the functional description of this system and the mapping between these
descriptions and the system model can be considered.
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11.1.4 Mapping between the functional and system models
It will be seen from the above that there is no reference to any actual aspect
of the system in the functional descriptions. For example, while the functional
description calls for a lamp to light up, it does not explicitly refer to the lamp
in the schematic. That link is made after the completion of both the functional
model and the system’s structural model, the schematic in this case. This map-
ping between the two models was discussed in Section 5.6. This approach differs
from that of (Price, 1998), and used in the tool developed in earlier work (Au-
toSteve) where the functional description made explicit use of the actual system
properties. The approach taken here encourages the reuse of functional models
for different systems that fulfil some purpose. For example, the system illustrated
here makes use of electrical connections throughout, as shown by the schematic,
but the functional description is equally applicable to a similar system that makes
greater use of software and digital technology, for example, using network con-
nections between the components. Another advantage of this approach is that it
allows the functional and structural models to be constructed separately, so either
model can be constructed first. This introduces the possibility that the functional
model can be built early in the design process and used both as a representation
of the functional requirements of the system and for verification of its evolving
design. This is discussed more fully in Section 11.2.
The drawback is that there is a need for separate, explicit links between the func-
tional descriptions’ triggers and effects and the corresponding component states or
properties in the system model. Note that in this example a qualitative simulator
is used for the sake of simplicity, as described in Section 11.1.2, and that it is safe
to regard the effectors (the lamp and chimer) as working if there is current flowing
between their terminals. This is, arguably a fairly safe assumption in the case of
the lamp as if it “blows” the filament breaks and no current will flow. It is less safe
in the case of the chimer if it has failure modes that allow current to flow without
it sounding.. If these assumption were not made, then behavioural descriptions
of the components could be used as the basis for these mappings, and would also
be required for simulation of the system, alongside the electrical simulator, as is
described in (Snooke, 1999).
The triggers for the give_warning function mostly map to the states of switches
within the system. Given that the components labelled “pass buckle” and “driver
buckle” are switches within the seat belt fitting that are opened when the buckle
is inserted, then the driver_unbuckled element in the trigger expression can be
implemented either by the state of the switch, or even by indicating that the
electrical resistance across the switch is zero.
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‘‘driver buckle’’.position = unbuckled
IMPLEMENTS
give_warning.driver_unbuckled
The passenger buckle switch mapping is similar. A similar approach is used
for the passenger seat occupancy detector (the “seat mat”) where if the seat is
occupied, this closes a sprung push-to-make contact, so the mapping might look
like this.
‘‘seat mat’’.position = occupied
IMPLEMENTS
give_warning.passenger_present
In both these cases, of course, a reusable switch model could (in principle) be
used, provided care was taken that the “open” and “closed” switch positions were
correctly mapped.
As noted earlier, the treatment of the speed sensor is simplified, so that there is
no need to include the speed sensing system as part of this system model. As the
seat belt warning system is merely concerned with whether or not the vehicle speed
is over or under some threshold, we can get away with treating the speed sensor
as a binary switch with two states, so that mapping might (rather simplistically)
look like this.
‘‘speed sensor’’.state = fast IMPLEMENTS give_warning.speed > threshold
The remaining element of the give_warning trigger expression is the state of
the disabled functions’ effects. These are discussed below.
That completes the trigger mappings for the give_warning function. The dis-
abling functions mostly reuse these mappings, by specifying triggers such as
give_warning.driver_unbuckled. The temporary_disable function is trig-
gered using an expression that can reuse the mapping between the driver buckle
component and the give_warning trigger. This avoids the need for redundant
mappings, eliminating the danger that the two sets of mappings differ. The addi-
tion is the use of the ignition switch, specifically to cancel the temporary disabling
function when switching off. As a car’s ignition switch typically has four positions
(which can be labelled off, accessories, run, start) the correct subset of these







It will be seen that these mappings are quite straightforward. As discussed in
Section 5.6, the mappings for the effects are more complex.
The effects for the give_warning are actually those associated with the two
subsidiary functions, each of which has one effect. The effect lamp_lit of the
show_warning_lamp subsidiary function can be mapped to the lamp, like this.
lamp.current = active IMPLEMENTS show_warning_lamp.lamp_lit
UNEXPECTED_CONSEQUENCE "Dashboard lamp distracts driver"
SEVERITY 3
DETECTION 2
Note the inclusion of the consequences of unexpected achievement of the effect,
which might be caused by the wire connecting the lamp to the GEM shorting to
ground.
The effect of the chimer_on effect of the audible_unbuckled_warning function
is a little more interesting. Here the mapping is between one element of the effect
expression, like this.
chimer.current = active IMPLEMENTS audible_unbuckled_warning.chimer_on
UNEXPECTED_CONSEQUENCE "Incessant chiming distracts driver"
SEVERITY 4
DETECTION 2
In both these cases, component states could be used in place of the values for
current. This might well be required where a component is behaviourally more
complex, and specifically where it has failure modes that mean that the overall
system state (the presence of current) does not necessarily result in achievement
of the required effect. This illustrates the advantage of associating the unexpected
consequences of an effect with the mapping between system and effect rather than
with the function. Here, it is most likely that the timing of the chimer is controlled
by an ECU (the GEM) and this being the case, the wire connecting the chimer
with the GEM shorting to ground will cause the chimer to sound incessantly.
As this does not achieve the associated function (which depends on the ordering
and timing of the effects) if the consequences of unexpected achievement were
associated with the function, that failure would (apparently) have no effect.
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It is also worth noting that here the value ACTIVE for the current has been used,
consistently with the qualitative simulation described earlier, but these mappings
could equally well be mapped to quantitative values, if a numerical simulator was
to be used.
These are the only two effects associated with the give_warning function, but
there is an effect associated with the temporary_disable function, which is then
added to the trigger expression of give_warning. This might be described like
this.
GEM.state.seat_belt_off IMPLEMENTS temporary_disable.temp_disabled
UNEXPECTED_CONSEQUENCE "Driver not warned of unbuckled seat belt"
SEVERITY 4
DETECTION 7
This assumes some sort of state based behavioural model of the GEM. This aspect
of the GEM was omitted from the discussion of the simulation for simplicity and
as it was unnecessary for the illustration. This mapping is reused in both the
end_temporary_disable function and in give_warning, as part of its trigger
expression. The consequences of the effect being achieved unexpectedly are that
the expected warning is not given when it should be. As these are identical to
the consequences of failure of give_warning, a possible refinement might be to
use these consequences (in the warn_unbuckled description of purpose) as the
consequences of unexpected achievement of this effect. Similar mappings would
also be required for the permanent disable function.
Having completed the mapping between the system model and its functional
model, running simulations of the system in various states can show cases where
the system’s behaviour does not match that specified by the functional model.
This can be used either to verify the design or for failure analysis.
The schematic of the seat belt warning system is believed to be correct, but
if, say, wire ‘C’ was omitted from the schematic, then running a simulation will
reveal that even when the speed is over the threshold and the driver is unbuckled,
there will be no current through the lamp so it will not come on, even though
it should, and the consequences of this error in the system design are known.
If failure analysis is being carried out, then the system can be simulated with
that wire broken (for example) and the same consequences will be found. A
part of an FMEA report that could be automatically generated from simulation
of this system, interpreted using the functional model described here, is shown in
Table 11.1. It will be appreciated that the whole FMEA report will be considerably
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 DetFailure effect Cause Consequence
Function give_warning failed because
function sound_chimer failed because





drawn to unbuckled seat
belt. Risk of injury.
Function give_warning failed because
function show_warning_lamp failed because
expected efect lamp_lit was absent and
function  sound_chimer failed because


















Table 11.1: Part of an FMEA report for the seat belt system example.
longer than this extract, typically an FMEA report will include several hundred
rows. However, this short extract is sufficient to illustrate the main features of
the approach, such as distinguishing between the complete ad partial failure of
the main give_warning function. It has also been simplified by omitting any
reference to the trigger expressions. This seems tolerable here as the failures
shown will mean the associated effects and functions are never achieved correctly.
The descriptions of the functions that have failed or are unexpected and of the
consequences are consistent with the rules for representation of failures introduced
in Chapter 5 and summarised in Appendix A. This summary refers to the rule
numbers as given in the appendix, as they are easier to find for reference. The top
row of the extract shown notes that the function give warning failed consistently
with rule A.11 as are the failed subsidiary function and the missing effect (rule
A.12). As only one of the subsidiary functions failed the consequences are those of
that function, consistently with rule A.19. In the second row, both subsidiary func-
tions have failed, so the consequences are those of the top level function, following
rule A.18. In the third row, there is an unexpected effect leading to unexpected
achievement of the lamp lit function. As that function has no consequences of
unexpected achievement, the consequences are those associated with the effect
(strictly, its mapping to the system model), following rule A.15. It will be seen
that this allows the report to distinguish between complete and partial failure of
the top level give warning function and also means that the consequences of any
unexpected effect are included.
It is perhaps worth closing this section with a brief description of how this simu-
lation and interpretation works, for one of the failures shown. Suppose the system
model has been set with the input states (switch positions) as in section 11.1.2.
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Also, as this is a failure analysis, the system is simulated with wire A open cir-
cuit. Running the simulator will show that the chimer never sounds, though
the lamp will light. On completing this simulation (actually one of a sequence
of simulations) then a comparison with the mappings and the functional model
will reveal that the settings of the system mean the give_warning function is
triggered, so both the purposive incomplete subfunctions are triggered, but that
the sound_chimer function has failed (its trigger, inherited from give_warning
is true but its effect false as the chimer never sounds) so this failure and the
consequences of its associated description of purpose are included in the result-
ing report, as shown in the table. It will be appreciated how laborious a task
this interpretation would be without the interpretation allowed by the functional
description. It will be seen that a similar simulation and interpretation can be
used for design verification by simulating the system with no failures and finding
similar mismatches between expected results (as specified in the functional model)
and the results of the simulation. This approach does, of course, follow the func-
tional labelling approach described in (Price, 1998) with the difference that the
specification of the trigger allows the use of the functional descriptions for design
verification and the additional operators allow the description of the more complex
behaviour associated with the chimer function.
The foregoing shows the usefulness of the approach for the intended purpose
of automating design analysis of engineered systems. The relationship between
functional models created using the Functional Interpretation Language and the
simulation is discussed in more general terms in Section 11.4, following a discussion
of possible other rôles of the language in the design of engineered systems.
11.2 Other possible rôles for the language
Having described a case study demonstrating the use of the Functional Interpre-
tation Language for interpretation of simulation for design analysis in some detail,
other case studies will be used to illustrate other uses of the language, and espe-
cially features of the language not fully explored in the preceding section. However,
these case studies will not be described in such detail, in the interest of brevity.
Beside the use of language in automating design analysis (both design verifica-
tion and failure analysis), as illustrated in the preceding section, there are two
areas that might be considered as possible applications of the functional mod-
elling the language enables. These are diagnosis and functional specification of a
system design. It should be appreciated that these were not the motivations for
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the research, so the usefulness of the language in these rôles has not been fully
explored. This might be done in future, especially for the analysis of software
based systems.
11.2.1 Diagnosis
As the Functional Interpretation Language is intended for use in design analysis,
including failure analysis, it can be used for generation of a fault tree that can be
used as the starting point for diagnosis. The use of functional interpretation of
the simulation allows a functional description of the symptomatic system failure
to be used, subject to correct matching of terms in relating the description of the
symptom to the functional description of the failure in the fault tree chart.
The generation of a fault tree from FMEA was described in (Price et al., 1996c)
and the use of a fault tree in diagnosis for identifying candidate failures in (Price
et al., 1996b). These approaches are equally applicable to FMEA carried out using
the Functional Interpretation Language.
One possibility that might be explored is that the more precise functional de-
scriptions that the Functional Interpretation Language is capable of might be used
to improve the candidate identification from a fault tree relative to the earlier ap-
proach. This will certainly be the case where a system includes functions whose
trigger cannot be unambiguously derived from the simulation of the correctly
working system (that is, there are dependent functions) as that need no longer be
the basis of the failure analysis that forms the basis of the fault tree. This fol-
lows from the improvement the present approach offers for failure analysis if such
systems, in that the functional description defines the trigger for all functions.
It is worth noting that diagnosis maps back from effect to cause of a fault in
behaviour unlike the design analyses that the Functional Interpretation Language
is intended to help automate, all of which map forward from cause to effect. In
other words the FIL is intended more to help with forward chaining tasks. There
is at least room for arguing that there is less need for the mapping to purpose in
diagnosis as the symptoms are known and can be described in terms of an effect
(in many cases) rather than the failure of a system to meet its purpose. However,
this is not the case in all cases and there is a possible rôle for a functional language,
such as the present one, in identifying candidate failures in such cases. Because the
Functional Interpretation Language increases the capability of automatic design
analysis and this can be applied to diagnosis as described in (Price et al., 1996b),
it follows that the language increases the capability of the approach in that paper.
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11.2.2 Functional specification of system design
One advantage of the inclusion of the trigger and the use of labels for the trig-
ger(s) and effect(s) associated with a function is that a functional description and
so a system’s functional model can be constructed independently of the system
model itself. It can, therefore, be constructed before the system model, leading to
the idea that the language can be used to specify the functional requirements of a
proposed system in such a way that validating a design of the system against these
requirements can be done automatically as part of the design process. This idea
was introduced in Chapter 5, using the simple torch example, where it was shown
that the functional model of the torch could be constructed to include a functional
description that included the torch being lit while a button was pressed (for flash-
ing the torch). This would imply the use of a push-to-make switch alongside the
conventional slider switch.
Another aspect of this use of the language is possibility of using the language
to specify what should happen in the event of failure of some system function.
For example, in (Gunzert & Nägele, 1999), the development of a safety critical
system in which a fault tolerant module is built from two “fail silent units” is
described. The failure of a fail silent unit might be described using the Functional
Interpretation Language as in the example below. This is a simplified description








This function describes (at an admittedly high level of abstraction) the normal
behaviour of the brake manager, simply that it receives a request (brake_request)
that indicates that braking is required and a request for a force of braking
(brake_force), both derived from the position of the driver’s brake pedal and
in response sends a signal (signal_brake_pressure) to the four brake actuators
(one for each wheel) requesting a certain degree of braking force to be applied.
The system described in (Gunzert & Nägele, 1999) specifies the use of two such
modules, the failure of either one can be tolerated, provided that it fails silently so
no conflicting braking signals are sent to the actuators. The idea that the Brake By
Wire Manager should fail silently can be specified by the Functional Interpretation





(brake_request AND NOT brake_force)
OR





Here if one of the input signals is detected and not the other, this implies a fault
in the Brake Manager and it should stop working (having sent a signal to that
effect), allowing its partner to govern braking alone, so the driver can continue
until it is safe to stop. In other words, the braking system as whole carries on in
a limp home mode.
In this case, the description has been simplified somewhat, but it does illustrate
the idea that this failure mode behaviour can be specified as part of the functional
description of the Brake Manager.
Another approach to the specification of a system failure mode behaviour is
the use of dependent functions. For example in a motorised camera, pressing
the shutter release causes a sequence of events to happen. As was shown in










This covers three actions, the exposure (opening and closing of the shutter), the
effects needed for expose_frame, the winding on of the film and the re-cocking of
the shutter. However, this description does not define what should happen if one
or other of these effects should fail. If dependent functions are used, the response
to failure can be defined and so incorporated into the functional specification of
the camera. One possible approach might be to reduce the take_photo function








As there is now but the one effect of take_photo, there is no need to treat
expose_frame as a subsidiary function. The recharging function, wind_on is now
triggered by the achievement of this function, and can itself usefully be divided
into two functions, so that the failure mode behaviour is defined. The resulting














So each function is triggered by the achievement of the previous function in the
sequence. It will be seen that now, if the frame is not exposed, the film should
not be wound on, so preventing the waste of a frame. This example is arguably
an oversimplification, as take_photo might fail if, say, the timing of the shutter
opening and closing was incorrect resulting in the frame being badly exposed. The
other example is safer as if the film winding on fails, the shutter should not be
cocked. This behaviour eliminates the danger of the frame being inadvertently
double exposed. This demonstrates the use of the Functional Interpretation Lan-
guage to specify aspects of the failure mode behaviour of a proposed system as
part of its functional specification. This increases its usefulness for the functional
specification of a system. Thus example shows how the language might be used (if
somewhat informally) to refine the system’s functional specification. The specifi-
cation of the motorised camera might start with the simple description, where the
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three associated functions share a trigger, and this description might be refined
as the drawbacks of this simple functional specification become clear. This might
happen in response to examining the results of simulation as part of the design
analysis, as the functional model is capable of this automated evaluation. For
example, a simulation might show that the film does wind on despite the failure
of the shutter to open but that this winding on is not itself seen as a failure, that
is it has no consequences in the design analysis report. This could prompt the
designer to create a more refined functional description that does highlight this
failure, such as the more complex version given above.
The idea that the language is used in specifying the functionality of a system, as
discussed in this section, allows the functional modelling and the simulation and
so the design analysis to be integrated more closely in the design process. This
encourages design analysis to be carried out early and often in the system’s design
process, when it is most beneficial.
A rather more speculative area related to this use of the Functional Interpre-
tation Language is whether a system’s functional specification constructed using
the language can be combined with knowledge of the behaviour of candidate com-
ponents to automatically generate a candidate system design, in an approach not
unlike that of (Iwasaki et al., 1993). This use of the language does differ from
the approach in that paper, component functions are not used, being replaced by
knowledge of component behavioural models, of the kind used in simulation for
design analysis. For this to work the functional description of a system would need
to be decomposed rather more than the “black box” description used in this the-
sis. One objection to the Functional Interpretation Language for this task is that
the lower level functional description might be unwieldy as description of purpose
might be felt to be redundant. One possible approach might be to decompose
a system function into subsidiary operational incomplete functions, avoiding any
need to construct superfluous descriptions of purpose. Because these subsidiary
functions can use the effect of some other function as its trigger it is not impos-
sible that a complete functional model could be constructed in this way and its
appropriateness evaluated against the trigger and effect of the original top level
function. This evaluation could be done before the functional model is reified as
a candidate design, simply by comparing the truth of the conditions (trigger and
effect) of the main function with the conditions resulting from the causal model
constructed by combining subsidiary functions in this way. It should be stressed
that this has not been tried and while the Functional Interpretation language
might be insufficient to automate this process, it does seem possible to use it to
help construct and evaluate candidate designs. How these functional models are
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then mapped to a structural model of the system remains as an area for future
work, as does developing this possible use of the language itself. One possible field
in which this might be done is software design, if only because the knowledge of
component behaviour might be available. Components in this case will, of course,
be software components, such as object oriented classes and methods.
11.2.3 Explanation generation in education and training
One area where model based simulation has been used is in training and educa-
tion. Examples include the use of the General Architecture for Reasoning about
Physics (GARP) (Bredeweg, 1992) in learning. Developments for this applica-
tion have included a graphical representation of the simulation models (Bouwer &
Bredeweg, 2001) and an interactive tool to support the construction of the simu-
lations (Machado & Bredeweg, 2001). In addition, CyclePad, a simulation tool for
thermodynamic systems based on a process centred ontology (Forbus, 1997) was
intended for use in education. It has been used in the instruction of engineers in
the field of thermodynamics, (Baher, 1999) and its use was evaluated in (Tuttle
& Wu, 2001).
The rôle of interpretation of simulation might well be rather different in this
field, as compared to design analysis. For example, students might be encouraged
to predict the result of a simulation and compare their results with the result of
the model based simulation. While this places greater emphasis on the simulation
itself, one can see a need for some means of providing some interpretive explana-
tion of any differences between these results. These explanations will frequently
be in terms of the relationships between the causes of the differences between the
predicted and actual simulations rather than the effects of these differences, but
it is not impossible that there are cases where the Functional Interpretation Lan-
guage might prove useful. One possibility that springs to mind is in explaining the
effects of errors in student exercises in programming. This remains a possible area
for future work, however, as this use of the language has not yet been investigated.
11.3 Functional description of software
One of the motivations for the development of the Functional Interpretation Lan-
guage is the desire to automate design analysis of systems that incorporate soft-
ware based components. This was the aim of the SoftFMEA project which was
the source of funding for much of the research described in this thesis. It will
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be appreciated that the use of software introduces the greater complexity of be-
haviour on which a system’s functionality can depend, and which the language
was developed to describe.
While software examples have been used in this thesis, the fact that the descrip-
tion of software based systems was an important part of the motivation suggests
that a brief discussion of the use of the language for describing software is worth
including. This section will discuss questions that arise from the use of the Func-
tional Interpretation Language for describing software and software based systems
rather than include a full case study. This is partly because there are such ques-
tions that need some discussion and partly because any case study of realistic scale
will be of sufficient complexity to make the necessary explanation excessively pro-
tracted.
The first question that arises is the one of whether the approach to modelling of
software based systems for design analysis is of interest. There has been interest
in design analysis (particularly FMEA) of software and embedded systems (Maier,
1995; Bowles & Wan, 2001). With the increasing use of programmed components
(such as ECUs) in areas such as the automotive sector the safety analysis of such
systems is of increasing importance, especially with the introduction of “drive
by wire” systems with no mechanical backup, as noted in (Papadopoulos et al.,
2001). That paper describes a “semi-automatic” approach to this safety analysis,
based on constructing fault trees of the system, which process is repeated at finer
granularities as the design process continues. The lack of, and need for, mature
techniques for manual software FMEA is noted by (Goddard, 2000). There is
a description of the early research into an approach to modelling software for
automated safety analysis in (Snooke, 2004). That approach traces the paths of
possible errors arising in a program’s variables and so traces the effects of such
errors. There have been encouraging initial results with the use of the Functional
Interpretation Language for interpretation of the result of this analysis of software.
Using the Functional Interpretation Language to build functional models of the
system as a way of specifying the system’s intended functionality is, of course,
equally applicable to software system as to any other system, so the possibility ex-
ists of building functional models of an intended software system early in the design
process and being able to simulate the behaviour of the system so that the design
can be automatically verified against this functional specification. This approach
is not a substitute for a conventional formal method, because the correctness of
the system described can only be demonstrated by simulation (so depends on the
correctness of the system model) as opposed to being mathematically proved. In
the case of software, of course, it is feasible for the source code to be used in the
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system model, which means that model’s correctness depends on the compiler. It
does share with formal methods the idea that the functional requirements can be
expressed in a such a way that the system can be verified against them and this
will be done early in the design process.
While the CYCLE operator gives the Functional Interpretation Language a way
of describing iteration in a program, the lack of any control operator might be
seen as preventing its use in modelling the function of software. However, this
is arguably not the case, as any control branching of a program that results in
a different output (or effect) will simply result in the achievement of some other
system function. This does mean that the condition that triggers the branch
program needs representing in the functional description. For example, consider
an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) that will refuse a request for a withdrawal if
the account has insufficient funds available. A possible pseudocode listing of the
relevant fragment might look like this.
void checkBalance (int request)





This does, of course, lead to two alternative responses to the original trigger
(which can be taken to be the user entering the amount to be withdrawn). As the
two responses fulfil different purposes, they are modelled as different functions in









Here, of course, the variable request in the pseudocode implements the func-
tional description’s element request_amount and the balance variable imple-
ments account_balance. The purpose of this function is, of course, to dispense
the requested amount of cash. The other branch of the ATM pseudocode results










The mappings are shared with the make_withdrawal function. The purpose here
is, of course, to protect the account from becoming inadvertently overdrawn and
the effect is likely to be the display of some appropriate message on the ATM’s
screen.
Where a program’s control path does not affect the actual effect or the purpose
of a program or program fragment it can safely be ignored in the functional model
of the system. Examples are not easy to come up with as these cases are relatively
unusual. One possible case might be that it is specified that a program should
not be closed with any unsaved work open, and while this leads to two distinct
behaviours (if there is any unsaved work it must be saved, if not no action is
necessary), functionally the end result is identical and so the difference between
these behaviours could be ignored. It is appreciated that this is a somewhat
contrived example which does, perhaps, show how unusual such cases are.
While the functional descriptions above are more elaborate than the code they
describe, it is worth pointing out that they do incorporate an abstract view of parts
of the software not listed, as the system functions described also depend on the
correct behaviour of the refuseWithdrawal and dispenseCash code and indeed
the hardware that actually dispenses the cash, so the system these functional de-
scriptions describe is more elaborate than the illustration suggests. This example
illustrates what might well be the most likely use of the Functional Interpreta-
tion Language with regard to the modelling of software, which is the modelling of
embedded systems where at the functional level there is little need to distinguish
between the hardware and software components of the system. Indeed the fact
that the functional descriptions are independent of the domain means that the
same functional description can be used whether a given function is implemented
in hardware or software.
Having considered different uses of the Functional Interpretation Language and
seen that its use for design analysis as well as for functional specification depends
on the availability of a simulation engine to generate a model of the system’s
behaviour, it is time to examine the relationship between functional models built
using the Functional Interpretation Language and the simulation engine.
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11.4 Relationship with the simulation engine
As was suggested earlier, the automation of design analysis depends on both the
ability to simulate a system, to obtain a description of the system’s behaviour
and the ability to interpret that behaviour in terms of the system’s purpose to
allow the automatic generation of a design analysis report. While the purpose of
the Functional Interpretation Language is this interpretation side of the design
analysis task, it is necessary to at least consider the implications of the use of this
language on the requirements of the simulation engine (or engines) used in a design
analysis tool. As the subject of this thesis is the interpretation language, rather
than simulation, this discussion will be confined to requirements of the simulation.
The use of the Functional Interpretation Language should not restrict the choice
of simulator, provided the chosen simulator provides output that can be mapped
to the appropriate parts of the functional model and it meets the requirements
discussed in this section. While an electrical simulator was used in the worked
example earlier there is no reason why that should be the case. The seat belt
warning system could have had more of its control behaviour implemented in
software (using a data bus for communicating between the ECUs, perhaps) and
while that would lead to a change in the approach for simulation, there would be no
need to change the functional description. One could envisage a design analysis
system that used the FIL for interpretation and allowed the use of alternative
simulators for electrical, hydraulic and software based subsystems, and any others
found necessary.
This follows from the functional labelling approach in (Price, 1998) and a brief
summary of that system as implemented in the commercial design tool (AutoSteve)
will help to clarify the requirements to be discussed. This approach uses an elec-
trical simulator combined with behavioural descriptions of the components, as
described in (Snooke, 1999). To run a simulation, the inputs to the system (such
as switch positions) are set and the simulation started. The simulation will then
run until the system settles into a steady state whereupon the states or activity of
the effector components can be mapped against the functional labels to establish
which system functions are achieved in this system state. For example, if after the
simulation of the current behaviour of a car lighting system is complete and the
system is in a steady state there is current in the headlamp dipped beam filaments,
the dipped_beam function is achieved.
This introduces one immediate difference as using the Functional Interpretation
Language the function will only be achieved if the function’s triggers (which map
to the input components) are also true. In other words, the function will only be
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achieved if the switches are set correctly for that function. This does not place
any new demands on the simulation engine as the switch positions were known at
the start of the simulation.
There are a few areas where the relationship between the Functional Interpreta-
tion Language and the simulation needs discussion. These arise largely from the
novel features of the language. They will be discussed in turn.
11.4.1 Sequential behaviour and temporal constraints
It will be appreciated that the approach described above is appropriate where a
function depends on a persistent output or state of the system, but cannot be
used with functions that depend on intermittent or sequential outputs, either be-
cause the system will never reach a steady state until some other input causes the
intermittent behaviour to stop or because the earlier outputs in a sequence are
over before the steady state is reached. These are, of course, the types of function
that can be described using the SEQ, L-SEQ and CYCLE operators. Therefore the
ability of the Functional Interpretation Language to describe functions that de-
pend on such behaviour introduces these two new requirements on the associated
simulation engine. In practice the simulation engine has to recognise that the
simulation has entered a cycle regardless of the interpretation, simply because if it
fails to do so, the simulation might run indefinitely. There seems to be no intrinsic
difficulty in having the simulation engine returning a sequential description of the
states the system entered during the simulation. The example simulator output
in Section 11.1.2 does this. The only difficulty is ensuring that such a sequential
description of the system’s behaviour covers all the significant states. Obviously,
if every state change is listed, this will be done, and the interpretation side of the
design analysis tool can ignore those state changes that do not affect the state or
behaviour of any components that are mapped to the functional model. For ex-
ample, the momentary state where a relay has current flowing through it, but the
switch has not yet moved in response can be ignored as the effector components
driven by the current through the relay’s switch will not have changed state.
This requirement of the simulation engine can be further refined by requiring the
modelling of timing of these changes of state, so that the timing of achievement of
a function can be described, allowing the interpretation side of the design analysis
tool to identify situations where a function is achieved in an untimely manner,
as discussed in Chapter 9. This does entail the incorporation of timing informa-
tion in behavioural models, of course, which increases the overhead in building
the necessary models. This is quite applicable to models based on state charts,
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as described in (Snooke, 1999). This approach is also appropriate for software
based behaviours. Another aspect of timing in a system model is where timing
constraints are a part of the trigger of a system function, as in the temporary dis-
abling function of the seat belt warning system described earlier in this chapter.
This does raise problematic requirements for the simulation engine, as an input
event will have to be added to the simulation at the appropriate point while the
simulation is running following the previous input. The assumption that inputs
to the system are independent and instantaneous can no longer be used. One
possible (though perhaps not feasible) approach is to run the simulation in real
time (perhaps scaled if necessary) so the new inputs can be made when needed.
Another possible (if complex) approach is to allow a programmed scenario of in-
puts (that would otherwise drive distinct simulation steps) to include temporal
information. Then, given that the simulation can keep track of time, the timed
input can be made programmatically at the right point in the simulation.
11.4.2 Simulation through the design lifecycle
Because the Functional Interpretation Language allows the possibility of build-
ing the functional model of a system early in the design process, as part of re-
quirements definition, this raises the possibility of using the functional model to
interpret a sequence of different simulations, of finer granularity, as the design
process progresses. This is not dissimilar to the generation of fault trees of finer
granularity proposed in (Papadopoulos et al., 2001). An approach to analysis us-
ing finer grained as more precise models become available is described in (Price
et al., 2003). Here as the electrical system design is refined, three valued qualita-
tive circuit modelling is superseded by multiple valued qualitative and finally by
numerical circuit models.
The functional descriptions are, of course, equally applicable to any of these
system models. All that is required is a refinement of the mappings between the
system models and the effects in the functional description. For example, a system
function might depend on some lamp being lit, and the lamp might be regarded
as being lit if the current through it is active in the three valued model, medium
in the multiple valued qualitative model and with a current of, say, between 500
and 700 milliamps in the numerical model. The effect’s label need not change,
so neither need the functional description itself; only the mapping between it and
the system model changes. The functions to which the lamp being lit contribute
do not change at all, of course, as the purpose will not. Even this change to the
mappings between the system and functional descriptions might not be needed if
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the effector components are described in terms of state as the state description
will themselves change with the increasing granularity of the model, but the same
(or at least corresponding) states will be associated with a function’s effect. This
places all the changes required through the design process on the simulation side of
the tool, with the advantage that as they are associated with reusable component
behavioural models. These alternative models can be retrieved from a library of
component models.
11.4.3 Dependent functions
The idea that a system function might depend on some other function (as discussed
in Chapter 10) has relatively little effect on the simulation side of a design analysis
tool. One point that does arise, though, is that a where a function is triggered
by the achievement or otherwise of some other functions, it will be triggered as a
result of a change in system state during the simulation rather than directly by
the inputs from outside the system. There seems no reason why this should cause
any particular problems, but it is the case that the sequential description of the
system behaviour required for functions having intermittent or sequential effects
will also need to be checked by the interpretation side of the design analysis tool
for system states that trigger some dependent function. The idea that a dependent
function might affect the seriousness of the main functions, such as a telltale light
failing and making the failure of the main function less detectable is a purely
interpretive point and has no effect on the relationship between the simulation
and the functional model.
Having discussed the aspects of the Functional Interpretation Language that
might have most affect on the relationship with the simulation engine, there are
one or two minor aspects that can be swiftly discussed.
As the functional descriptions are generally independent of the domain of the
system, there should be no difficulty relating the functional descriptions to systems
whose analysis depends on a mixture of domain based simulators, such as there
being domain based simulators for the electrical and water flow in a washing
machine.
Because the triggers and effects of a function are essentially binary in nature,
being either true or false, there is a need for these to be related to states of com-
ponents that are not binary. This might be because the output (say) is modelled
numerically, in which case an acceptable range of values can be associated with
correct achievement of the effect, as described above, or because the effect depends
on a component with several qualitatively distinct states (such as slow or fast of
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windscreen wipers). This presents no difficulty as again the mapping between the
functional description and the system model will use the correct one of these pos-
sible states and logical NOT can be used to simplify functional descriptions where
necessary.
All the foregoing has been concerned with the relation between the Functional In-
terpretation Language and a system model and simulator built using a component
centred ontology. This is, arguably, a natural ontology for the design analysis of
engineered systems. It is also the case that other functional modelling approaches
tend to be associated with that ontology. This is clearly the case where the func-
tional language is used to define the function of components, such as in (Hawkins
& Woollons, 1998).
However, while the present work has not investigated the possibility of using the
functional language for interpretation of the effects of a process based simulation,
there seems to be little difficulty in doing so. A function is modelled in terms of
the triggers and effects on a system’s intended behaviour, associated with specific
components (such as the headlamps in the example above). It should be possible to
associate system functions with specific processes rather than specific components.
Indeed, the functional model might be identical. For example, a boiler needs a







There seems to be no difficulty in mapping the effect either to the state of a
component (the safety valve) or to the triggering of some process, the escape of
steam.
The discussions above, regarding the relationship between the Functional Inter-
pretation Language and the simulation engine suggest that a design analysis tool
has two distinct (but mutually dependent) aspects, so there is a simulation en-
gine (or more than one domain based one) forming the simulation side of the tool
and the Functional Interpretation Language forms the basis for the interpretation
side of the design analysis tool. In principle, the domain independent nature of
the Functional Interpretation Language allows different simulators to be used in
conjunction with a functional model, simply by changing the mappings between
the system model and the functional model, so it is not impossible, say, that the
same functional model could be used for a gas and electric hob.
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While this is not concerned with the relationship between the interpretation and
simulation, it seems worth concluding this section with a brief consideration of
how the arrangement of functional descriptions, so that the functions can share
effects and mappings, might be implemented. This is especially important where
there are dependent functions as this increases the number of relationships between
functions, and so cases where ne functional description will refer to another. The
approach taken in this thesis is to use a qualified name for the function or element
that is being referred to, as was illustrated in the seat belt warning case study
earlier in this chapter. For example, the temporary_disable function has as its
trigger the trigger of the seat belt system’s main function, give_warning. This
was shown by qualifying the label of the trigger with the name of the function to
which it belonged, give_warning.driver_unbuckled. One approach to imple-
menting these relationships is to keep the functional descriptions in separate files,
having the arrangement of files mirror the arrangement of functions and elements.
A group of functions might be associated with a system, say, so that the system is
mirrored by a directory with the same name, and functions can therefore be identi-
fied by the system, as well as elements (such as trigger and effect) by the function.
This is very similar to the way the package structure in a Java application’s source
tree matches the file structure itself.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion and future work
The use of the Functional Interpretation Language for interpretation of simula-
tion of engineered systems, as has already been stated, builds on the Functional
Labelling approach of (Price, 1998) and by the use of that approach in AutoSteve,
the model based design analysis tool developed in previous work in Aberystwyth.
That work demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach on which the present
work builds. Therefore the conclusion of the present work must be in terms of how
effectively the language described herein addresses the limitations of the earlier
work, by increasing the range of systems and tasks for which the language can be
used, and more specifically by how well the Functional Interpretation Language
meets the sets of requirements stated in the Introduction and in Chapter 5.
This chapter will discuss the language in terms of those requirements and in
relation to the research question, can we devise a language for interpretation of
behavioural simulation of engineered systems (of arbitrary complexity) in terms
of the systems’ purpose?, and motivation presented in the introduction before a
discussion of possible future work. This discussion of future work also serves to
highlight other areas in which the Functional Interpretation Language might prove
to be of use, though its use in these areas has not been explored as part of the
present research.
12.1 How the Functional Interpretation
Language meets its requirements
This section discusses how well the functional interpretation language meets the
requirements set out in Chapter 5 and then goes on to discuss how well it meets
267
the requirements for functional modelling of systems of the kinds enumerated in
the Introduction.
There are five requirements of a functional modelling language set out in Chap-
ter 5, each will be discussed in turn.
Capable of recognising whether the system’s purpose is being fulfilled.
This feature of the Functional Interpretation Language is common with the Func-
tional Labelling approach of (Price, 1998) in which the achievement of a function is
associated with the presence or otherwise of some expected effect. The present lan-
guage can be argued to refine this approach by the inclusion of the trigger (which
was added to the functional labelling approach for design verification) leading to
the abstraction of a system’s behaviour into one of four states expressed largely
(though not entirely) in terms of the fulfilling of some purpose of the system. The
use of the recogniser (based on the truth of the trigger and effect expressions)
allows the language to recognise when a system’s purpose is being achieved.
Applicable to static or dynamic functions. This is, arguably, the weakest
aspect of the Functional Interpretation Language. The nature of the recogniser of
achievement of a function, depending as it does on a trigger and effect, can hardly
be said to lend itself naturally to the description of a static function, though an
approach to modelling such functions was described in Chapter 5. As the pri-
mary aim of the language is interpretation of simulation (where it is reasonable
to expect some dynamic change to the system), this weakness is, perhaps, un-
derstandable. However, the approach to describing static functions in Chapter 5
is a sound approach to the problem so the langauge does fulfil this requirement.
What it is incapable of describing usefully are functions whose effect is incapable
of simulation, such as a subjective case like the aesthetic function of a placing
a vase of flowers in a room. The language could be used to describe such func-
tions, but their achievement cannot be recognised, as it cannot be modelled in the
simulation.
Applicable to physical and abstract objects. The most significant example
of abstract systems we might want to analyse are software based ones, and the use
of the Functional Interpretation Language for the design analysis of such systems
was discussed in Section 11.3. The language can be used for the description of
abstract systems, with the proviso that such systems must (assuming the language
is used for its intended purpose of the interpretation of simulation) be capable
of being simulated in terms that are applicable to the language. This implies
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the presence of triggering inputs and outputs to and from the system that can
be associated with the triggers and effects of the system’s function. It seems
reasonable to suggest that this is an appropriate model for analysis of software
based systems (such as programmable electronic control units). The language
could be used to describe such abstract systems as elements in a work plan (such
as specifying the triggering inputs and effects of individual work packages) but
this has not been explored and the usefulness of the language in this area has not
been established.
Independent of the system. This is a significant difference between the Func-
tional Interpretation language as presented here and the functional labelling ap-
proach from which it is derived. In the functional labelling approach in (Price,
1998), the functional description is attached to an known property of a compo-
nent of the system to be analysed. Therefore, the functional model could not be
built independently of the system with which it was associated. The use of labels
for the trigger and effect of a function, that are then mapped to the appropriate
system properties, does allow a system’s functional model to be constructed inde-
pendently of the system. One advantage of this is the possibility it introduces of
building a functional model of an intended system before the system itself is de-
signed, allowing the functional model to specify the functionality that the system
is to embody and allowing the system to be tested (in simulation) against this
specified behaviour. The functional model can therefore be regarded as represent-
ing the system’s functional requirements. This is arguably the most significant
improvement over the earlier work.
Capable of specifying expected behaviour to arbitrary level of precision.
While the functional hierarchy used in the functional labelling approach, as de-
scribed in (Snooke & Price, 1998), allows a system function to be described with
precision, the use of both triggers and labels for functions and effects encourages a
greater degree of precision in describing a system function. This was discussed in
Chapter 5. The simple torch example used in that discussion serves to illustrate
the advantage of the present approach, illustrated by the example of the use of
the language in specifying the need for a trigger for flashing the torch. It is also
suggested that the use of labels to allow decomposition of functions in terms of
effects as well as in terms of subsidiary functions is valuable in constructing a
precise functional description.
The list of requirements above includes two of the three requirements of a func-
tional modelling language in (Chandrasekaran & Josephson, 1996) and it seems
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worth at least mentioning the remaining one, that the language be applicable to
natural and man made systems. As was argued in Chapter 5 this was felt not
to be important in a language intended for design analysis of man made systems
and there is arguably a difficulty over considering the behaviour of some natural
systems in terms of purpose. However, it does seem possible that, given that a
system can be described in terms of fulfilling a purpose, the Functional Interpre-
tation Language might be useful for modelling natural systems. For example, it
would be quite feasible to use the language to describe the function of an organ
(such as the heart), but given the problems of any notion of purpose introduces, it
is perhaps inappropriate for describing natural ecosystems. It could conceivably
be used to describe biological systems resulting from human use of land, where
the notion of purpose is less difficult. This has not been explored, however.
As was stated in the introduction to this thesis, the original motivation for the
development of the Functional Interpretation Language was to increase the range
of systems for which the functional labelling approach to model based design
analysis can be applied. The modelling of the four classes of system behaviour
concerned was discussed in Chapters 6 to 10 and how these features of the language
might be used in practice was discussed in Chapter 11. The importance of this
work in motivation of the research herein suggests that it is worth a brief recap of
these features and their use in this concluding chapter. There are four classes of
system behaviour that it was felt the language should be capable of describing.
Systems where a function might be partially achieved. Unlike the ap-
proach to hierarchical functional modelling described in (Snooke & Price, 1998),
the Functional Interpretation Language draws a distinction between a function’s
effects and subsidiary functions. This allows the language to differentiate cases
where the presence of one of two (or more) effects can be regarded as partial
achievement of a function from cases where the function depends on all effects
being present, as discussed in Chapter 6, where these cases were illustrated using
small examples. The flexibility of this use of subsidiary function is increased by
the introduction of “incomplete functions” so that common parts of a functional
hierarchy need no repetition. This was illustrated in Chapter 7. Therefore the
language allows cases where a function is partially achieved to be distinguished,
where this distinction is appropriate. The examples used in those earlier chapters
(the headlamp system against the warning system) illustrate this distinction. This
was further explored in the full case study in Chapter 11 in which one of the visual
and audible outputs occurring despite the loss of the other could be regarded as
mitigating the loss of the warning function.
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Systems whose functionality depends on intermittent or sequential ef-
fects. This is, perhaps, the most apparent addition to previous functional de-
scription languages. The addition of sequential operators (similar to the future
operators in temporal logic) introduces the possibility of functional description of
a range of systems that could not be so described previously. This was discussed
in Chapter 8, which included examples of such systems and the use of these op-
erators was also explored in the case study in Chapter 11. As has been noted,
the fact that the system described in that chapter could not be modelled with the
earlier language was a trigger for the present research. The use of the sequential
operators allows more precise description of the temporally complex behaviour
to be expected of software based systems and the increasing use of such systems
embedded in many products enables a valuable increase in the range of systems
the language can describe, relative to earlier functional description languages.
Systems where there is a danger of the required effects being achieved
in an untimely manner. This feature of the Functional Interpretation Lan-
guage clearly relates to the sequential outputs summarised above. The use of
temporal constraints to specify the timing of the sequence of the chimer in the
seat belt warning system was illustrated in Chapter 11. The distinction between
the untimely achievement of a function (as opposed to its unexpected achieve-
ment) and its failure was discussed and illustrated in Chapter 9. The possibility
of such untimely achievement of a function is increased by the increasing inter-
relationships between system functions. One example of this is where functions
depend on competition for access to a CSMA-CD network (such as CANbus) so
that network messages are delayed by the network being occupied by the mes-
sages associated with some other (arguably higher priority) function. The use of
these temporal constraints allows such cases of late achievement of a function to
be recognised and differentiated from failure of the function.
Systems with subsidiary functions whose achievement depends on the
state of some other system function. The inclusion of the trigger as the pre-
condition of a function introduces the possibility of the post-conditions (effects)
of a function being used as the precondition (trigger) of some other function, so
that the idea that one function depends on the state of another can readily be
described. This allows the description of the different categories of function that
depend on some other function that were discussed in Chapter 10. The set of tell-
tale and warning functions described therein is complete (given their dependence
on inputs and outputs rather than internal behaviour), but the fault tolerant func-
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tions set cannot be so described as the nature of that set depends on the behaviour
associated with the fault tolerant function. There is also the recharging function
that was illustrated by the camera example in Chapter 11. A functional language
that does not include the trigger cannot describe such functional dependencies.
An effect of this limitation is that such a functional language cannot describe the
failure of such a function. The failure of a telltale lamp, for example, cannot
be described, because the language fails to unambiguously define that function’s
trigger. The inclusion of the trigger in the Functional Interpretation Language
eliminates this shortcoming.
These summaries have been kept brief, as these features and uses of the language
were discussed in the chapters indicated. It is felt that any further description of
this material in this conclusion is somewhat repetitious and therefore superfluous.
The fact that the Functional Interpretation Language can be used to describe the
functions of systems with the above characteristics demonstrates that the language
increases the range of system that can be modelled for design analysis, relative
to the earlier functional labelling approach. In addition, the incorporation of a
function’s trigger and the use of labels for the function’s trigger and effect, so that
the functional model can be built independently of the system model, increase
the range of tasks for which the language is applicable, as well as encouraging the
closer integration of functional modelling and simulation into the design process.
Because the language depends upon a simulation, rather than being a self con-
tained model of the system, it cannot be proved that the language can be applied
to systems of arbitrary complexity. However, the language’s consistency and the
inclusion of temporal operators suggest that the limitation on complexity is more
likely to be set by the complexity of the models than any inherent shortcomings
with the language. The examples used in this thesis demonstrate that the Func-
tional Interpretation Language can be used to describe the functions of systems
whose behaviour was beyond the capabilities of the earlier language. This enables
the simulation of such systems to be interpreted in terms of the system’s purpose
and so allows the automatic generation of design analysis reports both for design
verification and for failure analysis of a wide variety of engineered systems, most
particularly for software based systems.
12.2 Future work
Some possible areas for future work based on the present research were outlined
in earlier chapters. It seems worth reprising these to summarise different ways in
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which this research might be carried forward.
One difficulty with the present state of this research is the additional require-
ments on the simulation side of a model based design analysis tool. The Func-
tional Interpretation language would support the design analysis of systems whose
behaviour is beyond the capabilities of the implementation of an associated simu-
lation engine. As was suggested in the section on the relationship with the simula-
tion engine, Section 11.4, there is no intrinsic difficulty with building a simulation
engine that fulfils the requirements that the Functional Interpretation Language
places on that side of the design analysis tool. Indeed the approach to simulation
used in AutoSteve, mixing a domain based simulator with state based component
simulation, offers the possibility of a generating a sufficiently sophisticated de-
scription of a system’s behaviour, but there is a need for an implementation of
such a simulation engine that fulfils this potential.
An interesting possibility for simulation (or behavioural modelling) that might be
used in conjunction with the Functional Interpretation Language is in the field of
software design analysis. The approach to software modelling, based on tracing the
possible paths of errors in variables that was introduced in (Snooke, 2004) seems to
be a promising approach to model based design analysis of software systems. The
basis for the system model (which forms the basis of the behavioural analysis) is,
of course, the source code. There have been some encouraging early results using
the Functional Interpretation Language to interpret this software modelling for
generating FMEA of software. The modelling of software (especially of embedded
software) looks a promising application area for this language, with its capabilities
of describing the sort of complex behaviour that software can introduce into a
system.
A possibly related area of future investigation is the use of the langauge in in-
terpretation for explanation generation in education and training. As was briefly
discussed in Section 11.2.3, this might be found useful in assessing and explaining
the effects of errors in student programming exercises. This introduces a possible
rôle for the language in education, by using it to enrich explanation of the work-
ings of some system. There is possible scope for investigation of this use of the
language in explanation generation relating to physical (and biological) systems,
and possibly in interpretation of the results of exercises in modelling social and
economic systems.
On a more speculative level, the possibility of using the Functional Interpreta-
tion Language for supporting the design process itself, although not a primary
motivation of its development, does look an interesting area. One particular area
that looks worth investigation is the possibility of using the language as a means
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of specifying the functional requirements of a design, against which a candidate
system design can be analysed by simulation, as the possibility exists of auto-
matically comparing the system’s behaviour (as simulated) with the functional
requirements. This does have the advantage of incorporating the simulation of
the system more closely in the design process, encouraging the early and frequent
carrying out of the sort of safety analyses the functional language is intended to
help automate.
It is worth noting that all the examples in this thesis have been modelled using
a component centred ontology, indeed most approaches to functional description,
at least for design analysis, seem to use that ontology. In the case of the present
approach, as in the earlier functional labelling approach of (Price, 1998), system
functions are associated with the inputs and outputs, or states, of specific com-
ponents. This is an intuitive approach to use for the analysis of system design, in
that it models the system as an assembly of components. However, one possible
area of interest for future work might be to evaluate the use of the Functional
Interpretation Language in relation to process centred simulation. While this is
speculative at this stage, there do not seem to be any intrinsic difficulties with
associating the trigger or effect of a system function with the state of a process
rather than that of a component. One difference is that while physical components
are invariably present in the system, even if they are idle, processes might appear
and disappear during the course of a simulation. It remains to be seen whether
this would lead to problems with associating a function with a process. One other
question that arises is what properties a process has that can be associated with
the trigger and effect conditions of a function.
A final possibility for future research, arguably the only one that involves al-
tering the functional language itself is the investigation of whether the functional
language can be used for supporting the design process by enabling the functional
refinement of a system design. As the Functional Interpretation Language is not
intended for the description of component function, it does not look ideally suited
for this task, especially as the language does not represent the connection between
components. While this is not an intended rôle of the language, the possibility
that the langauge might be extended to allow its use for this task is a possible
area for investigation.
To summarise, while the Functional Interpretation Language cannot be proved to
support the functional description of systems of arbitrary behavioural complexity
for automation of design analysis, it does succeed in increasing both the range of
systems and range of design analysis tasks for which the approach is available.
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Appendix A
Formal description of the
Functional Interpretation
Language
This appendix contains a formal description of the Functional Interpretation Lan-
guage. It will therefore act as a key to the examples in the text of the thesis as well
as providing a summary of the language’s logical basis. There is little explanation
herein, as that is in the text of the thesis.
A.1 Elements of the language
Let f be some device function. It is associated with a trigger t and an effect e
where t and e are Boolean expressions. The trigger and effect expressions are
mapped to appropriate properties (such as the states of relevant components) in
the system’s structural and behavioural model. In addition, f is associated with
a description of purpose pf that in turn includes a description of consequences of
failure to achieve the function, cf and may optionally incorporate a description
of consequences of unexpected achievement of the function’s effect uf . It is these
descriptions of consequences that will appear in an automatically generated design
analysis report. This is annotated as R (for report) so that where a design analysis
report will include the consequences of failure of f , this is indicated by R(cf ). The
term “includes” is used to indicate that a function is associated with an optional
element.
Each element n in an effect expression is associated with a description of con-
sequences of unexpected achievement of that individual effect un. To illustrate,
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where a function depends on the effect a∧b, there will be unexpected consequences
ua and ub.
A.2 States of device functions
As a device function f depends on two Boolean expressions, it can be in one of
four states. These are termed inactive, In(f); failed, Fa(f); unexpected, Un(f) and
achieved, Ac(f). These are defined in terms of the trigger and effect expressions
as follows.
In(f) ⇔ ¬t ∧ ¬e (A.1)
Fa(f) ⇔ t ∧ ¬e (A.2)
Un(f) ⇔ ¬t ∧ e (A.3)
Ac(f) ⇔ t ∧ e (A.4)
These are numbered 5.1 to 5.4 in Section 5.2. Additionally, the states triggered,
Tr(f) and effective, (f) are defined in terms of the device function’s trigger and
effect respectively.
Tr(f) ⇔ t ⇔ t ∧ (e ∨ ¬e) (A.5)
Ef(f) ⇔ e ⇔ e ∧ (t ∨ ¬t) (A.6)
These are numbered 5.5 and 5.6 in Section 5.2. Notice that the state of a function
can be defined in terms of these states, as follows.
In(f) ⇔ ¬Tr(f) ∧ ¬Ef(f) (A.7)
Fa(f) ⇔ Tr(f) ∧ ¬Ef(f) (A.8)
Un(f) ⇔ ¬Tr(f) ∧ Ef(f) (A.9)
Ac(f) ⇔ Tr(f) ∧ Ef(f) (A.10)
These are equivalent to the definitions above and are numbered 5.7 to 5.10 in
Section 5.2.
The design analysis report will include a reference to the state of any device
function f that is failed or unexpected but not to a function that is inoperative
or achieved.
R(f) if Fa(f) ∨ Un(f) (A.11)
It will also include a reference to the state of any individual effect e that is not
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consistent with the expected state of the associated device function.
R(e) if (Tr(f) ∧ ¬e) ∨ (¬Tr(f) ∧ e) (A.12)
These are numbered 5.11 and 5.12. in Section 5.7. Here an effect is taken to be
any element of a Boolean expression that describes a function’s required effects,
so a design analysis report will include a reference to some absent or unexpected
effect even where this does not amount to loss of a device function. In addition,
the design analysis report will include consequences of failure of the function f
and of unexpected achievement of the function or of an effect e as follows.
R(cf ) if Fa(f) and if (f includes cf ) (A.13)
This is numbered 7.5 in Section 7.2.
R(uf ) if Un(f) and if (f includes uf ) (A.14)
This is numbered 6.2 in Section 6.2.3. In rule A.13, the includes condition is
required because the failed function might be an Operational Incomplete Function
without its own consequences of failure, as described in Section 7.2. Where an
effect e is achieved unexpectedly without unexpectedly achieving a function, or
where a function has no unexpected consequences of its own, we can report ue the
consequences of the unexpected achievement of e.
R(ue) if (¬Tr(f) ∧ e) ∧ (¬Un(f) ∨ ¬(f includes uf )) (A.15)
A.3 Subsidiary functions
Let f be a function composed of subsidiary functions a and b. These subsidiary
functions are related using any Boolean operator ⊗, so f is composed of a⊗ b. It
will also be associated with a description of purpose. The rule used for resolving
the state of f is
Tr(f) if Tr(a) ⊗ Tr(b) (A.16)
Ef(f) if Ef(a) ⊗ Ef(b) (A.17)
These are 6.3 and 6.4 in Section 6.3. This allows the state of f to be defined in
terms of its being triggered and effective, following rules A.7 to A.10. In other
words, the trigger of f can be regarded as the combination of the triggers of a and
b and the effect of f as the combination of the effects of a and b and those triggers
277
and effects are combined using the operator in the functional decomposition. This
does restrict the use of subsidiary functions to cases where their trigger and effect
expressions share an operator The use of incomplete functions, described below,
circumvents this restriction.
The reporting of failure or unexpected achievement of functions follows rules A.11
and A.12 above. There are different rules for reporting the consequences of failure
of functions. Let cf be the consequences of failure of f and ca and cb be those of a
and b respectively. The first rule is used if the subsidiary functions are combined
using AND or OR. In these cases, if one but not both of the subsidiary function fails,
the consequences of the failure of that subsidiary function are included, regardless
of the state of the top function.
R(cf ) if and only if Fa(a) ∧ Fa(b) (A.18)
R(ca) if Fa(a) ∧ ¬Fa(b) (A.19)
These rules are inappropriate where the subsidiary device functions are combined
using XOR and the opposite approach has to be taken.
R(cf ) if (Fa(a) ∧ ¬Fa(b)) ∨ (¬Fa(a) ∧ Fa(b)) (A.20)
These are numbered 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 in Section 6.3. The reporting of consequences
of unexpected achievement of a function (or effect) follow rules A.14 and A.15
above.
Where Purposive Incomplete Functions (PIFs) are used, so a device function
f is composed of a trigger t and subsidiary PIFs combined using some Boolean
operator ⊗, p⊗ q, then all these device functions will share the same value for the
trigger and the state of f will depend on the truth of the effects of p and q.
In(f) ⇔ ¬Tr(f) ∧ ¬(Ef(p) ⊗ Ef(q)) (A.21)
Fa(f) ⇔ Tr(f) ∧ ¬(Ef(p) ⊗ Ef(q)) (A.22)
Un(f) ⇔ ¬Tr(f) ∧ (Ef(p) ⊗ Ef(q)) (A.23)
Ac(f) ⇔ Tr(f) ∧ (Ef(p) ⊗ Ef(q)) (A.24)
These are numbered 7.1 to 7.4 in Section 7.1. Note that these rules do not duplicate
simply mapping a given trigger to two subsidiary functions a and b as if device
function f is composed of a ⊕ b the trigger of both a and b will be true whenever
either is triggered, so from rule A.16, f will never be triggered as it will never be
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the case that only one of a and b will be triggered..
The rules for decomposition of a device function composed of Operational Incom-
plete Functions (OIFs) follows those for decomposition of a function composed of
(complete) subsidiary functions. As an OIF has no description of purpose, and so
no consequences of failure, the consequences of any OIF being in the failed state
must be described in terms of the state of the function of which it is a component.
This accounts for the ”includes” condition in rule A.13 above.
The rules for Triggered Incomplete Functions (TIFs) are similar but the TIFs
take the place of elements of the trigger expression of device function f . Let device
function f be composed of TIFs t ⊗ u and an effect e.
In(f) ⇔ ¬(Tr(s) ⊗ Tr(u)) ∧ ¬Ef(f) (A.25)
Fa(f) ⇔ (Tr(s) ⊗ Tr(u)) ∧ ¬Ef(f) (A.26)
Un(f) ⇔ ¬(Tr(s) ⊗ Tr(u)) ∧ Ef(f) (A.27)
Ac(f) ⇔ (Tr(s) ⊗ Tr(u)) ∧ Ef(f) (A.28)
These rules are numbered 7.6 to 7.9 in Section 7.3. Note that these rules cannot
be matched by sharing an effect between complete subsidiary functions as if one
subsidiary function is effective, so will the other be so if the device function f is
composed of a ⊕ b, it will never be effective as it will never be the case that only
one of a and b will be effective.
The rules for reporting of PIFs and TIFs follow those for reporting subsidiary
functions, rules A.11 and A.12, and the rules for reporting of consequences of
failure follow A.18, A.19 and A.20.
A.4 Sequential operators
To allow the description of functions that depend upon a sequence of effects the
Functional Interpretation Language includes two sequential operators, SEQ and
L-SEQ. These depend on a model of time that consists of intervals bounded by
instants, as proposed in (Galton, 1990). Parts of the notation from that paper
are used in this description. This model of time is consistent with the use of state
charts to describe behaviour of a system or its components.
The sequence operator SEQ is true if the state described after the operator
holds immediately after the present state of the system (defined in terms of the
properties described in the functional description) ceases to hold. This can be
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described using notation from (Galton, 1990). Let I1 be an interval such that
condition a holds throughout the interval, HOLDS AT(a, I1), as Galton notates
it, and I2 be an interval such that HOLDS AT(b, I2). Then,
a SEQ b if HOLDS AT(a, I1) ∧ HOLDS AT(b, I2) ∧ MEETS(I1, I2) (A.29)
Where MEETS follows the definition in (Allen, 1984),that the interval I2 follows
the interval I1 with no interval separating them. The state preceding the first
use of SEQ (or L-SEQ) in a functional description will not be defined as this
will be the system state that was in effect before the triggering of that function.
This state will not be known at model building time as a function might have
alternative triggers, depending on the preceding system state, or the initial state
might be affected by failure of some other function and so specification of the initial
condition for some function would mean that failure of some preceding function
would inevitably result in failure of the present function. SEQ is therefore treated
as a unary operator, similar to the N (next time step) operator in Computational
Tree Logic (CTL) (Emerson & Halpern, 1985).
The loose sequence operator L-SEQ is true if the state described after the oper-
ator holds some time after the present state of the system ceases to hold. That is
to say that there can be an interval separating the described states. During this
intervening interval the state of the described elements of the functional model is
not defined. L-SEQ is similar to the F (some time in the future) operator in CTL
and tense logic (Prior, 1957). It differs from SEQ in that the intervals when the
states hold need not meet, as long as the second one follows the first eventually.
It can be defined using Galton’s HOLDS IN operator, which is true if the state
is present some of the time during some interval. So if I1 is an interval such that
HOLDS IN(a, I1) and I2 an interval such that HOLDS IN(b, I2), then
a L-SEQ b if HOLDS IN(a, I1) ∧ HOLDS IN(b, I2) ∧ MEETS(I1, I2) (A.30)
As discussed in Chapter 8, this means the state of the system is undefined during
some intermediate interval. L-SEQ has therefore to be used with some caution
and can be replaced by a sequence of SEQ states so the intermediate states are
defined.
Where SEQ (or L-SEQ) is used to combine subsidiary functions, rules A.16 and
A.17 still hold.
The CYCLE and NEW-CYCLE operators and temporal constraints (BEFORE
and AFTER) are not really susceptible to formal description. Informal definitions
of these appear in Appendix B.
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Appendix B
Notation used for functional
description
This appendix contains a brief summary of the textual notation used for the
Functional Interpretation Language described in this work, and as used throughout
the thesis. The conventions used herein are also described.
B.1 The language
Here, the keywords used in the Functional Interpretation Language, together with
those of the associated external descriptions, are listed, grouped according to their
use.
B.1.1 Labels
This lists the keywords used to label different models and the components of these
models.
ACHIEVES Used in a functional description to label the purpose that function
fulfils, indicates the description of purpose.
BY Used to label the recogniser for a function, separating the recogniser from the
ACHIEVES clause.
FUNCTION Used to label a functional description, as opposed to either an incom-
plete function or a description of purpose.
OIF Labels an “operational incomplete function”, one that is a mapping between
trigger and effect, with no distinct purpose.
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PIF Labels a “purposive incomplete function”, one that maps between an ef-
fect and a purpose, but shares a trigger with other elements of a top level
function.
PURPOSE Labels a description of purpose (teleological model).
TIF Labels a “triggered incomplete function”, that is one that maps a trigger to
a purpose, allowing representations of functions that share an effect, whose
purpose is defined by the trigger.
B.1.2 Operators
The conventional logical operators are used, with their usual meanings, so are not
listed here.
CYCLE Indicates the start of a cyclical sequence of states that will continue until
some event causes the cycle to be broken.
L-SEQ The system should enter the state following the operator at some time
after the preceding state, as opposed to immediately after.
NEW-CYCLE Marks the end of a cycle. On reaching this, the function is expected
to return to the state described after the corresponding CYCLE.
SEQ The system should enter for following the state immediately after the pre-
ceding state, so all expected effects should start simultaneously.
TRIGGERS Relates the (preceding) trigger expression to the effect expression of a
function. The function is said to be achieved if both are true.
B.1.3 Functional states and relations
The four possible functional states are defined in terms of the truth of a function’s
trigger and effect, as discussed in Section 5.2. They are:-
INOPERATIVE A function’s trigger and effect are both false, so the function is
uncalled for.
ACHIEVED A function’s trigger and effect are both true, so the function is achieved
correctly and its purpose is being fulfilled.
FAILED A function’s trigger is true but its effect is false, so the function is failing
to fulfil its purpose even though it should be.
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UNEXPECTED A function’s trigger is false but its effect is true, so the effect is
unnecessary.
It will be seen that the first two of these states are consistent with correct behaviour
of the system, the other two are not. In addition to these states, two ‘partial states’
are defined, useful in specifying dependencies between functions. These are:-
TRIGGERED Simply means a function’s trigger is true, so is equivalent to achieved
OR failed.
EFFECTIVE A function’s effect is true, so this is equivalent to achieved OR unex-
pected.
As all these states trace are defined in terms of truth of trigger and / or effect,
there is no ambiguity.
B.1.4 Temporal constraints
These are used to specify that the expression to which the temporal constraint
applies must be achieved within the specified time, measured from the preceding
effective state (starting, typically) with the trigger becoming true).
AFTER Used to label the time before which the associated state should not become
true, so specifies a minimum delay.
BEFORE Used to specify a time before which the associated state should become
true, so specifies a deadline.
B.1.5 Other keywords
These include the items included in a description of purpose and / or the mapping
between a functional description and the system model.
DESCRIPTION Labels the description of some purpose with which a function is
associated.
DETECTION The value from 1 to 10 given for the likelihood that a function’s failure
or an unexpected effect will be noticed.
FAILURE_CONSEQUENCE Labels the description of the consequences of failure to
fulfil the purpose with which the label is associated.
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IMPLEMENTS Shows the mapping between a system property and the functional
element (trigger or effect) with which it is associated.
SEVERITY The value from 1 to 10 given to show the seriousness of the conse-
quences of a failure to achieve some purpose or of an unexpected effect.
UNEXPECTED_CONSEQUENCE Labels the textual description of the consequence of
some effect (or function) being achieved unexpectedly.
B.2 Conventions used in this thesis
In the thesis, all quotations of or from a functional description, or other aspect
of the Functional Interpretation Language, have been indicated by the use of
a fixed width font. In addition, key words (including the conventional logic
operators) have been placed in block capitals.
Text for quoting in a design analysis report, typically the consequences part of a
description of purpose, are in quotation marks, in the same way as a string literal
in a programming language. It is assumed that these quotes would not be part




Common elements of diagrams
As there are several similar diagrams, it was felt worth including a key to the
symbols and elements common to these diagrams.
The symbols used in the model relationship diagrams used in comparing ap-






model that must be generated by user, explicitly represented
model generated by user, no explicit representation (an implicitly required model)
automatically generated model
model relationship provided by user
model relationship provided by system
(in both these cases, arrow head indicate direction of relationship)
domain
theory model provided by reasoning engine
subsystem
function additional model that user might choose to generate
Figure C.1: Common symbols in the model relationship diagrams
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description of purpose - to include failure consequences, severity, detection
triplet of unexpected consequences, severity, detection
function
incomplete function
purposive incomplete function, mapping between effect and purpose
operational incomplete function, mapping between trigger and effect
mapping to external model component







label for mapping between function and purpose
label of mapping between component property and function it implements
relationship between parts of a single description
TIF triggered incomplete function, mapping between trigger and effect
Figure C.2: Common symbols in the function composition diagrams
The symbols used in the diagrams used in Chapter 6, to illustrate functional
decomposition are shown in Figure C.2. It should be noted that these diagrams
are not intended to constitute a formal visual notation, they are simply intended
to illustrate features of the language.
In these diagrams, an attempt has been made to arrange components as con-
sistently as possible with the layout of the model relationship diagrams, so the
description of purpose is shown to the right and mappings between the system
model and the functional model to the left. While a simple functional decom-
position (in terms of triggers and effects) is shown using plain lines, arrows are
used to indicate that subsidiary functions (whether complete of incomplete) will
be separate models, available for reuse independently of the present top level func-
tion. Any items at either end of an arrow are (or can be considered to be) separate
parts of the model, stored independently. Naturally, whether or not this is actually
the case might depend on the user’s choice between reusability of models against
the resulting complication of the model library. How this storage is managed is
also dependent on the implementation. It might be done with a file hierarchy as






This appendix describes the notation used in the tables that illustrate the rela-
tionship between the logical basis of the functional language and the generated
text in a resulting design analysis report, and especially to illustrate the func-
tional decompositions. Tables using this notation appear in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.
Because of their appearance in different places of the thesis and to avoid breaking
up the text around the earlier appearances of such tables, it was decided to place
a detailed description of them here, for reference.































Function C2 failed because expected
effect e2 absent
Function C2 achieved unexpectedly
because unexpected effect 2 present
Function F achieved unexpectedly
























Table D.1: Example functional decomposition table
rows from Table 6.2 in Chapter 6. In the headings, “state” has been used to label
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the functional state of a function as shown in Table 5.1 on page 92. those columns
can therefore have any of the four values:-
Inoperative (In) Both trigger and effect are false, so function is uncalled for
and (correctly) not achieved.
Achieved (Ac) Both trigger and effect are true and function is achieved as ex-
pected (though possibly as a result of unexpected internal behaviour).
Failed (Fa) Trigger is true but effect false, so triggering the function has not
resulted in the expected effect.
Unexpected (Un) Trigger is false but effect true, so the effect is present despite
being uncalled for.
As these values are defined in terms of the truth of trigger and effect, including
the values of trigger, effect and state for the subsidiary functions (C1 and C2 ) is
tautologous. It was felt that the full description would clarify the relationships
between triggers, effects and states in the decompositions, however.
The heading for trigger is abbreviated to ‘t’ and for effect to ‘e’. Where a specific
trigger or effect might appear in the resulting design analysis report (shown in the
generated text column), it has been italicised and where necessary identified with
a suffix, so e1 is the effect associated with the first child function. Function names
(that might also appear in a resulting report) are similarly italicised, but are in
capitals.
As triggers and effects are Boolean expressions, they have the values true (T)
or false (F). It is to reduce the likelihood of confusion with the value ‘false’ that
‘failed’ is abbreviated to Fa and this has led to the use of two letter abbreviations
for the other functional states throughout the thesis.
The layout of this side of the tables showing purposive incomplete functions
(PIFs) is slightly different, as shown in Table D.2. Here the trigger is common to
the top level function (called F ) and both of the subsidiary PIFs. Each PIF has
columns for its effect and state. There is a column for the effect expression of the
top level function, derived from the effects of the PIFs, labelled eF, and one for its
state. The top level function is labelled with the relation between its subsidiary
PIFs in the header.
The entry in the “generated text” column is a brief example of what might appear
in the resulting report, using the names identified in the table headings. It might,
of course, be the case that the actual text is more detailed than appears here, so




















Function P1 achieved unexpectedly because
unexpected effect e1 present
Function F achieved unexpectedly because















Table D.2: Example of decomposition using PIFs
Function F achieved unexpectedly because function C1 achieved un-
expectedly because unexpected effect e1 was present and function C2
achieved unexpectedly because unexpected effect e2 was present.
In these tables, the functional labels have been used, but it would be feasible to
use the linked system properties, traced from the mappings between functional
and system models, in a design analysis report.
The consequences are assumed to be a set of textual description, value for severity
and value for detection, associated with a function’s description of purpose (though
here simply associated with the function itself) or with an effect. This should be
associated with the mapping between the effect and the system model, of course,
but the functional labels themselves are used in the tables, for simplicity. The entry
Fa(C2 ) means the consequences associated with the failure of (the description
of purpose associated with) function C2. As a description of purpose might or
might not have unexpected consequences, this raises the possibility of alternative
consequences associated with unexpected achievement of a function’s effect(s).
For example, in the fourth line of Table D.1, “U(C2 ) or U(e2 )” means that if
there are unexpected consequences associated with C2 include them, if not use
the (required) ones for the effect e2. These might differ, of course, as C2 might
have several effects combined using a Boolean expression.
Where there are several possible failures whose consequences might be listed,
different approaches are possible, as discussed in the text. In the tables it is
assumed that the more severe of the consequences are listed, indicated by ‘max’.
In practice, this is more complex than the tables suggest, because the consequences
with the higher value for severity will be used (unless both are listed in the report,
of course) but it is arguably more appropriate to use the lower value for detection,
as this shows how likely the fault will be noticed by the operator, and which
might not belong to the same set of consequences. In the tables the columns for
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consequences, severity and detection, as illustrated in Table 5.2 on page 110, are




Behavioural knowledge Knowledge of what happens within a device.
Dependent function Any function that depends on the state of some other system
function for its trigger.
Detection A value between 1 and 10 indicating the likelihood that some failure
will be detected before any consequences arise.
FMEA Failure Mode Effects Analysis, a design analysis that establishes the effects
on a system of failures to components in that system.
FTA Fault Tree Analysis, a design analysis in which the result is a report that
relates effects (symptoms) back to candidate causes.
Functional (design) analysis A term used to group those design analysis tasks that
are concerned with whether a system fulfils its intended function, either
when working correctly or under a component failure.
Functional description A representation of an individual function of a system that
achieves one of the system’s intended purposes.
Functional knowledge Knowledge of how a device achieves its purpose. More for-
mally defined as
An object O has a function F if it achieves an intended goal by
virtue of some external trigger T resulting in the achievement of
an external effect E.
Functional model The collection of one or more functional descriptions associated
with some system.
Occurrence A value between 1 and 10 indicating the likelihood of the cause of
some failure.
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Ontology The nature of the model used as the basis for model based reasoning.
Typically concerned with whether the model is built using knowledge of
components, processes or constraints.
Operational incomplete function A representation of a function that only repre-
sents the relation between trigger and effect. It should only be used as
part of a functional decomposition to ensure triggers are associated with
the appropriate effects.
Prime function Some function that fulfils a purpose of the system. Used specifi-
cally to refer to a function upon which some other function depends.
Purposive incomplete function A representation of function that only represents
the mapping between effect and purpose. It should only be used as part of
a functional decomposition.
Risk Priority Number (RPN) A value indicating the seriousness of a system fail-
ure and therefore how much priority should be given to eliminating the
failure. It is the product of values for severity, detection and occurrence.
SCA Sneak Circuit Analysis, an electrical design analysis that ensures that no
unexpected effects occur as a result of combinations of switch settings.
Severity A value between 1 and 10 indicating the seriousness of consequence of
some failure.
Structural knowledge Knowledge of the components (or processes) that make up
a device and the connections between them.
Teleological knowledge Knowledge of the purpose of a device. In the represen-
tation of function proposed herein, it includes a description of the conse-
quences of a function’s failure to achieve the purpose.
Triggered incomplete function A representation of function that relates a trigger
to its intended purpose. It is used where an effect is common to several
triggers, which determine the purpose of achieving the effect.
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